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Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman**

**Political Technologies
of Information War:
Domestic and World Aspects**

Monograph

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The scientific publication is devoted to the theoretical and applied aspects of
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dimension of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and ways to counter these challenges.

For researchers, students and anyone interested in politics and political science.

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МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ
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Політичні технології
інформаційної війни:
внутрішній та світовий аспекти

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INTRODUCTION

In academic circles and among the general Ukrainian public, the debate continues as to whether the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war began in 2014 or much earlier. The only thing that scholars, journalists, and everyone involved in the public discourse agree on is the statement about the hybrid nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This monographic study offers the author's view on the information dimension of hybrid aggression against Ukraine.

The authors focus in particular on the role of social media as an instrument of information warfare, in particular, for the purpose of achieving propaganda goals on the example of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Based on the analysis of statistical data on the audience of social networks, using media materials and expert opinions, the authors examine the potential of social networks for spreading propaganda, disinformation and manipulating mass consciousness.

A separate section is devoted to the analysis of political manipulation as a component of political communication in the context of information warfare. The technologies and techniques of political manipulation as an effective communication tool in the context of the current Russian-Ukrainian war, which is hybrid and multidimensional, are highlighted. The authors highlight the impact of political manipulation on the quality of political communication in Ukrainian society, in particular in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The author analyses separately information technologies, which are not only a communication channel and technological models, but which, in combination with the global expansion of the information space, influence the formation of new and change of old traditions, values and forms of behaviour. Thus, public opinion plays a significant role in the development of a democratic political system.

The role and place of suggestion in information warfare is the subject of a separate author's study. Suggestion is a powerful tool for influencing the consciousness and subconscious of a person and society. That is why suggestive technologies play a leading role in information warfare. Information warfare involves measures to influence people's minds in the ideological and emotional spheres. Knowledge of suggestive practices is important because the cognitive dimension of information warfare is based on knowledge of the opponent's thinking.

The study of Russian imperial narratives, which are an effective tool of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war, is based on the author's conviction that the Russian-Ukrainian war should be viewed as a

conflict of worldviews and values, a struggle of identities and historical memories. It is emphasised that imperial narratives have been tools of Russian propaganda for several centuries, aimed at both the direct and/or symbolic enemy and other people not directly involved in the existential struggle.

The analysis of the peculiarities of the Ukrainian institutional system related to information policy, its capabilities and weaknesses in countering information warfare is due to the great hidden influence of propaganda on military operations in Ukraine through changing values and consciousness of people. The main topics of discussion are the evolution of information policy institutions, their development, effectiveness and weaknesses in countering information warfare. In general, threats to information security are the lack of preventive measures, insufficient attention to civic education, development of patriotism, active citizenship, democratic values and principles. In such circumstances, a broad understanding of the institutional system is a means of countering information warfare.

Svitlana Bulbeniuk

FROM THE AUTHOR'S TEAM

The monograph was prepared on the basis of the Department of Political Technologies of the Kyiv National Economic University named after V. Hetman. The authors of this monograph are representatives of Ukrainian universities from Kyiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia. Each chapter (article) is a complete author's research.

The spelling of geographical names and proper names related to the aggressor state and its leaders is the author's own, so it is not unified in the monograph. This remark is important, as there is no consensus in Ukrainian academic circles on this issue.

The authors are open to discussion of the author's positions presented in the monograph.

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SOCIAL NETWORKS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Abstract.

The paper focuses on the study of the role of social networks as an instrument of information warfare. The research relevance lies in the growing role of social media in modern information wars, which made it possible to analyze the possibilities of using social media for propaganda purposes on the example of the russian-Ukrainian war. The aim is to study social media as means of conducting information warfare, to identify key technologies and tools, and to assess the effectiveness of their use by different parties to the war. Methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison for studying the phenomenon of social networks and their role in information wars are applied in the paper.

The authors analyze the dynamics of social networks and their transformation into a popular source of news for millions of users. It is determined that Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, and TikTok are the most influential platforms both in the world and in Ukraine. Statistical data on the audience of social networks are analyzed, using media materials and expert opinions. The possibilities of social networks for spreading propaganda, disinformation and manipulation of mass consciousness are investigated. The authors analyze russia's use of social media tools (bots, trolls, fakes) in its hybrid war against Ukraine.

The research reveals the transformation of social networks into a powerful tool for influencing public opinion. The key technologies of information warfare in social networks are identified: the spread of fakes, the work of bots and trolls, and propaganda narratives. The information policy of Ukraine in social networks, aimed at countering russian information attacks, is considered. The key messages and channels for disseminating truthful information are identified.

It is concluded that social networks are effectively used in the information war, despite certain challenges by both sides of the conflict. Recommendations for improving the strategy of Ukraine's information policy in social networks are formulated, taking into account the experience gained.

Keywords: *communication, social networks, social media, information warfare, propaganda, astroturfing, information and psychological operations, troll factories, bot farms.*

Problem formulation in general and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. Informatization and rapid penetration of the latest technologies into all life spheres is a distinctive feature of the modern world. Information technologies radically transform the economy, politics, culture, and social interaction (Qiang, Yan et al., 2013). With the help of IT, a global information space is formed, where data is distributed, consumed and exchanged at an exponentially increasing speed. Information and access to it are becoming a key resource and source of power in the 21st century. In these conditions, the effective use of information technologies and the protection of one's own information space acquire strategic importance for the national security and competitiveness of states (Shmalenko et al., 2022). Countries are actively developing information technologies and cyber armies, which are becoming an integral part of modern international relations and geopolitical rivalry. Previously, citizens received news mainly from traditional mass media — newspapers, television and radio. These channels tended to have some level of objectivity and professional standards. Traditional mass media such as newspapers, television and radio have historically played a leading role in shaping the information space and society agenda. They were able to determine which events and topics are the most resonant, and therefore to influence public opinion and political discourse. However, in recent years, the situation has changed dramatically thanks to the rapid development of social networks and online media. They have become no less influential platforms for spreading information and assessing the importance of events (Shmalenko et al., 2021). Moreover, sometimes it is social networks that set the tone and «throw» topics to traditional media. So today we can state the emergence of a fundamentally new information and media landscape, where traditional and new media closely interact, determining the news hierarchy and the priorities of public discourse. Their combined influence on public opinion and decision-making is constantly growing.

Social networks have radically transformed public discourse and led to rapid changes in the media space and communications (Hromko, 2018). The rapid growth of digital platforms and Internet technologies has made it possible for every citizen to express their own opinion, to join the public debate as equals. The development of social networks and the Internet spread using forms a public discourse in which different views collide and the need to express one's opinion appears. The result analysis of annual surveys on the population's attitude to the mass media and the consumption of various types of media make it possible to find out the trends in the distribution of media and to

investigate the level of trust in them. Global trends show that social networks are increasingly becoming the most widespread and popular source of information for the vast majority of people. As of October 2023, the number of people using social media exceeded 4.95 billion worldwide, with the average user visiting 6.7 social media platforms every month (Brian Dean, 2023). Today, the most popular social networks are Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram (Digital 2024: Global Overview Report).




Figure 1. Compiled by the author based on sources 18

The development of social networks has radically transformed modern society and methods of information dissemination. From simple platforms for communication, they have turned into powerful mass media that shape public opinion and the mood of millions of people. This trend has become global. Yes, in the USA already a third of the population gets their news from social networks. Sites such as Facebook or YouTube have become the main source of information about events in the world and in their country for many citizens (Pew Research Center, 2021).

Similar trends can be traced in Ukraine. Ukraine does not lag behind global trends, but has its own regional characteristics. The share of Ukrainians who use social networks to search for news is growing rapidly. This became especially noticeable after the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014. Given the information war and propaganda

by the Russian Federation, for Ukrainians social networks often became the only available source of true information. The evolution of social networks from entertainment to news media is a reality today both in the West and in Ukraine. And this trend will gain momentum, radically changing the media landscape.




Figure 2. Compiled by the author based on sources 27

Annual sociological surveys demonstrate that social networks are increasingly becoming the main source of news for the vast majority of both ordinary Ukrainians and representatives of political elites, business, and expert circles. Therefore, communications are moving to the plane of ideologies', opinions', worldview clashes. At the beginning of 2022, approximately 82% of surveyed Ukrainians used the Internet at least once a week, of which 78% used it every day or almost every day (KIIS, 2022). 76.6% of Ukrainians received news from social networks (OPORA, 2022). In 2021, the most popular resources for obtaining information in Ukrainian society were: Facebook (43%), YouTube (25%) and Telegram (20%) (USAID, 2021). It is interesting to note that the fourth place both in the world and in Ukraine is occupied by Instagram (12%, 17%), Twitter (11%) is in the fifth place in the world, Viber (13%) in Ukraine (Social network usage for news access worldwide 2019-2023. Statista).

In 2023, the second year of a full-scale war, the trend of switching to messengers and social networks as sources of information that provide the promptest information on social and political events has persisted. In 2023, social networks were the most popular source of

information: 77.9% of Ukrainians used social networks to get news, 62.5% preferred television, 67.7% were Internet users (not including social networks), 33.7% of citizens of Ukraine listened to the radio, and 17.8% of respondents read print media (OPORA, 2023). The results of the Gradus Research company show that 65% of respondents learn about events in messengers, and 61% — in social networks. Whereas in August 2020, the share of messengers was only 41% (Gradus Research, 2023).




Figure 3. Compiled by the author based on sources 20

Social networks have turned into an important tool for shaping public discourse and influencing public opinion. Unlike traditional mass media, they allow a much wider range of people to join the hot topic's discussion, express their own position or ideas. Social networks allow each user to be not only a consumer, but also an information content creator. Anyone can instantly share their testimony of events, express their own opinion or assessment. This definitely promotes pluralism of viewpoints. However, social networks also create serious challenges. Social networks have gradually transformed from a tool of freedom of speech and free exchange of ideas into a tool of total disinformation and propaganda. This is especially noticeable on the example of russia's hybrid information war against Ukraine, where the kremlin's fakes and lies have become a real threat to national security.

Information wars are a relatively new phenomenon that has gained particular importance in the 21st century with the development of global media and the Internet. The modern information war uses both traditional means of influence (print media, radio) and the latest technologies of television, the Internet, social networks, which has significantly expanded the possibilities for propaganda and manipulation of mass consciousness (Shmalenko, 2022). Missile volleys of fake news, attacks by Internet trolls, use of bots — all these are elements of the kremlin's powerful information and psychological operations against Ukraine in social networks, with the aim of sowing chaos, panic, distrust of the authorities, and splitting society. Despite these threats, the convenience and speed of obtaining information on social networks makes them an increasingly popular source of news among the audience. The media space future largely depends on whether social networks can effectively fight misinformation while maintaining their advantages.

The Internet space and social networks have their own specifics, so classic theories of propaganda need to be rethought, which necessitates comprehensive studies of the laws and mechanisms of modern information warfare using social networks to develop effective methods of countermeasures and protection.

Goals and objectives. The research aim is to analyse the role of social networks as a tool for conducting information warfare using the example of a full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022; to analyse the development dynamics of social networks in the world and in Ukraine, to determine the most popular platforms; to explore the possibilities of using social networks to spread certain informational narratives, propaganda and fakes; to determine which social media tools were used during the information confrontation between russia and Ukraine; to analyse the information policy of Ukraine in social networks aimed at combating russian propaganda and fakes; to evaluate the effectiveness of using social networks as a tool for spreading true information and combating disinformation during war; to formulate recommendations for improving Ukraine's information war strategy in social networks, taking into account the experience of 2022.

The proposed set of tasks will make it possible to comprehensively investigate the phenomenon of social networks as an effective tool of modern information warfare.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The influence of social networks on political processes is the subject of active scientific discussions at the current stage, which is connected with the growing role of the Internet and social networks in social and political life. Many

researchers are studying the potential of social networks for propaganda and information warfare. Social networks as a new channel for information warfare are studied by B. Kovalevych. A. Onkovych analyses the use of Facebook for information and psychological operations, in particular by Russia in the war against Ukraine, focusing on the methods and technologies used in these operations. In particular, the technologies of influence on public opinion, dissemination of disinformation, manipulation of political attitudes of citizens are analysed. Among the well-known theorists who laid the foundations for the study of information wars and propaganda, such scientists as Lasswell, Lippman, McLuhan, Noam Chomsky can be singled out. Their ideas are relevant for understanding the modern information struggle in social networks. A. Pravdiuk considers *Astroturfing* in social networks as a threat to democracy, analysing how artificial creation of public opinion can manipulate public consciousness. N. Dyachenko and A. Voynalovych study the use of trolling in social networks as a tool of information warfare. Adéla Klečková studies the role of «cyber wolves» in the information war against Russia, describing their tasks, methods of work and effectiveness.

Other researchers, such as Brian Dean, Clark J., Donath J.S., Pariser E., Romano A., Singer P.W., Snowden Collette, Shmalenko I., Van Slyke analyze the wider use of social media in information warfare — spreading propaganda, filtering information, polarizing society. They explore various aspects of this problem. These and other works form the scientific basis for analyzing the role of social networks in information wars, outlining key tools, methods and threats of their use, which allows us to better understand this phenomenon and look for ways to counter it. Further comprehensive research will make it possible to develop an effective strategy for counteracting negative informational influences and protecting the national information space.

Outlining previously unresolved parts of the general issue that the article is dedicated to. The dynamics of social media development in Ukraine and the world has been extremely rapid in recent years. However, there is a lack of comprehensive research on the most effective methods of using these platforms in information confrontation. In particular, insufficient attention has been paid to the study of the very technologies and social media tools that Russia uses in its propaganda activities against Ukraine. The mechanisms of spreading fake news, creating bot farms, organizing information attacks, etc. require additional analysis. The best ways for Ukraine to counter Russian disinformation on social media are also not sufficiently studied. It is necessary to analyse the information policy of our country during

the war, to identify its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the effectiveness of various formats of Ukrainian content to counteract false russian narratives needs to be thoroughly evaluated. It is also necessary to develop a system of criteria for such an assessment. Consequently, there are a number of unresolved issues of social media research in the context of the current russian-Ukrainian war that should be addressed.

Research methods. The methodological basis of the research is general scientific and special methods of scientific analysis. The analysis of statistical data on the dynamics of social media audiences in Ukraine and the world over the past five years made it possible to identify the most popular platforms. The use of content analysis of informational materials in the Ukrainian and russian segments of social networks for the presence of propaganda narratives, fakes, and manipulative techniques; analysis of the functionality of social networks such as bots, communities, etc. in order to identify key tools of information warfare; content analysis of official accounts of authorities and officials of Ukraine in social networks to evaluate the implementation of information policy. Comparative analysis of the effectiveness of various content formats (text, graphics, video, live broadcasts, etc.) in countering disinformation based on audience feedback.

Results and discussion. Social media provide Ukrainian politicians with an effective tool for mobilizing and coordinating citizens around common goals and objectives. Ukrainian politicians have actively utilized these opportunities in their activities. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, or YouTube have become channels for them to communicate with citizens, mobilize supporters, and promote initiatives. A striking example is the creation of the Maidan Self-Defense community on Facebook during the Revolution of Dignity. This resource united thousands of concerned Ukrainians from all over the country who opposed the arbitrariness of the authorities and defended the right of citizens to protest. With the outbreak of russian aggression in 2014, Maidan Self-Defense transformed into a powerful volunteer platform that coordinated assistance to the Ukrainian military in Donbas. In particular, this community raised funds, food, equipment, and warm clothes for the defenders on the front line. Ukrainian politicians are actively using the potential of social media to consolidate society around key initiatives and tasks.

February 24, 2022 marked the beginning of a new tragic era in the history of Ukraine, when russia launched unprovoked full-scale military aggression. Although there had been localized conflicts in

eastern Ukraine before, it was the invasion of russian regular troops that marked the transition to open hostilities throughout the territory. This war has become the first armed conflict of this magnitude in history to take place in the era of the Internet and social media. Ukrainians are actively documenting every minute of the confrontation, sharing testimonies of the horrors of war, and calling for help and support. Unlike previous conflicts in other parts of the world, the population of Ukraine has much wider access to the Internet, and thus the ability to quickly inform the whole world. Social networks have become the main source of news and the centre of the information war between Ukraine and russia. Through Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, Ukrainians' messages are instantly spread around the world, attracting the attention of millions of people. On the other hand, russia spreads fake news and propaganda, trying to justify its criminal actions and change the attitude of the international community. The war has dramatically changed the priorities of Ukrainian society. Now everyone is primarily concerned with survival, security, and resistance to the enemy. The Ukrainian government is actively using both traditional media and social media to inform citizens, coordinate actions, and unite the nation in the face of danger. Online communications also make it possible to effectively attract the support of the world community, to call for tough sanctions against the russian federation and the provision of military aid to Ukraine. And although the future of our country is currently shrouded in a fog of uncertainty, Ukrainians continue to fight both at the front and in the information space.

In the face of russian aggression, Ukrainian leaders used social media to attract international support, coordinate volunteerism, and fight enemy propaganda. With the help of social media, politicians inform citizens in a timely manner, explain their positions on key issues, and engage them in various initiatives. Social media has dramatically transformed the interaction between politicians and citizens, providing the former with powerful tools to influence public opinion and decision-making.

Social media has become a powerful tool in the hands of the Ukrainian authorities in the context of a full-scale war with the russian aggressor. Politicians are actively using Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram not only to communicate with citizens and inform the international community, but also to effectively counter the kremlin's hybrid threats.

Since the beginning of the russian invasion, Ukrainian officials have become real influencers on social media. They demonstrate examples of indomitable spirit and patriotism for a nation under fire from the

occupier. And their bright, emotional posts with appeals to partners receive millions of likes and reposts around the world.

When it was discovered that kremlin bots and trolls were being activated to spread lies and propaganda on Twitter, the Ukrainian authorities reacted immediately. Thanks to the support of 2 million followers, official accounts began to effectively combat russian fakes, exposing their essence to a foreign audience (The official Twitter account of Ukraine). However, in the information war it is no less important to keep the blow on the enemy's territory. For Ukraine, social networks have become both a platform for global communication and a powerful weapon in the fight for truth and justice in this war. This helps Ukraine attract the attention of the international community and ensure support in its efforts to preserve territorial integrity and independence.

The kremlin's information war against Ukraine began long before the full-scale invasion in 2022. Already in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of Donbas, russia deployed a powerful propaganda machine both in the middle of the russian federation and on the international arena. According to the commander-in-chief of the NATO forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, moscow's information attack has become unprecedented in scale and intensity. It was then that social media manipulation was involved, which today has turned into a full-scale cyberwar. After the terrorist attack against MH17, Twitter exploded with conflicting messages and conspiracy theories generated by russian bots and trolls (Snowden, 2022). This misinformed the international community and made it difficult to find those responsible for the plane downing. Unfortunately, the kremlin's lies still poison the information space, making it impossible to establish justice. So, 2014 was the year of the birth of the newest russian propaganda on Twitter and other social networks. And Ukraine still resists this machine of lies and violence against the consciousness of millions.

One of the most active users of social networks among Ukrainian politicians is the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi. During the war, V. Zelensky turned into a real influencer in the online space. His pages on Facebook and Instagram, with audiences of millions, are regularly updated with emotional appeals, photos and videos from the front or the rear. The President's YouTube channel has become a unique online military tribune. It is here that Zelensky reports daily to the nation and the world about the state of affairs, shares tactical plans and strategic perspectives. These broadcasts collect millions of views and approving comments. Volodymyr Zelenskyi actively communicates

with world leaders on Twitter, urging them to support Ukraine. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, on the initiative of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi, the official fundraising platform of Ukraine — UNITED24 — has been created. This charity hub is represented in all popular social networks and has a significant number of followers: Facebook (304 000), Instagram (171 000), YouTube (945 000), Twitter (60 000), Telegram (14 000) (UNITED24). The UNITED24 pages on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, and Telegram inform the international community every day about the needs of the Ukrainian army and the civilian population, and call for support for specific fundraising efforts to help our country. Thanks to effective communications in the online space and the support of international partners, UNITED24 has turned into a powerful tool for consolidating global aid to Ukraine in its fight against the enemy.

When Russia unleashed a full-scale war against Ukraine on February 24, the Ministry of Digital Transformation became the epicentre of the information and psychological struggle against the Kremlin in cyberspace. The head of the ministry, Mykhailo Fedorov, realizing the threat posed by its powerful propaganda machine, launched a large-scale operation to dismantle Putin's false narratives and fakes on social media. From his official Telegram channel, Fedorov addressed the top management of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube with demands to limit Russian propaganda and close down Kremlin media outlets. His open letters caused a wide resonance and forced the global IT giants to react (Telegram channel, Mykhailo Fedorov). Mykhailo Fedorov's Twitter conversation with American billionaire Elon Musk about providing Ukraine with access to satellite Internet via Starlink became public (Twitter, Mykhailo Fedorov).

Social networks have turned into the newest «digital battlefield» between Ukraine and the Russian aggressor. And in this war for people's minds and hearts, Ukrainian politicians demonstrate great skill and intelligence, skilfully using online tools. First of all, the authorities' and officials' official accounts on Twitter, Facebook, or Telegram serve as a reliable source of true information about events at the front and in the rear (Shmalenko, 2023b). This makes it possible to oppose the false narratives of Russian propaganda in social networks and to inform both Ukrainians and the international community.

In addition, online resources are actively used to mobilize public support for the Armed Forces and the volunteer movement. Politicians' calls for fundraising, participation in pro-Ukrainian actions or spreading patriotic slogans instantly spread virally on social networks, uniting millions around a common aim.

Social networks have become a powerful tool for Ukrainian politicians in wartime conditions. Understanding the potential and opportunities, Ukrainian politicians actively use social networks to wage an informational struggle against Russia and its propaganda tools. Pages in social networks of Ukrainian politicians and high-ranking officials have become official channels for spreading true information about the situation in Eastern Ukraine and about Russian aggression in general. Social networks contribute to the involvement of the public in actions supporting the military and other measures aimed at strengthening the country's defence capabilities.

Effective use of social networks helps to counter disinformation and propaganda, knowing the entire arsenal of «dirty» technologies used by Russia in the information war against Ukraine.

Russian propaganda in social networks is an extremely dangerous phenomenon, because it is aimed at manipulating mass consciousness. Unfortunately, in its hybrid war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is resorting to a whole arsenal of dirty technologies in the online space. First, this is astroturfing — creating the impression of mass support for a certain idea by making comments on behalf of non-existent persons. Secondly, the active use of so-called «troll factories» and bot farms — hired workers or programs that spread propaganda content around the clock.

Another technique is attempts to discredit Ukrainian politicians through Cancel Culture — imposing a negative image of a person in the eyes of the public.

And, of course, Russia actively conducts information and psychological operations (IPSO) with the aim of demoralizing Ukrainians and sowing panic.

So, let's take a closer look at the main types of dirty technologies of Russian propaganda in social networks.

Modern political technologists actively use astroturfing to create the impression of mass public support for a certain person or idea, resorting to the creation of artificial groups in social networks, hiring bots, distributing comments to order, etc. Astroturfing is a manipulative technology that disguises as public opinion what is actually the product of a targeted PR campaign or political propaganda. A democratic society should oppose such unethical practices.

Astroturfing (from the English «*astro turf*» — «artificial grass») is a technology for simulating public support for a certain person, idea or product, artificially creating the mass support impression for a certain idea or narrative with the help of comments on behalf of non-existent users. The name comes from AstroTurf, a brand of synthetic turf that

mimics real grass. The term originated in the US political lexicon in the 1970s thanks to Senator Lloyd Bentsen, who described as «artificial grass» the pro-government Republican campaigns initiated by the George W. Bush team (Pravdiuk, 2023). Astroturfing is a technology for creating an artificial illusion of mass public support for certain ideas, persons or products, simulating public demand using various means, a technology for simulating public support for certain ideas or persons for the purpose of manipulating public opinion.

In today's environment, astroturfing is gaining new opportunities and becoming a more visible phenomenon, as the key tool of astroturfing is the use of digital technologies, including bots and bot farms on social media, which allows creating the illusion of mass support or criticism by artificially «inflating» the information occasion. Astroturfing is often used by political strategists and marketers to manipulate public opinion. Online astroturfing technologies are typically used by political technologists and radical groups to strengthen propaganda and foment conflicts in society. At the same time, the media, and opinion leaders may unknowingly disseminate the results of astroturfing as real public initiatives.

Astroturfing has become a powerful industry for manipulating public opinion, closely integrated with the markets of politics, business, and advertising. Leading companies and political players are actively using the technology of artificially «heating up» information occasions. Astroturfing is used to promote business interests, lobby for bills, and build loyalty to politicians. The peculiarity of modern astroturfing is its global scale: information campaigns are typically spread in many countries at once. Researchers warn that the development of artificial intelligence technologies and diplomatic fakes makes it possible to create an extremely realistic imitation of public opinion, which can threaten democracy and national security.

One of the most effective tools of modern online astroturfing is the use of troll factories and bot farms — automated social media accounts that mimic real users and spread propaganda messages, comments, and articles on social media around the clock. Massive «bot farms» allow to amplify information artificially, to spread propaganda messages, to manipulate ratings and statistics.

Information wars have moved from social media to real life and have become a powerful weapon of the 21st century, using not only direct lies and fakes, but also distortions and manipulative presentation of true facts. Information wars of the 21st century is waged not only by states, but also by entire «troll factories» — organizations that specialize in influencing social media using various types of

«information troops»: an army of bots, trolls, and opinion leaders. Bots automatically spread the necessary information, trolls provoke disputes and conflicts in comments, and opinion leaders support and reinforce the desired narratives. Their coordinated activities can manipulate public opinion, incite social conflicts, and influence political processes.

The massive use of bots is a common technology in information warfare. Bots are programs that automatically create fake social media profiles and spread the right information. They are easily distinguished by the date of account registration. An analysis of hundreds of profiles during the Ukrainian elections showed that most bots were created shortly before the vote. This indicates the targeted use of such programs to influence voters. Creating bots is a fairly cheap tool for manipulating social media. They can massively spread any information. That is why it is important to learn how to recognize such artificial profiles and be critical of their messages. This will help protect against information manipulation.

Social media bots have a number of characteristic features. First, they often post identical messages. You can find dozens of profiles with identical text posted at the same time. Secondly, bot avatars usually feature abstract images rather than photos of real people. To recognize a bot, you should check the information through a social media search. If the same message is published in many accounts at the same time, it is most likely the work of bots. This check will help you critically evaluate information and avoid manipulation.

Trolls are real users who specialize in creating and distributing manipulative content on social media. They write provocative posts, comments, and start disputes in order to cause conflicts, insults, and sow distrust and hatred. Trolls can also spread fakes, propaganda slogans, and offensive stereotypes. Unlike bots, trolls are backed by real people with specific goals. They are difficult to recognize because they disguise themselves as ordinary users. But their activity is aimed at dividing society and manipulating it. Therefore, it is worthwhile to be critical of emotional and provocative messages online.

The origin of the term «trolling» is related to sport fishing. The English word «to trawl» means «to catch with a net, to trawl». Hence, the term «trolling for suckers» — «catching fools on a hook» — was appeared. The modern meaning of this phenomenon was formed in Internet conferences in the late 1980s. One of the first researchers of trolling was Judith Donat, a specialist in the psychology of online communication. In her opinion, for a troll, it is a kind of intellectual game aimed at manipulating a group of users. He tries to stir up disputes, turn participants against each other, and provoke aggression

and swearing. At the same time, the troll itself keeps in the shadows, fuelling the conflict from the outside (Donath, 1998).

The essence of Internet trolling is to provoke emotional reactions from users and manipulate their behaviour (Diachenko & Voinalovych, 2023). At the same time, the troll itself tries to remain inconspicuous, shifting the responsibility for inciting passions to other participants.

Trolls have a whole arsenal of proven methods of manipulating public opinion and spreading misinformation. The first way is to pretend to be an expert in a certain field and impose your own point of view as the only correct one. Or create a fake account in the name of a real specialist and spread disinformation, allegedly from his person. Sometimes trolls create «doubles» of real people, i.e. accounts similar to the original ones, with the same photos and data. Then they send friend requests, allegedly due to the loss of the previous profile, and start posting manipulative content on behalf of the real person.

Another common method used by trolls is to play on contrast, where they deliberately create the illusion of conflicting opinions around a certain topic or person. Trolls need several accounts for this. First, they ask seemingly naive or provocative questions on behalf of one user in order to discredit the expert or public figure in the eyes of the audience. Then other fake profiles of their own are connected, starting a whole controversy around the question. They try to depict a dispute between adherents of different views. At the final stage, another troll profile joins the discussion, pretending to be an independent expert or eyewitness to the events. It cites convincing, sometimes fabricated facts in order to finish the reputation of a «victim». This is how trolls create the illusion of public resonance and destroy trust in specific persons. And their false pseudo-arguments are often accepted by the audience as truth.

One of the most sophisticated methods of online manipulators is to draw the audience's attention to their own personality, when trolls pose as experts or public figures, actively engaging in discussions and spreading biased information, trying to create an image of a supposedly authoritative or influential person to gain the trust of followers. Others simply seek attention by stirring up controversy, insulting opponents, or sharing shocking content. The main thing for them is the audience's reaction, because the number of comments, likes, or reposts is exactly what a troll seeks.

Typically, such manipulators deliberately spread fakes, conspiracy theories, and other harmful information. They can cite authoritative sources, falsify evidence and expert opinions. Their main goal is to attract as much attention as possible to their persona and topic, even if it means lying.

You can recognize an Internet troll on social media by a number of signs. Trolls often use newly created empty pages without personal information. However, recently, there have been more and more «legendary» profiles with fabricated data. Another common practice is to pretend to be a patriot or a supporter of a particular ideology. However, a careful analysis of such users' statements in various communities reveals their true, mostly manipulative, intentions. In addition, the activity of many trolls is limited to 8-10 hours a day, which is the approximate working time. With the help of social media search, you can track and link several profiles of one manipulator hiding under «masks».

One of the key elements of information wars on social media is «opinion leaders» (influencers) — bloggers and people with a large audience on social media. Their role is to promote certain narratives and messages commissioned by stakeholders (Kovalevych, 2014). The more followers a blogger has, the more effectively he or she can influence public opinion in the interests of the client. Sometimes, more than 5-10 thousand readers are involved in this process. In addition, there are the so-called «information mammoths» — people whose opinion is authoritative, although they do not have an audience of millions. They are quoted by the media and trusted. Therefore, they can effectively sow certain narratives and frames of perception of events. Manipulators actively involve opinion leaders and influencers in promoting interpretations, fakes, or conspiracy theories that are favourable to them, which is one of the most effective levers of influence on public opinion.

It is extremely difficult to recognize a true thought leader from a hired manipulator. After all, professional trolls create convincing images of ordinary users — with «family» photos, interesting personal content, correct behaviour. However, their ultimate goal is to ignite a dispute, provoke an emotional reaction from the real participants in the discussion, and impose the desired point of view. It is the activity of comments and dissemination of information that is the main KPI for such «leaders».

To expose a troll, you need to carefully monitor his behaviour and the content of his posts. For example, a sudden change of opinion on the eve of an election or the launch of contradictory narratives may indicate that a person works for money. It is difficult to prove it. Identifying «pocket» leaders requires critical thinking and careful analysis of content and behaviour on social networks. This is the only way to understand the true motives and intentions of this or that public figure.

There are a number of useful tools for analysing activity and detecting fake profiles in social networks. For example, Facebook Graph and Stalkscan services provide an opportunity to view information about closed Facebook and Instagram accounts.

The Botsentiel extension will help to track Twitter bots — it marks suspicious automated profiles using its own database. And the Social Bearing tool will analyse the main metrics of the account.

Another useful service is Hoaxy. It demonstrates how certain slogans or messages spread on Twitter and will show the botnets involved in their viral distribution (Ali M. Meligy et al., 2017).

Ukraine also has its own movement of fact-checkers and troll hunters — Cyberelves. These are volunteers united by the common aim of fighting disinformation and propaganda in social networks. They monitor fake profiles and messages on Facebook, find signs of manipulative activity, and send complaints to the administration to block trolls. Work coordination is provided by a special TrolessUA resource. Anyone who cares about the cleanliness of the info field in Ukraine can join here. And to motivate the most active cyber fighters, contests with valuable prizes are regularly held (Klečková, 2022).

The concept of «information and psychological operations» (IPSO) spreading in Ukraine in recent years helped to realize the manipulation scale and forms in the information space. Although misrepresentation and propaganda are not new phenomena, today's digital technologies have greatly increased the possibilities for disinformation to spread. IPSO research has become an important direction for Ukrainian scientists and practitioners in the field of information security. Ukraine, finding itself in the conditions of a complex political and military confrontation with the Russian Federation, became the sphere of active application of IPSO. The Ukrainian-Russian confrontation is a kind of battlefield not only in the physical, but also in the information space, which has turned into the newest virtual battlefield between Ukraine and the Russian aggressor. And in this war for the mind and emotions of millions of people, a special place belongs to information and psychological operations. Information and psychological operations are actions aimed at influencing the psychological state of people and population groups, performed using information technologies and media.

The purpose of IPSO is to change the psychological state of the target audience in order to achieve the desired result, which may be political, economic, military or other. IPSOs are used in a variety of areas, including military conflicts, political campaigns, marketing and advertising, and to alter the psychological state of mass audiences for

the purposes of social engineering and manipulation of public opinion. The concept of IPSO entered into active scientific use from the middle of the 20th century, but it gained media popularity in Ukraine only with the beginning of the Ukrainian-russian confrontation (Onkovyeh, 2021).

Information and psychological operations (IPSO) use various methods and techniques to achieve their goals. It will be about disinformation, the use of false or altered information in order to change people's perceptions, opinions, and beliefs; psychological pressure on people to change their behaviour or beliefs; activities aimed at undermining trust in the government, law enforcement agencies and other institutions; limiting access to information and controlling its distribution to ensure certain influence; the use of psychological technologies to gain an advantage over the enemy; manipulation of mass consciousness; social engineering to change social behaviour and manage people; intimidation, threats, or violence to change people's behaviour (Pariser, 2011). These methods and techniques are used individually or in combination to achieve military and political goals within the IPSO framework. Since they can have a significant impact on the psychological state of the military and the population, it is important to develop effective measures to protect against IPSO (Shmalenko, 2023a).

Information and psychological warfare in social networks is a powerful weapon of the 21st century, which is actively used by the kremlin in its aggression against Ukraine. After all, by controlling the emotions and moods of millions of people, it is possible to achieve the desired political goals without resorting to actual military operations. Information and psychological operations, or IPSO, is one of the most sophisticated and dangerous tools of russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. IPSO can have various goals — influencing public opinion and mood in society by spreading certain narratives through mass media, social networks, online resources, manipulating mass consciousness by spreading specially selected information in the media and social networks, demoralizing society and radicalizing certain groups of the population.

Social networks have turned into an effective tool of information and psychological operations, which russia is actively using in the war against Ukraine. The scale and forms of these IPSOs are impressive. russia uses its entire propaganda apparatus to hold IPSO — from TV channels and online media to social media and bloggers. A vivid example is the full-scale russian invasion, for which the information ground was carefully prepared for many years. The russian media's lies

about «fascists» in Ukraine became an excuse for the bloody invasion. With the help of propaganda and lies, the kremlin formed in the minds of its own citizens distorted ideas about Ukraine as a «failed state» in need of «liberation». These manipulations led to mass support for the war in russia. For example, russia uses them to spread fakes about the «fascist junta» in Ukraine, propagandistic myths about the «defense of Donbas», supporting separatist ideas in Donbas, calling for violence against Ukrainian patriots. Fake «victories» spread on Telegram are supposed to keep putin in power despite the failures of his army.

Russia's information-psychological operations against Ukraine are a real weapon of mass destruction of minds and feelings, the consequences of which kill people, destroy lives, and affect the entire society. The kremlin's manipulation of consciousness leads to real tragedies. On the one hand, the kremlin is trying to convince russians of the «denazification» of Ukraine, spreading outright lies about «Nazis» in Ukraine, fakes about «saving» Donbas, and manipulations about the causes of the war. This is done in order to create a negative image of Ukraine and justify aggression. On the other hand, russia is trying to demoralize Ukrainians by spreading rumours about the surrender of cities, the death of the Ukrainian Armed Forces command, and the military defecting to the enemy. In other words, fakes are being spread to sow panic and distrust in the government, to create the impression that resistance is futile. Examples of fake news using for IPSO include the spread of rumors about military operations in eastern Ukraine that cause panic, or the spread of photo montages and other falsifications on social media aimed at causing negative attitudes towards certain events or political figures. According to research, the spread of fake news has a significant impact on people's moods and beliefs, and can lead to serious consequences, such as political instability and social tension. Therefore, in order to ensure national security, it is important to develop effective strategies to combat this phenomenon, which will include teaching the public critical thinking and developing appropriate technologies to detect and counteract fake news.

For a long time, the kremlin's IPSOs remained an inconspicuous, but extremely dangerous phenomenon (Bäcker, 2023). However, after the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the russian federation, Ukrainians finally realized the perniciousness and destructive power of russian propaganda and informational and psychological manipulations.

The russian side uses various methods and technologies of IPSO aimed at manipulating opinions, distorting facts, creating fake news and spreading propaganda information in order to influence Ukrainian

society and international perception of the conflict. It should be noted that Russia has used IPSO for years to hack democracies, meddling in more than 30 national elections from Hungary and Poland to Brexit and the 2016 US presidential race. They floated conspiracy theories that ranged from Q-Anon to lies about the coronavirus vaccine, and provided justifications for Russian military action everywhere from Georgia to Syria (Singer, 2022). At the same time, Ukraine is trying to convey to the world the truth about the war and the crimes of the occupiers. The study of IPSOs and protection against them is of crucial importance for the security of Ukraine. Protection against informational and psychological operations of the Kremlin is an extremely important task of every Ukrainian in the conditions of war. To recognize fakes and Russian propaganda, one should develop critical thinking — the ability to analyze information, not to succumb to emotions. Carefully check news sources, assess their reliability, bearing in mind that the Kremlin can distort facts and present them in a way that is beneficial to itself. It is necessary to be aware of the deep reasons of certain moods in society in order to understand whether they are the result of hostile information spillovers. So, whoever owns the information field will have a strategic advantage in this confrontation. Ukraine has every chance to win this war by actively using social networks, to inform citizens, coordinate volunteers and attract support from the world.

Astroturfing and IPSO technologies are increasingly being used to influence public opinion in real life and online. The spread of social networks in recent years has radically changed communication and the formation of public opinion, which has led to the emergence and spread of new sociocultural phenomena, one of which is the «cancel culture», which involves the purposeful creation of a negative image among the general public of a certain politician, public figure or organizations through their public condemnation or boycott for their words, actions or views deemed unacceptable. The Cambridge Dictionary defines cancellation culture as a way of behaving in a society or group, especially on social media, in which it is customary to completely ignore and stop supporting someone because they said or did something that offended you (Cancel culture. Cambridge Dictionary). According to Dictionary.com, cancellation culture refers to the popular practice of ending support (cancelling) of public figures and companies after they have done or said something that is considered reprehensible or offensive. Cancel culture is generally seen as something that plays out on social media in the group shaming form (Lemoine, 2020).

Cancel Culture is a relatively new Internet phenomenon born out of social networks and open discussions. It's about «cancelling» a person,

place, or thing, a socially mediated phenomenon that originated in minority Twitter communities as a way to call attention to discrimination and achieve justice. The term «Cancel Culture» gained popularity with the #MeToo movement, when victims of harassment organized campaigns against showbiz stars, which went «viral» on social networks and in open discussions on the Internet (Shmalenko & Sokol, 2022). Politicians, experts, celebrities, academics, and ordinary people have interpreted «Cancel Culture» as a moral panic close to real harm, adding a neological twist to the practice origins, linking it to an unfounded fear of censorship and default. But «Cancel Culture» should be seen as the last desperate call for justice «reserved» only for stars, brands and other unattainable figures (Meredith, 2020).

«Cancellation culture» is a complex phenomenon. On the one hand, globalization, and the transformation of Ukraine into an information society have expanded the opportunities for citizens to openly discuss socially important issues. On the other hand, the anonymity and emotionality of online discussions often leads to radicalization of views and «witch hunts». Some see the «cancellation culture» as a threat to freedom of speech, as people are persecuted for expressing an unpopular opinion. Others consider it an effective way to draw public attention to serious social problems. People whose thoughts or actions are deemed «unacceptable» may face mass harassment and boycotts on social media. Sometimes «cancellation» goes beyond the virtual world and has real consequences. This calls into question freedom of expression and creates an atmosphere of fear. Therefore, there is a debate in Ukrainian society: whether the «culture of cancellation» is an effective way of combating discrimination, or a threat to pluralism of opinion. On the one hand, it provides an opportunity to hear the voices of marginalized groups and challenge entrenched prejudices. But on the other hand, it carries the risk of radicalization when people are attacked for minor mistakes or jokes. Therefore, a balanced approach is needed so that this trend promotes, and does not harm, justice.

Cancellation culture is a phenomenon when a large number of people, usually united by certain values or features of the worldview, decide to «throw away» a person, company or product from their personal or professional life not to consume, not to speak, not to interact, not to buy (Khoroshchak, 2022). In recent years, Ukrainian society has also seen a trend of «cancellation» — public harassment and pressure on certain individuals because of their statements, views, or actions. This primarily concerns public figures such as politicians, journalists, public figures, and showmen. Most often, they are «cancelled» for manifestations of discrimination, sexism, homophobia,

and racism. Examples include campaigns against MPs or officials for their offensive statements (Oleksiy Arestovych, Olha Bohomolets, Nadiya Savchenko). There are also cases of «cancellation» of Ukrainian and Russian performers (Ani Lorak, Regina Todorenco, Natasha Koroleva) for supporting aggression against Ukraine after the outbreak of war and continuing to earn money in Russia.

The culture of cancellation is often used for manipulative purposes with the help of technologies such as astroturfing and bot farms. Through coordinated information campaigns on social media and the media, the effect of «public outrage» at certain actions of the authorities or public figures is created. Bots and fake accounts spread outrageous information and fuel the «cancellation» hysteria, thereby creating an artificial «heating» of the scandal around the chosen target. Botfarms can imitate massive outrage on social media, as if millions were demanding someone's cancellation. To ruin a reputation, they purposefully spread false or distorted information on social media. They try to discredit those who are trying to protect the «victim» of the cancellation. They are portrayed as biased, unbiased, etc. Professional propagandists can artificially initiate condemnation of politicians, military officers, representatives of religious denominations, etc. Unlike direct calls for the overthrow of the government, such technologies pretend to be a real civic position, using the right to freedom of speech. However, in reality, their goal is to manipulate public opinion and discredit the objects of criticism, which poses a threat to the information security of the state. Such manipulations are extremely dangerous because they artificially radicalize society. We need to be very attentive to the «trends of cancellation» in social media and check the facts.

Recently, there has been a lot of talk about how the «culture of cancellation» can destroy careers and reputations. However, in practice, there are not many cases of complete and final «cancellation» of public figures. Of course, many public figures and brands have experienced a serious wave of outrage and criticism on social media. Some have been accused of inappropriate language or unethical behaviour, but there have been few real fatal consequences for their careers (Romano, 2019). More often, «cancelled» stars or companies simply disappear from view for a while to wait out the storm. Later, they return, apologize, promise to make amends, their fans accept it. A true and final «cancellation» is the exception rather than the rule, more of a high-profile informational event than the inevitable destruction of reputation.

Conclusions.

The growing popularity of social networks has contributed to the wider spread of misinformation in the information space, which can be explained by several factors. First, it is difficult to trace the original source of information and check the facts in social networks. Secondly, the spread of fakes is facilitated by the emotionality of users and the desire to share sensational news. In the conditions of war or other emergency situation, the issue of freedom of speech acquires special complexity. On the one hand, a democratic society must guarantee citizens the right to free expression of views. On the other hand, the dissemination of certain information can harm the national security and defence capability of the state. Hostile propaganda is often disguised as an «alternative point of view» to avoid legal consequences. However, in reality, it can incite violence, spread misinformation, incite inter-ethnic enmity, etc. In the conditions of a real threat to public safety, the state has the right to limit certain manifestations of freedom of speech. But such restrictions must be clearly regulated by law, comply with the principle of proportionality and be cancelled immediately after the normalization of the situation.

Social networks can be used as a tool of information warfare because they have become powerful means of mass communication that allow easy dissemination of information to a wide range of users. This applies to various aspects, including political propaganda, manipulation of public opinion and disinformation. Here are some aspects that highlight the role of social networks in today's information wars. The misuse of social media for disseminating false or manipulated information to influence public opinion, create a distorted view of events, or exacerbate conflicts; manipulating social network algorithms to direct users to specific information resources, shift their perspective, and create the illusion of a certain public mood; creation of fake accounts, profiles and groups that hide their true nature in order to influence the discussion and opinion of users; abuse of social networks to interfere in election processes by spreading disinformation or supporting specific candidates.

Algorithms of social networks can contribute to the formation of echo chambers, where users surround themselves with information that confirms their own views, reducing the possibility of access to objective information (Clark & Van Slyke, 2010). These challenges require attention and response from both social networks and users, as well as developed regulation and control strategies to effectively counter negative impacts.

Recommendations for improving Ukraine's information war strategy in social networks:

1. To create a single coordination centre under the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, who would be responsible for the development of a state information policy at wartime.

2. Develop a comprehensive communication strategy in social networks aimed at promoting Ukrainian informational narratives and effectively countering russian disinformation.

3. Create a network of bots and volunteers that would constantly monitor social networks, record manifestations of hostile propaganda and promptly respond to them.

4. To use the possibilities of social networks to spread true information about the situation at the front, in the rear, and the activities of authorities.

5. To more actively involve leaders of public opinion, bloggers, and journalists to promote patriotic content in social networks.

6. To strengthen the informing of the international community about the crimes of russia, violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

7. Develop a system of indicators for comprehensive assessment of information campaigns' effectiveness in social networks.

The implementation of such recommendations will contribute to the strengthening of Ukraine's information security and successful resistance to russian hybrid aggression.

In the current media space, it is extremely important to critically evaluate «viral» trends and check them for uniqueness, in order to allow the manipulation of a huge mind to stand up. People who are especially receptive to misinformation are those with unimportant minds when they reject verified information from official sources. To remove anxiety, the stench is expanding sensitively and dubious data from informal channels. Thus, experts speak out on the importance of media awareness for the critical interpretation of content in social networks. It is also necessary to quickly provide verified official information to avoid the proliferation of fakes.

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MANIPULATION AS A COMPONENT OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Abstract.

This study analyses political manipulation as a component of political communication within the context of information warfare. It aims to provide an objective assessment of the nature and content of this phenomenon. The research examines the technologies and techniques of political manipulation as an effective communication tool in the modern Russian-Ukrainian war, which is not exclusively a military armed confrontation but is hybrid and multidimensional. The study provides a systematic analysis that combines general scientific and specific methods. It presents the fundamental techniques of political manipulation and identifies the main trends in the development of political manipulation technologies in the context of information confrontation and warfare. The research concludes that manipulation, as a component of political communication, can be carried out at different levels: interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup, and mass. The authors highlight the effects of political manipulation on the quality of political communication in Ukrainian society, specifically in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. They stress the need to develop effective methods to counteract manipulative influence as a crucial component of political communication in the modern information space. The study emphasises the effectiveness of countering political and manipulative influences in the information and communication space by observing the principles of impartiality, timely confirmation of information with documents and verified facts, and finding alternative sources of information. The authors conclude that countering hostile manipulative technologies and information manipulative influence should become the basis of the State's domestic and foreign policy. This policy should focus on protecting the information space and enhancing the level of information security.

Keywords: *manipulation, political manipulation, technologies of political manipulation, political communication, information warfare/war.*

Problem statement in general and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. In the context of the information war as a component of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war for the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, it is crucial for Ukrainian state policy to focus on protecting the information space and enhancing information security and resilience to information threats. Thus, the research problem is the study of political manipulation as a component of political communication in the information society era. This study examines the theoretical and methodological foundations of political manipulation, as well as the development and implementation of manipulation techniques in the context of the information confrontation during the Russian-Ukrainian war, which escalated in February 2022 with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. The war between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014 and encompasses various dimensions beyond military confrontation, including historical, ideological, communicative, mental, and informational aspects. It is crucial to avoid distorting information, spreading disinformation, and promoting biased narratives and ways of thinking, as these are all part of hybrid warfare. Misinformation in the modern information space poses a direct threat to global democracies. Therefore, political manipulation is a significant aspect of communication during information warfare. It is a powerful tool for influencing perception and shaping citizens' awareness.

Goals and objectives. The aim of this study is to investigate political manipulation as a tool of political communication and a technology used in information warfare. The research involves the following tasks:

- 1) to highlight the content and role of political manipulation in the processes of political communication;
- 2) to study the peculiarities of the use of political manipulation technologies in the modern information war;
- 3) to find out the content of basic techniques and technologies of political manipulation and their impact on modern Ukrainian society in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Outlining previously unresolved parts of the general problem that the article is dedicated to. In our opinion, some of the unsolved tasks regarding the role of political manipulation and the technologies of its influence on public opinion were considered by the author in the

article (Lysenko & Maneliuk «Techniques of political manipulation and their impact on public opinion in modern political processes», 2022). However, further research is required to address the effectiveness of countering manipulative influence in the modern global information space. The issue of researching ways to minimize the negative impact of political manipulation technologies on social media is particularly relevant and still unresolved. Additionally, the problem of threats and consequences of information terror in global political communication remains poorly understood.

Research methods. The study of the informational communication aspect of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war involves the application of interdisciplinary methodology. The research is based on system analysis as a general scientific method, and special scientific methods are also used in the study. On the one hand, manipulation is an element of political communication at different levels of its implementation (local, national, global). On the other hand, political manipulation is an instrument of influence on the formation of attitudes, views, and values of society. Since «political communication», «political manipulation» and «information warfare» are central categories in our study, it is logical to use methods of observation, comparison and generalisation. Political science analyses the technologies of political manipulation and their impact on public consciousness, public opinion, and political behaviour at the individual, group, and mass levels. In our study, this methodology is useful for analysing collective psychology, as seen in political communication and the formation of worldview attitudes and political views in modern information society.

Changes in the modern information space dictate trends in the systematic use of information and communication technologies as a tool to attract the attention of the widest possible range of citizens and to influence their thinking, worldview and political opinions. Under these circumstances, manipulation can be considered an integral element of socio-political governance and the struggle for power. The relevance of manipulative influence and political manipulation in public life is increasing within the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict for state independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which commenced in 2014 and escalated following the direct invasion on 24th February 2022.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The theoretical and methodological aspects of the essence of political manipulation and manipulative technologies are described in the scientific studies of Ukrainian scholars, in particular, O. Boyko (2010), A. Kruglashev, S. Naumkina, G. Pocheptsov, Y. Shaygorodsky, V. Voronkova (2004)

and others. The concept of political manipulation, as well as its various types, mechanisms of implementation, and specific applications within political processes, have been researched by W. Riker (1986), T. Andrushchenko (2022), D. Arabadzhev (2019), O. Hoyman, O. Dyachenko, D. Moshak (2021), K. Zakharenko, M. Kostelnyuk, V. Maksymets, O. Shevchuk, T. Yaroshenko, and others. Manipulative techniques as a component of political communication in the context of information confrontation, propaganda, and information warfare in cyberspace are studied by D. Avramenko, M. Avramenko (2022), T. Andrushchenko and V. Zelenin (2022), M. Brodchak (2012), O. Medvedev (2023), A. Stadnyk (2015), V. Petryk (2006) and others.

Results and discussions Thus, based on thorough research by Ukrainian scientists and taking into account the current realities of Ukrainian society, we can consider manipulation as a common method of communicative action used to shift attention, hide the objective, conceal certain information, etc. Manipulation should be interpreted as an action with certain intentions, goals, and hidden motives for control, aimed at the object of information influence.

The scientific understanding of the term «manipulation» in Ukrainian encyclopedic editions (Voronkova, 2004, p. 321) is defined as a system of means and ideological, spiritual, and psychological influence on the mass consciousness in order to impose certain views, ideas, values. The concept of «information warfare» was developed by American scholars in the early 1990s long before the aforementioned events in Ukraine. Modern Ukrainian scholars (Myrnyi & Moroz, 2023) define «information warfare» as a form of conflict between different actors, such as states, blocs, political parties, etc. This involves using the media, computer networks and other means to influence the population in order to shape public opinion, and erode society's morale and its institutions.

Information warfare is a critical element of shaping the mass consciousness. Manipulation is a powerful tool of political influence within the context of information warfare. The techniques and methods of manipulative influence have a broad and dynamic range of applications, making them difficult to predict.

In the context of information warfare, manipulative technologies are becoming increasingly diverse in their form, content, goals and purpose. According to researchers, the dramatic changes taking place in the modern information space have created conditions for their use in the interests of information and psychological influence. A struggle has begun, sometimes a fierce one, not inferior to the classical version of armed confrontation. The systematic use of the latest «information

and communication technologies allows states in some cases to achieve their goals without using conventional weapons at all» (as cited in Medvedev, 2023, p.135).

The development of technologies of political influence depends on the level of information and communication interaction in the political sphere. Thus, technologies of political manipulation acquire signs of dynamism, high activity, and adaptive nature. They include verbal and non-verbal, individual and mass, overt and covert methods of influencing the consciousness and even the subconscious of the public. Ukrainian scientists (Smolianiuk et al., 2021, p. 11) emphasize that there are certain patterns in the development of manipulative political technologies:

- 1) complication — from coercion to manipulation;
- 2) complication of the manipulative arsenal;
- 3) complication of the manipulative scheme — from linear to non-linear («by other people's hands»);
- 4) acceleration of manipulative processes. The reasons for the popularization and active use of manipulative technologies are the need for an effective way to achieve the practical goals of the participants in the political process.

The Ukrainian scientist O. Boyko (2010), a researcher of political manipulation, notes that the key elements of political manipulation are the concealment of the action; targeted influence on the mass audience; the manipulator's desire to direct public sentiment and behavior, which leads to a comprehensive approach to understanding the essence of manipulation. Political manipulation is a complex of psychological actions aimed at covertly adjusting the mass consciousness in order to stimulate social activity in the direction desired by the manipulator in the struggle for political power, its seizure, use and retention (Boyko, 2010, p.295).

The interpretation of the nature of manipulation as a socio-psychological phenomenon of communication is the focus of the scientific work of Andrushchenko T. and Zelenin V. (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022). The above-mentioned authors argue that in most cases psychological manipulation is carried out through the manipulation of information as a system of ways to influence human consciousness and unconsciousness with the aim of certain deception, deliberate distortion of reality, introduction into the mind of illusory concepts about a certain segment of reality, elementary concealment of the truth, goals, deeds, actions. Among the characteristics of manipulation as a form of communication, the authors identify the following:

1) the desire to gain a one-sided advantage, but at the same time, the manipulator cares about preserving his own image reputation;

2) the tendency to ignore other people's interests and intentions. However, this is not all-encompassing, but manifests itself in relation to the audience (interlocutor);

3) the presence of hidden influence involving indirect pressure rather than direct pressure using provocation, deception, intrigue, etc.

The purpose of manipulation is:

1) to disrupt the state of psychological balance and shake the psychological mood of an individual or social group (to cause feelings of threat, fear, uncertainty, doubt in political beliefs; to provoke panic, mass anxiety, etc.)

2) to improve the moral and psychological state of an individual, social group, or society. This includes forming convictions in the correctness of a political position, belief in victory, and other similar outcomes.

3) to consolidate a certain stereotype or myth in the minds of a person or social group. This is achieved by forming a strong negative belief towards a political opponent or by promoting the infallibility of a leader.

4) to encourage action, often through propaganda and advertising (Smolianiuk et al., 2021, p.12).

Manipulation as a component of political communication can be carried out at different levels: interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup, and mass. Experts in the field of applied political research argue that political manipulation has certain characteristic features at each of these levels of application, namely: at the level of a person (individual), it is characterized by a clear targeting of manipulative action, relative ease of attracting and diverting attention, and consideration of temperament and character. Political manipulation aimed at a group (collective) affects a social characteristic (element) based on professional, age, ethnic and other characteristics; it should include overcoming the focus of people's attention on narrow group interests, the effect of the mechanism of emotional contagion. At the mass level, manipulative actions lose their clear target, are based primarily on taking into account the peculiarities of mentality, using generalized techniques of psychological influence, exploiting the inherent emotionality, personal irresponsibility, and spread of the mechanism of emotional contagion in the masses (Horbatenko, 2008, p. 296).

The introduction of political manipulation technologies as a component of political communication is based on a thorough consideration of various factors, including the historical, socio-

economic, mental, religious, and ethno-national characteristics of society, as well as its foreign policy orientation and the formation of political elites. In an information war, manipulation is a part of the communication processes of the political environment. Political communication affects the formation of political views and values, the level of political culture and the level of public trust in state institutions, as well as the formation of public opinion. Scientists who study applied aspects of political science (Horbatenko, 2008) believe that the most common ways of manipulating public opinion in modern society in the context of information warfare are:

1) direct disinformation (misleading, untrustworthy information deliberately spread by a participant in the political process and presented as true);

2) distortion of facts, which consists in their incomplete, one-sided or biased presentation to the public with deliberate concealment of essential details or distortion of the reliable factual basis of the message;

3) inadequate use of sociological survey data with free interpretation, or even the creation of falsified surveys by specially created sociological centres;

4) «leakage» of pseudo-secret information. The technology of deliberate dissemination of «pseudo-secret» information that is perceived by society with a predominantly trusting attitude and a high level of interest;

5) references to unconfirmed sources that are difficult to verify;

6) speculating on people's fears; such technologies are often used during elections to influence voters' preferences for a particular option for certain politicians or political forces to come to power (or not);

7) making analysis impossible. This technique involves spreading the flow of information without being able to isolate or analyze a particular message or trend i.e. without being able to draw independent conclusions due to the constant pressure of information;

8) limiting and distracting attention. The technique involves spreading a «sensation» that is intended to distract the attention of an informed audience from really more relevant events;

9) the use of historical analogies. This technique plays an important role in political manipulation technologies, as historical facts can be interpreted as analogies to all cases of modern life (for example, the dissemination of historical metaphors in the media or social networks, which to some extent program certain opinions, assessments, preferences and behavior of the objects of influence, ensuring the achievement of manipulative goals);

10) the use of the method of associations, which is one of the most common in the practice of using political manipulation technologies (for example, activation of negative memory and transfer of a negative image to a specific person, etc.)

11) imposing socio-political myths and stereotypes on the mass consciousness, which are perceived by society without their rational and critical reflection;

12) logical persuasion in the desired context. The method of political manipulation is designed for those who prefer facts, evidence, and critical reflection on information influence. This method includes the technique of involving experts, opinion leaders, popular media personalities, whose speeches (lectures, appeals, reasoned assessments) are used to exert a targeted influence on thinking, political preferences, public opinion positions, and worldview in general (as cited in Horbatenko, 2008, p.p. 224-226).

Manipulation as a technique of information and communication political technologies is mostly negative and poses a certain threat to the development of civil society. It causes alienation of people from participation in political life, and distorts the public's perception of social phenomena. This is due to the fact that manipulative technologies in the context of information and propaganda wars involve applying the principles of political confrontation and hate speech. According to scholars (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022) political propaganda as a psycholinguistic phenomenon manipulates information through the following three strategies.

1) Generalization — each new message is categorized and compared with previous subjective experience in order to be classified as a «correct» category.

2) Deletion — silencing, censoring or deleting unnecessary (unfavourable) information messages. This strategy is based on the fact that, when receiving certain information, a person tends to miss a significant amount of data.

3) Distortion — people tend to interpret information in accordance with their habits of perception: established views, stereotypes, values, beliefs, previous experience, etc.

In presenting information messages, propaganda on the one hand takes into account the reality of the situation and the existing «world picture» of the target audience, and on the other hand actively (often covertly) influences the reformation of the cause-and-effect relationships of this «world picture» in the direction desired by the propaganda subject.

All of the above-mentioned strategies form a single structure of propaganda work with information. Manipulation as a component of

political communication in the context of information warfare is aimed at inciting hatred, deepening confrontation, and making it impossible to find compromises.

Ukrainian scholar O. Boyko (2010) notes that information manipulation is aimed at forming and fixing in people's minds a false model of external reality. This act is carried out using technological methods of processing, interpreting and presenting information. The researcher notes that the message of a political manipulator should not only be perceived, but also produce the «desired» effect in the target audience, in particular, to cause reactions, form certain moods, and stimulate a specific action. The main task of such manipulative influences in political communication is to deform the public consciousness. Among the universal methods of information and psychological manipulation, the following are extremely common:

- the method of silencing or distorting information;
- the method of «labelling» — a selection of offensive epithets, metaphors, names aimed at discrediting a person, organization, ideas or proposals;
- the method of "transfer" or «transmission» — spread of a person's authority to support (positive transfer) or discredit (negative transfer) certain political figures, social groups, political ideas or programmes in a way that is unobtrusive or inconspicuous to the majority;
- the «card shuffling» technique is a one-sided or tendentious disclosure of facts and judgements while simultaneously silencing the opposite;
- the «guys you can trust» technique — showing the manipulator's unity with the audience through visual similarity and social affiliation to quickly establish contact with the target audience, gain trust and create an image of a «man of the people»;
- the «common platform/common carriage» technique — dissemination of thoughts, ideas, statements that require uniformity in behaviour, creating the effect of «acting like everyone else» (Boyko, 2010, p.p. 167-169).

Furthermore, the arsenal of manipulative technologies is being dynamically expanded, supplemented and enriched in connection with the development of the latest information and communication capabilities of modern society. The spread of propaganda in the course of the information war has actualized such means of manipulative influence as:

- substitution of concepts — the use of special terms that create a distorted reality, an inaccurate picture of reality, misleading the object of manipulation;

- concealment — the transmission of reliable but incomplete information in order to conceal important and significant details, resulting in a distorted perception of reality by targeted audience;
- selection — selective presentation of material, disclosure of only that part of the information that is important to the manipulator;
- distortion — deliberate exaggeration of the insignificant or reduction of the significance of something important in communication interactions;
- falsification — the submission of false information for mercenary reasons that distorts phenomena, facts, events;
- creation of a non-existent reality — the formation of a false perception of the political situation, the image of a leader or a political force in the object of manipulation;
- disguise — an attempt to hide essential information behind insignificant information;
- timing manipulation — delay in publishing reliable, truthful information at the moment when it has lost its relevance, etc.

Manipulators use certain logical and psychological techniques to influence feelings, perception, memory, and thinking (Boyko, 2010, p.174), (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022, p.p. 60-61).

Ukrainian scholars (Boyko, 2010), (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022) researching political manipulation and the psychology of political propaganda have identified the following logical techniques of manipulative influence:

1) the technique of uncertainty of the thesis: speculation on the fact that an unclearly formulated main thesis of the discussion allows the initiator of the technique to use different options for interpreting the opinion expressed by him; that is, the possibility of interpreting what is said in different ways, depending on the situation;

2) the technique of substituting theses: the manipulator covertly changes the basic thesis during the discussion or debate;

3) the technique of disregarding the law of sufficient grounds: an attempt to prove the legitimacy of statements by covertly violating such generally accepted rules of argumentation as reliability, sufficiency, and consistency;

4) the technique of double comparisons: contamination of two comparative judgements (inclusion of details of one event in another) based on different parameters. The purpose of this technique is to create the illusion of a double advantage. For example, «politician A is younger and more promising than politician B, and has a higher rating than politician C». As a result, the illusion of a double advantage of politician A arises (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022 p.60);

5) the technique of false causation: the artificial embedding of individual facts into an imaginary causal relationship;

6) the technique of false generalization or exaggeration:
a) deliberate admission by the manipulator of a logical error — transferring a part of it to the object of assessment, characterization, etc.
b) presentation or emphasis of a single fact as a regular phenomenon
c) unjustified generalization, exaggeration of the meaning of the opponent's statements, extended interpretation of them (for example, «our leader is authoritative and popular, which means that our entire party has authority among the people, a high rating of popularity and support») (Boyko, 2010, p.175);

7) the technique of false concretization: transfer of reasonable conclusions about the whole to its parts;

8) the technique of 'jumping over the event' involves discussing future events in detail while avoiding analysis of current issues. The technique aims to deliberately divert attention from current issues.

9) the use of a false alternative (illusion of choice): a) the use of incomparable concepts in the course of a discussion (dialogue); b) offering the opponent alternatives, among which one (necessary for the manipulator) is presented or evaluated as correct on the basis of the unacceptability of others;

10) analogy from the opposite: deliberate use of logically incorrect statements that are not relevant to the analogy. For example, politician A, being principled and professional, participates in an action/event, so politician B, who does not join it, is unprincipled and unprofessional (Andrushchenko & Zelenin , 2022, p. 61).

Psychological methods of political manipulation include:

1) the method of imposing a model of perception: covert but consistent and purposeful forcing an opponent to agree with certain criteria and assessments; forms and methods of analysis that create an impression of the world around the manipulator that is favourable to him/her;

2) the technique of devaluation: artificially reducing the level of importance of an issue and denying the expediency of discussing it when the opponent's arguments are more thorough and convincing. It is often used through phrases such as «At first glance, you may seem right, but...» or «Your arguments seem to be valid, but...» (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022, p. 61), (Boyko, 2010, p.176);

3) the technique of increasing value: shifting the emphasis so that the position (statement) is valued higher than the opponent interprets it;

4) the technique of differentiation: dividing the opponent's statements into two groups: a) statements that should be agreed with;

b) statements that should be denied in order to compromise the main undesirable ideas and proposals in the further discussion;

5) the technique of discrediting the opponent's idea: removing from the discussion an idea (problem) that is unfavourable to the manipulator by ignoring it, focusing on the opponent's personal qualities, appealing to common sense, etc.;

6) the use of double standards: assessing a person, event, or fact depending on how much they help or hinder the implementation of manipulative plans. The technique involves: a) recognizing the same arguments as convincing when they are used to defend the manipulator's position and unacceptable when they are expressed by the opponent; b) emphasizing the idea that the arguments in favour of the manipulator's position are true, justified and supported by evidence, while opposing arguments are false, erroneous, or falsified (Boyko, 2010, p.177). For example, sending troops into the territory of a foreign state during an internal armed conflict can be labelled as either «intervention» or «military assistance» (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022, p. 61);

7) the «wordplay» technique: using the peculiarities and characteristics of language depending on the circumstances and needs of the manipulator: changing words to similar sounding ones, parts of a word or a single letter; using verbal and figurative associations; deliberately misplaced emphasis; using so-called «linguistic pearls» or ambiguities; distorting the meaning, deliberately confusing, changing the order of words in the context;

8) the technique of using vague (ambiguous) statements: a) reducing the clarity and certainty of statements, such as: «there is an opinion...», «according to the latest data...» (without specifying sources of information, exact dates, statistics, etc.); b) distortion of information through emotional hyperbole;

c) assessment without specific criteria, for example: policy A is better than policy B (without specifying comparison criteria, specific differences in how much and in what way it is better, etc.)

9) the irrelevance technique: formulating a message that is not relevant to the information request. The manipulator uses tactics and techniques of distraction, presenting arguments that do not relate to the opponent's position, thoughts, behaviour and statements;

10) the «painting in black» technique: emphasizing the consequences of the opponent's position, which the manipulator presents as negative and unacceptable;

11) the «ice mountain» technique: warning or intimidation that it is enough to take one step on the «ice mountain», i.e. to make a seemingly

insignificant, unreasonable, wrong action and the situation will get out of control. In the information field of modern Ukrainian society, Russian propaganda narratives of the «nuclear threat», «accidents at nuclear power plants», «crossing the red lines as markers of the threat of world war», etc. are often promoted. Thus, they play on the feeling of fear, emphasize possible negative consequences of a large scale, etc.);

12) the «accuracy trap» technique: substantiating one's own statements with dubious statistics and figures. It speculates on the natural human tendency to associate precise figures with scientific rigour, seriousness, motivated arguments, and reliance on the authority of science. The technique is used in the information environment in several ways: a) as a reference to an imaginary authority that does not actually exist in the field concerned, for example, comments by pop stars, athletes, actors, opinion leaders on trends in the country's political development or the country's recovery from the crisis, etc.

b) a reference to a clearly unspecified expert («experts believe», «analysts predict», etc.) (Boyko, 2010, p.179);

13) the technique of negating arguments: rejecting a true and important argument as insignificant or false. Phrases that serve as tools for using this technique: «This argument is too naive/not serious enough to be taken into account...»;

14) the technique of obviousness: artificial presentation of the state of affairs as absolutely clear and obvious, which removes the question of debate, discussion and makes any further reasoning superfluous. To avoid the risk of revealing incompetence or causing a negative reaction from the majority, it is relevant to manipulate information using this technique instead of trying to prove a point;

15) the technique of combination: combining reliable and unreliable, dubious information in one statement;

16) the «triple helix» technique: a phased language manipulation where one story is suddenly cut off, then another is given, which is also cut off, and finally, a third story is presented, containing the key idea that the manipulator is trying to convey. After the initiator of the influence is convinced that the essence of the third story is clearly fixed in the mind of the object of manipulation, the message about the first and second stories logically ends. This technique is based on the laws of suggestion described by the famous hypnologist M. Erickson (USA) (Andrushchenko & Zelenin, 2022, p. 62);

17) the method of dominance of form over content: focusing not on the essence of the issue or problem, but on the form of its presentation — «packaging»;

18) the technique of nihilistic conformism: rejection of any generally accepted opinion (for instance, Russian propaganda often claims that Ukraine has never been an independent and sovereign state, etc.);

19) the use of the trap of the immutability of principles: stimulating blind adherence to principles, canons, dogmas, rituals, which lead to ignoring or denying real facts, total disorientation in a constantly changing world;

20) the technique of isolation: taking a statement out of context, isolating it and placing it in a sphere where it acquires a different meaning. Often, the quote is deliberately shortened, which gives the statement a new meaning desired by the manipulator (Boyko, 2010, p.183).

Of course, there are other logical and psychological methods of political manipulation in the context of modern information wars. All of them were used in the information confrontation of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war long before 2014. The use of manipulation principles has significantly increased after 24 February 2022. Analyzing the media discourse of political life in Ukraine and the world, we can state that the number of political manipulation techniques is increasing, which is due to the methods and tools of modern information confrontation. It is worth pointing out the growing trend in the use of manipulative psycho-technologies of political propaganda of the so-called «alternative history» narratives, which are used to create falsifications, information fakes, and insinuations to spread misinformation about the cause and effect of most events taking place in the modern world. Therefore, the ability to track them in communication can help build psychological resilience and critical thinking as prerequisites for psychological security and political consciousness in the realities of information warfare.

Television remains a powerful complex means of manipulating certain layers of society, as it organically combines visual and audio influences. The tools of communicative influence remain interviews (standard, random, sensational), techniques of «repetition of information», «last word effect», which allows the manipulator to promote his or her own or desired opinion in the form of conclusions expressed towards the end of a programme or speech.

The system of manipulative techniques can be characterized as elements of political communication in the context of information warfare by generalizing real political practice and considering the developments of scholars. They can be further divided into groups depending on the object of influence. These techniques impact the

mechanisms of mental reflection, including sensation, perception, thinking and memory. Additionally, their effects target the mechanisms of regulation such as attention, emotions, feelings, imagination, will, temperament, character and mentality.

Considering the essence of real political practice and the use of manipulative techniques in the context of Russian propaganda in Ukraine during the war, we can state that they are aimed at spreading the mood of «betrayal», intimidation and panic among the population; creating information chaos; systematic and purposeful persuasion of the target audience by ideological means; discrediting the activities of the authorities, individual civil society institutions, for example: TDF (Territorial Defence Forces), public associations and organizations, representatives of volunteer movements, as well as the media, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc. All of this will contribute to the «rocking of the boat» of Ukrainian society.

It is important to consider that the active use of manipulative technologies has a direct impact on the level of trust that civil society places in state institutions and their choices of information sources. According to the results of sociological study titled «Democracy, Rights and Freedoms of Citizens, and Media Consumption in Times of War», conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on behalf of the non-governmental and non-party all-Ukrainian public control organization «Opora», the information and media consumption practices of Ukrainians have changed since February 24th, 2022 («Naibilshe ukraintsi», 2022). In particular, it is said that the majority of respondents (69%) use social media as the most trusted source of information. Respondents named Telegram channels and Facebook groups among the most popular. It is worth noting that Ukrainians also consider the all-Ukrainian national telethon «United News» as an important source of information.

In the context of information warfare as a component of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity, it is crucial that Ukrainian state policy is focused on protecting the information space. The policy should aim to elevate the level of information security and increase resilience to information attacks and threats.

The international community supports Ukraine in countering manipulative influences in the information field. Scholars argue that European institutions are looking for ways to counter propaganda and methods to combat Russian fakes (Medvedev, 2023, p.139). Studying the peculiarities of the use of modern communication technologies, narratives and topics of information warfare, O. Medvedev (2023)

notes that the European community demonstrates an unjustifiably liberal approach to information aggression by the aggressor (Russia) and is extremely slow to take the necessary measures. When the European Union imposed sanctions on the Russian media holding «Russia Today» and the «Sputnik» news agency after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops, the decision gave rise to accusations of alleged violations of fundamental democratic principles and civil liberties by EU institutions (Medvedev, 2023, p.139). As part of its defensive information warfare operations against the aggressor country, Ukraine began to launch information attacks in response to the enemy's actions as well as to carry out information penetration into the enemy's territory and consciousness. Certain aspects of information warfare in cyberspace in modern conditions are covered in the scientific works of Ukrainian researchers (Medvedev, 2023), (Avramenko D. &Avramenko M. (2022). Information penetration into the enemy's territory has become a joint project of public-private and civil-military partnership (Medvedev, 2023, p.140).

In addition, it is worth emphasizing that non-governmental organizations have taken the primary initiative in actively countering manipulative influence in the information space of Ukrainian society. The level of political influence on public opinion in Ukrainian society is quite significant. That is why the issue of studying the peculiarities of the use of manipulation technologies, including those aimed at influencing public opinion, remains relevant. As a result, the development and implementation of appropriate methods and mechanisms for protecting and counteracting manipulative influence is in demand in modern society. It is worth noting the main fact-checking initiatives during the war that are available in the Ukrainian information space, in particular for verifying the accuracy of information, as well as for checking fakes, etc. These include: «The National Security and Defence Council's Countering Disinformation Centre», the National Media Literacy Project's Filter platform, «Bez brekhni», «Stop Fake», «Nota Yenot», «Ukraine Facts», etc, each of which has a website or is represented on popular social media. In the context of modern information wars, political manipulation is a powerful communication tool. The transition from analogue to digital means of transmitting and disseminating information has made it more accessible and less controlled by government institutions. This transition has increased the speed of virtual activities and reactions in widespread social networks, expanded opportunities for promoting elements of information terror, and changed the focus of information policy. Taking into account these trends, experts of the educational online platform «Zrozumilo» identify

certain peculiarities of the perception of information by Ukrainian society, which are used by manipulators to promote propaganda narratives and influences. These features are as follows («Informatsiini operatsii», 2023): citizens' distrust of state institutions; Ukrainians' desire to find quick solutions to complex problems; lack of a culture of searching for primary sources of information, unwillingness to verify information, etc.

Almost two years of full-scale invasion have changed the situation with the search for primary sources of information. According to the USAID-Internews Media Consumption Survey («Opytuvannia USAID-Internews», 2022), there have been significant changes in news consumption: consumption of TV, radio, press and websites has decreased (most of all TV), and the news audience has shifted mainly to social media; 49% of Ukrainians use several types of media for news; if they use only one source, it is usually social media. In 2022, Telegram became the main social network for both communication and news consumption. It is popular social media that has become the place of the highest concentration of information fakes — false information messages distorted by manipulators.

The average citizen who relies on social media and popular online channels for information lacks sufficient tools for filtering information and protection from fakes. This means that political manipulation is a powerful part of communication in the context of information warfare, and people as consumers of information are often left to deal with harmful content alone. Experts estimate that only 14% of Ukrainians can identify fake news in the information space («Informatsiini operatsii», 2023).

According to Ukrainian researcher A. Stadnyk (2015), information warfare consists of actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of the national military strategy, including by influencing the enemy's information and information systems, while at the same time strengthening and protecting one's own information, information systems and infrastructure. The main weapon used in information warfare is a specific information weapon, which is a means of destroying, distorting or stealing information arrays, etc (Stadnyk, 2015, p.113). Describing information warfare as a communication technology of influence on the mass consciousness and public opinion, A. Stadnyk (2015) outlines some features that characterize information weapons, including: universality, attacking nature, secrecy, multivariate forms of implementation, radical influence, pseudo-selectivity, freedom of spatial and temporal manoeuvre, and cost-effectiveness (Stadnyk, 2015, p.114). These features lead to the

conclusion that the manipulation of information in the context of information warfare is becoming a component of public communication, especially its political segment. One of the authors the Political Science Encyclopedic Dictionary (Voronkova, 2004) point out that the mass media in the context of political manipulation aim to form unified and deliberately simplified, reduced to the standards of mass consciousness ideas about existence that do not reach the level of theoretical reflection (Voronkova, 2004, p. 322). Thus, manipulation, as a component of political communication, is a tool for influencing the perception of political realities and shaping political views, assessments and actions necessary for the manipulator to promote the information he needs.

Manipulative actions in the political sphere are used not only through communication processes. Political manipulation has a wide arsenal and instruments of influence. The problem of protecting against manipulative influence in politics has always been relevant. This problem has become particularly acute for Ukrainian society in the current political environment. The Internet competes with print media and television in terms of audience reach, as it has no significant restrictions and is perceived as a platform for freedom of information.

Technologies of political manipulation and manipulation as a component of political communication in the modern information environment are aimed at intensifying or suppressing political activity. Such influence occurs at two levels: interpersonal and mass. Investigating the peculiarities of political manipulation in the information space, M. Brodchak (2012) notes that in order to influence the level of interpersonal relations, the manipulator resorts to a set of certain manipulative techniques intended for use at the interpersonal level. The mass level of manipulative influence, according to the scientist, is possible through the use of manipulative technologies. Such technologies are sometimes referred to as persuasive communications, avoiding the terminology «manipulative» (Brodchak, 2012, p.285). Among the most common methods and techniques in network manipulation technologies is the «commenting» technology, the use of which creates the illusion of citizen participation in the political process by expressing their own opinions, sharing and discussing them in popular social networks.

However, at the same time, organised groups of «interlocutors» from fake accounts, the so-called «bot farms», can be involved in such discussions. The main task of bots is to spread propaganda sentiments, fake false news or facts, manipulative information, or to carry out information or cyber attacks in favour of the manipulator. Therefore,

the manipulator can direct the opinions of citizens, interested social groups, or large social strata in the desired direction. This means taking into account the specifics of the political life of the society, historical and socio-economic features of its development, mental, religious and ethno-national characteristics, foreign policy orientation, peculiarities of the formation of political elites, political regime and other factors that can become the subject of disputes in social networks and be used to create informational and psychological special operations (IPSO) — as another example of an extremely popular reception of the political manipulation in the modern information space among mass media and social networks.

Manipulative political technologies work and achieve their goal because of the uncritical thinking of citizens, as a significant part of generalizations, information about social and political life, and interpretation of facts are not subject to verification by the public or potential electorate. The media and social networks have a wide range of potential opportunities to influence public opinion. Social values, political sentiments and preferences, and public opinion as such, are formed with the help of the media and modern Internet resources (Lysenko & Maneliuk, 2022, p. 45).

Counteracting hostile manipulative technologies and information manipulative influence in general should be the basis of the state's domestic and foreign policy, especially in the context of information warfare. In developed democracies, measures are taken at the state level to ensure an effective system of protection against manipulative influence. In the transition countries, to which Ukraine still belongs, traditional protection mechanisms have been destroyed or do not correspond to the development of modern manipulative technologies in the political sphere, as noted by domestic scholars, and the latest protection mechanisms are in the process of being formed under the influence of the new inauthenticity (Smolianiuk et al., 2021, p.157). However, according to L. Makarenko (2015), the state communication policy has not yet become a basic fundamental concept in public policy (Makarenko, 2015, p.p. 207-209). The researcher notes that in the context of incomplete democratic transformations in Ukraine, the search for new forms of interaction between public authorities, local self-government institutions and civil society continues. There have been various attempts to establish a system for informing the public about the activities of the authorities and to ensure sustainable feedback between the authorities and citizens. This is done within the framework of developing a culture of public administration.

Methods of counteracting political and manipulative influences in the information and communication space will be effective and appropriate if the following principles are observed:

- impartiality;
- confirmation of information with documents and verified facts;
- alternatives in the search for relevant sources of information;
- involvement of specialists, experts, opinion leaders with relevant professional competences in disseminating official information to the public.

In the long run, this will contribute to the development of political communication processes on a democratic basis, the formation of a civilized civil society, democratization and the consolidation of European political values regarding human expression in the information, communication and political processes of our time.

Conclusions.

Political manipulation is rapidly spreading in the modern information society and is becoming an integral technology of political communication. The application of techniques and methods of information warfare, as well as the implementation of mechanisms of manipulative influence, have a broad scope that is dynamic and difficult to predict.

In the context of information warfare, political manipulation technologies have a significant impact on the political moods and views of a particular society, especially manifested in the formation of public opinion, and shape the appropriate level of citizens' activity in the political life of the country. The basic elements of political manipulation are the following: the covert nature of action; targeted influence on a mass audience; and the manipulator's desire to direct public sentiment and political behavior.

Manipulation technologies in the field of political communication are characterized by the construction of a specific reality in order to achieve behaviour favourable to the manipulator and to divert public attention from acute social problems. To counteract manipulative influence in the media and social media, it is necessary to develop critical and analytical thinking skills and to observe information hygiene in the media space.

In the modern information space, there is a positive trend towards countering manipulative influences. The tendency to actively counteract the use of political manipulation technologies is becoming more relevant: the formation of feedback channels in communication processes at the government-citizen level is intensifying, and active digitalization of management processes is being introduced. It should

be borne in mind that the complex of manipulative technologies is dynamically expanding, supplementing, and updating in the context of the development of the latest information and communication capabilities of modern society. Therefore, it is crucial to improve methods of countering political and manipulative influences in the modern information and communication space at both individual and collective, social and state levels.

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THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA AND ANTI-PROPAGANDA TECHNOLOGIES ON THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE

Abstract.

The article analyzes information technologies, which are not only a channel of communication and technological models, they include a range of mechanisms, techniques, and means that are combined with the global expansion of the information space, influencing the formation of new and changing old traditions, values and forms of behavior. A serious danger for the democratic system and citizens is the use of mass media and information space as a channel for political manipulation, which is a covert management of people's behavior and political consciousness with the aim of forcing them to act against their own interests. Public opinion plays a significant role in the development of a democratic political system. The purpose of the article is to study the influence of political technologies of propaganda and anti-propaganda on the formation of public opinion in Ukraine. The article uses the historical method, which revealed the essence of propaganda and anti-propaganda from the time of Russian aggression from 2014 to today. System analysis provided an opportunity to analyze the formation of public opinion in Ukraine under the conditions of propaganda and anti-propaganda. The structural-functional method showed the analysis of the features of political propaganda in the conditions of war. The comparative method provided a comparison of the methods of political propaganda in the USA and political propaganda in Ukraine. To solve the problem in order to effectively combat propaganda, it is necessary to: ban the permission for propaganda, based on liberalism and pluralism of opinions; blocking footage in social networks that show war victims; drawing attention in each state to cases of growth in its information space of significant weight of mass media of another state. Fakes and narratives are used in the informational influence of the russian side. To overcome the narratives of the enemy, Ukraine needs a powerful and high-quality anti-propaganda product capable of broadcasting real stories about events in Ukraine. Media literacy, media education and public activism should encourage the population to highlight quality information.

Keywords: *public opinion, counter-propaganda, anti-propaganda, state information war, propaganda, information security, information policy, fake news, framing, narrative.*

Statement of the problem in a general form and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. In the development of

modern society, there is a rapid growth and improvement of information technologies, which is the driver of changes in the economy, social structure and politics, which cause a revolution in human consciousness. Information technologies are not only channels of communication and corresponding technological models, but also a range of mechanisms, methods, means, combined with the global expansion of the information space, influencing the formation of new and changing old traditions, values and forms of behavior. A significant danger for the democratic system and citizens is the use of mass media and information space as a channel for political manipulation, which is a covert management of people's behavior and political consciousness with the aim of forcing them to act against their own interests.

Public opinion contains illusory and real ideas about reality. The formation of public opinion takes place under the influence of political, socio-economic and social factors, through the means of ideology, within the framework of the theoretical-scientific and everyday level of consciousness, as a means of circulation of various information flows (gossip, news) and is a weapon in the struggle of various socio-political forces for power (Stefanchuk, 2008, p. 130).

Currently, the study of the problem of state information policy is a means of influencing the reflection of threats in the country's information field. Political activity and management decisions are carried out on the basis of the requirements of the state information policy. Important tasks of the state information policy should be the formation of favorable conditions for the formation, development, modernization and application of national information resources, information and telecommunication infrastructure and technologies.

Information wars as a global phenomenon of the information society and a type of modern confrontation are carried out in various spheres, where the main importance is the transmission of messages, constructs, narratives that are consumed by society. In terms of the deployment and course of information wars, the most effective is counter-propaganda, which is used as a response to propaganda activity (Denysiuk, 2021, pp. 46-47).

Public opinion plays a significant role in the development of a democratic political system. Therefore, politicians should always look for new mechanisms of influence on public opinion, taking into account this phenomenon of social life. In history, there were many examples of manipulation of public opinion. Examples of such influence were found in ancient Athens, while the processes of democratization and modernization transformed public opinion as a significant factor in public development, to which both the career of individual politicians

and the fate of the state depend. Public opinion characterizes the legitimacy of the political and social order, the results of electoral contests.

At various stages of historical development, the formation of public opinion was influenced by such political and social institutions as education, science, religion, family, political parties, mass media, institutions of civil society and private property. As for totalitarian states, there is a corresponding mechanism of influence on public opinion, namely, indoctrination, which includes all social spaces and education takes a prominent place.

In modern conditions, the influence on public opinion is carried out with the help of such communication technologies as propaganda and political advertising, which acquire special importance for domestic political theory and practice. Since Ukrainian society encountered a hybrid war during the process of forming democratic institutions and military aggression and annexation in 2014 (Kropyvko, 2021, p. 97).

The war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine revealed the shortcomings of a number of global problems and the system of international law. The main ones are truthfulness of information and countering propaganda. Information warfare is a tool for controlling the masses and distorting public consciousness (Drabyuk, 2022, p. 154). In war, in addition to military resources, propaganda resources are used, which exert a significant influence on the formation of public opinion. Anti-propaganda is a distortion of the defense of a position in an undemocratic way or the debunking of lies.

The goals and objectives of the article. The purpose of the article is to study the influence of political technologies of propaganda and anti-propaganda on the formation of public opinion in Ukraine. The main feature is the definition of the essence of the concept of «public opinion», «propaganda» and «anti-propaganda». Analysis of political propaganda during the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Research on the formation of public opinion under the influence of various informational and psychological factors. Tracking the information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and counter-propaganda to overcome the narratives of the enemy.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Among scientists, there is no unanimous understanding of the essence of public opinion. Public opinion was studied in the works of V. Lippman, which was the first attempt to deal with the problems of representative and democratic government. Democratic theory assumed that citizens could make rational decisions about public issues when they became aware of this fact. V. Lippmann argued as a competent opinion, which democracy

needs from those who have special knowledge, intelligence, which would provide relevant information for decision-makers in the executive and legislative power (Lippmann, 1992, p. xix). The works of H. Blumer are devoted to the study of public opinion (Blumer, 2003, p. 173).

The growth of tension in the processes of representative democracy was studied by R. Dalton, V. Burklin, and E. J. Drummond. Researchers have focused on two main forms of democratic government: representative and direct democracy. In particular, a decrease in voter turnout and public trust in parties and representative institutions in general. These signs indicated the growth of public dissatisfaction with the existing system of representative democracy (Dalton et al., 2001, pp. 141-153).

The study of public opinion and mass beliefs was developed by S. Feldman. The researcher identifies three main beliefs and values in the structure of the policy: support for equal opportunities, economic individualism, and a system of free enterprise. Researching the structure of public opinion and the mass system of beliefs, the scientist adopted a sociological model of limiting the system of beliefs, which considers the development of the structure in mass belief systems as a function of social learning (Feldman, 1988, pp. 416-417).

At the beginning of 2014, the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine caused the emergence of a new direction of research in modern historiography. The leadership in this direction belongs to the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences, whose representatives have analyzed modern Russian-Ukrainian relations in a number of works (Ilnytskyi et al., 2022, p. 44).

Ukrainian researchers B. Yuskiv and S. Khomych studied the «hybrid war» waged by the Russian Federation in Eastern Ukraine, where propaganda resources are used. The researchers used materials from articles on the Russia Today website, the «News» section, to analyze propaganda in the media. Lists of words that carried a propaganda load were selected — 75 words. Analyzed the frequency of occurrence of keywords in the news and generated word clouds. The next step in the analysis was the clustering of Russia Today keywords and news. The next step was the definition of word-associations in the articles (Yuski & Khomych, 2017, p. 27; pp. 34-38).

Ukrainian researcher U. Stefanchuk analyzed public opinion in Ukraine in the context of the influence of information technologies. The researcher considered mass media as a channel of information influence, focused attention on the mechanisms and methods used to form public opinion (Stefanchuk, 2008, p. 129).

Ukrainian researcher D. Pavlov analyzed public opinion as an object of political propaganda and identified factors characterizing the peculiarities of political and propaganda influence on public opinion. The ability to influence the formation of public opinion is an indicator of effective political propaganda, which is based on the peculiarities and regularities of the political worldview of the bearers of public opinion (Pavlov, 2013, p. 54).

Ukrainian researchers O. Tretyak, V. Toryanyk consider public policy as a factor in the formation of public opinion in the context of the development of the party system of modern Ukraine, which is based on two dimensions: 1) public policy as politics is a place of interaction of various political subjects. Therefore, the existing positive publicity of party subjects is the main criterion for their influence on public opinion and activity; 2) public policy in the sense of policy is a channel for implementing party proposals based on marketing analysis of public opinion. Under the conditions of digitalization of political communication, parties are able to obtain the status of a mediator of a dynamic public environment and the institutional environment of public policy (Tretyak & Toryanyk, 2023, p. 35; p. 38).

The role of propaganda and counter-propaganda in conducting an information war was studied by Zh. Denysiuk. It was with the beginning of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine that the state information policy determined its priorities and vectors. Legislation was adopted, where the external enemy was recognized as an aggressor and directions for the protection of national interests were determined. The main task of the information space has become the formation of appropriate state counter-propaganda and information security. In order to minimize the spread of manipulative propaganda influences in the national information space, it is natural to ask about the formation of practical mechanisms for the implementation of the country's information policy by building a system of strategic communications, establishing communication with civil society and increasing the general level of media literacy in society (Denisyuk, 2021, p. 46).

The value of propaganda is important in the time of war, in which the whole of Ukraine currently lives. Propaganda is a certain form of communication and is focused on spreading arguments, facts, and other information, influencing public opinion for a public position or a common cause.

As noted by O. Kuzmuk and V. Lyubchuk, the influence on public opinion is carried out through oral propaganda, mostly without any confirmation of this information. Today, such information measures are

an integral part of state policy. Oral propaganda can be recognized as the most effective tool today. Means of oral propaganda are: conversations, lectures, conferences, discussions (Kuzmuk & Liubchuk, 2022, p. 976; p. 981).

Highlighting previously unresolved parts of the general problem, to which the article is devoted. The influence of information technologies on the formation of public opinion in Ukraine is insufficiently researched. The problem of combating disinformation and propagandistic fakes requires scientific development. Further careful study is the influence of political technologies on the formation of public opinion. The study of the phenomenon of anti-propaganda and the impact of anti-propaganda on the formation of public opinion remains relevant.

Research methods. The article uses a set of **methods** for establishing and developing the influence of political propaganda and anti-propaganda technologies on the formation of public opinion in Ukraine. The historical method revealed the essence of propaganda and anti-propaganda from the time of Russian aggression from 2014 until today. System analysis provided an opportunity to analyze the formation of public opinion in Ukraine under the conditions of propaganda and anti-propaganda. The structural-functional method showed the analysis of the features of political propaganda in the conditions of war. The comparative method provided a comparison of the methods of political propaganda in the USA and political propaganda in Ukraine.

Results and discussions. Since the beginning of the 60s of the 20th century the influence on the masses acquired the characteristics of global technologies of political manipulation, with the aim of artificially forming their interests and needs, and managing socio-political processes of various scales. H. Schiller, P. Lazarsfeld, T. Adorno emphasize that a similar phenomenon is a tool and a sign of a democratic society, in which there is an illusion of functioning of its democratic institutions, which is public opinion. In the 1940s, American scientists B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and G. Gode analyzed mass media and information technologies in the context of their influence on public opinion. In particular, scientists proposed the idea of a «two-stage communication threshold» in the formation of public opinion. The second half of the 20th century was marked by increased interest in the problems of artificial formation of public opinion. Taking into account the informational nature of the era and the rapid development of mass communication, researchers are particularly interested in mass media as channels and relays of influence on public

opinion. In Ukraine, this issue was not sufficiently developed and only in the late 90s of the 20th century. research began and scientific works appeared (Stefanchuk, 2008, p. 130).

Researchers V. Ilnytskyi, V. Starka, M. Galiv (2022) define the term «propaganda» «in the sense of a systematic attempt to manipulate the beliefs, views or actions of other people with the help of symbols (words, gestures, flags, monuments, music, clothes, insignia, hairstyles, drawings on coins and postage stamps)» (Ilnytskyi et al., 2022, p. 45).

Political propaganda and propaganda in general is a way of spreading power. Power cannot exist without propaganda, which is the exclusive substance by means of which power gives the subjects of subjection the ability to believe, to know, to appreciate their own exclusive right to rule, for by means of propaganda power becomes power. Subordination is the result of propaganda. Means of propaganda for the exercise of power can be: ideologies, ideas, myths, manipulation, religions, strategic communications or fears. With the expansion and spread of power, the implementation of propaganda is most often understood. Depending on the type of government, the appropriate type of propaganda is used. With social power, social propaganda is used, which comes from the common good of man as a social being and society, demanding submission to collective rules and symbols. Political power carries out political propaganda, addressing first of all the interests of a certain group, citizen, region, nation-state.

Propaganda is a special kind of power. Propaganda power is the effectiveness and efficiency of imposing on society and its groups values that structure their political behavior. The values spread by the propagandist power are the driving force of the power, transforming into motives for action, forcing those who become the object of propaganda to act accordingly (Pavlov, 2018, p. 32).

The term «propaganda» from лат. propago «spread», the basis of which is the method and presentation of information to the mass consumer. The purpose of propaganda is to exert a hidden influence on people's minds and impose the «necessary» point of view on them. The mass effect of propaganda was in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, propaganda in the Soviet Union and the Nazi regime in Germany. Today, one can note the information policy of spreading the idea of the so-called «Russian peace».

Classification of types of propaganda under a certain ideological regime. Depending on the orientation: 1) internal propaganda — directed at the internal consumer and characterized by the following features: reception of the «internal enemy», chauvinism, control of consciousness through psycho-emotional influence, imposition of

relevant correct points of view and ideas and intimidation, isolation of society; 2) external propaganda — is moderate and latent, its addressees are outside the «system». Its purpose is to form groups loyal to the regime outside its borders and to distort or hide its real actions and goals.

Depending on the sphere of dissemination: 1) cultural propaganda — dissemination of certain ideological and political views through works of art, influencers and famous cultural figures; 2) informational propaganda — spreading propaganda through fake news and disinformation by mass media; 3) political propaganda is ideological views contained in pre-election programs of political parties or individual politicians and their public speeches; 4) personal sphere — spreading propaganda by means of private communication, through social networks and messengers.

Depending on the degree of reliability of the information: 1) true information — which can be a tool of propaganda, if it is presented to attract the consumer to a certain inspired vision of this or that event; 2) partially distorted information — coverage of events partially in the light desired by the propagandist, using such tools as phrases taken out of context, edited video clips from the scene of the events, and ambiguous shots; 3) outright lies — completely fabricated informational slips, some of them look real, others are completely absurd.

Depending on the stage: 1) preparatory propaganda — creation of a favorable environment for the spread of this or that idea, checking the level of trust in fake news, probing the population, destabilizing consciousness, analyzing public sentiment; 2) active propaganda — concentration of influence on the masses, pushing to implement the plans of the «regime», encouragement and support for active actions, partly forcing actions through intimidation and threats; 3) concealment of traces — denial, silence, concealment of crimes committed by the regime (Drabyuk, 2022, pp. 154-155).

Propaganda is considered a politically motivated informational and psychological influence on the emotional and volitional sphere of mass consciousness, as a result of which political views, ideas, attitudes are introduced, and political behavior is formed. The psychological goal of propaganda is to influence the system of public, political and ideological attitudes of people, which can be changed by forming new attitudes or strengthening existing ones.

The key elements of the propaganda process are: the subject is a social group whose interests are expressed by the propaganda; form and methods; content; propaganda means or channels (television, radio,

location propaganda system, printed media); object (social communities or audience to which propaganda is addressed).

Counter-propaganda is an informational influence aimed at reducing the role of values reproduced from the positions of ideologies that are distant from the leading ideologies. Propaganda and counter-propaganda, focused on the formation of the appropriate style of thinking and further behavior in the mass audience (Denysiuk, 2021, p. 47-48).

The main principle of propaganda is its hidden and indirect nature. Propaganda does not work if it is perceived as propaganda, since no one wants to be the one who is manipulated (Pavlov, 2018, p. 33). The significant role of propaganda in the formation of public opinion, noted by most researchers, suggests that a significant object of political and propaganda influence is public opinion as meaningful judgments within the relevant community, which outline the attitude of the majority of citizens to the authorities. With the help of political propaganda, political actors exert an effective influence on public opinion in order to make it impossible and easier to obtain and exercise power. In the study of public opinion, it is important in what way and through what political propaganda can effectively influence public opinion. In order to change the judgments of the public, propaganda must change the political worldview of the public, which is carried out as a transfer of attention from one topic or object to another, the introduction of models of worldview of the political space, the actualization of prevailing stereotypes, emotional and evaluative verbalizations of current situations by political leaders and experts, as a result of implementation large-scale strategies with wide use of mythologizing, virtualization and ideologizing of political reality.

The methods of political propaganda are based on causal schemes and scripts with normative assumptions and instilling fear, which meets the selection criteria of mass media and news reports — their novelty, drama, action, morality. The successful application of such methods was by J. Bush in the USA after September 11, 2001, in order to guarantee the favorable attitude of the public to the policy of strengthening security measures that limited individual freedom.

One of the models is the formation of public opinion through agenda setting, which is one of the propaganda techniques. Within this model of the formation of public opinion on the agenda, one of the variations of political propaganda is the organization of a relevant political event, which fixes a new issue on the «agenda» of the public, thematization of which in the mass media deepens the influence of the political force that was associated with the given event. The ruling political forces use

another strategy of political propaganda as a diversion of public attention from «inconvenient» topics for the official authorities by «throwing» beneficial or neutral topics into the information space thanks to the organization of successful events for the country.

The model of priming or activation of instruction is closely related to the model of formation of public opinion through the establishment of the «agenda». Another model of public opinion formation is framing or structuring. The effectiveness of political propaganda based on the framing model depends on the degree of resonance caused by framing as a constellation of words and images in public consciousness and the frequency of their repetition. At a higher frequency, framing will create additional feelings and thoughts of the majority of the audience. The effectiveness of this propaganda will increase when the audience has no other schemes of interpretation of events.

Drawing attention to the «specific» qualities of the leader's personality or features of the situation can adjust public opinion to an interpretive scheme favorable to the propagandist. Simplified forms of fabrication in politics are political advertising (fabrication of political reality and its future), «paid» support or protest actions (fabrication of public consent or dissatisfaction). To eliminate the effect of fabrication, the propaganda technique of discrediting is used (Pavlov, 2013, pp. 55-57; p. 58).

The public provides priorities for public policy and provides government officials with insight into the demands and needs of citizens. Public opinion is influenced by media entities that do not have a clear value, ideological or doctrinal identity. In a democracy, public opinion is based on the real conditions of society (Tretyak & Toryanyk, 2023, p. 35).

There are three main features of the propagandistic type of communication: purposeful dissemination of information; ignoring the interests of the recipient; rejection of opponents' positions. Giving the information flow a purposeful form reproduces the character of the political activity itself. Propaganda is a means of the actor's informational goals, a tool and a mechanism capable of shaping and concentrating the actor's political efforts. Propaganda can both help implement a constructive political project for society, and contribute to a destructive path of development. The quality of information and the type of propaganda depends on the goals of the communicator. Even if the political regime engages in mass propaganda for good purposes and becomes the only source of information, then the propaganda acquires a negative character. Totalitarian regimes based on information monopoly are the most negative examples of suppression of social and political freedoms of citizens (Makarenko, 2014, p. 362).

Fake news (in English — fake news; in German — Falschmeldungen) or false messages, are messages, publications, articles, videos with false information distributed on the Internet. Fake news is found in such social networks as Twitter or Facebook. Quite often, a false report is not completely fabricated, the information in it may be incorrect or taken out of context.

Sometimes fake news is a joke that does no harm, but at the same time it is a problematic message that has the effect of intimidation, spreading hatred, (political) opinions, incitement against relevant groups or deceiving people.

Fake news is dangerous if it is believed to be real, which is why it spreads. The functioning of a democratic society requires a general picture of reality. Everyone has to form their own opinion and the facts are the same for everyone («Was sind», n.d.). The fight against false information is currently conducted in Ukraine by various fact-checking sites Slovo i dilo, Stop Fake, VoxCheck, and there is a register of fakes of Ukraine. In particular, in the USA it is FactCheck, and in the EU EU vs DISINFO.

Fakes are used in the informational influence of the Russian side. An example can be staged videos with allegedly Ukrainian servicemen talking «about the leadership's betrayal». Deliberately created anonymous telegram channels that seem to be run by Ukrainian military personnel. Elements of data falsification such as creating video appeals of Ukrainian officials through deep-fake technologies are occasionally used. Russian informational influence always adapts to new conditions. For example, simply anonymous citizens or fake military personnel, with the aim of increasing mistrust, use the Ukrainian language in communication (Oleschuk, 2023).

In today's world, most of the conflicts, dialogues, confrontations are carried out with the use of information technologies. In order to achieve any goal, every state uses modern methods of information influence. An example can be the information policy of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. According to O. Salata, in order to protect the modern information space from external influences, Ukrainian society should take into account the practical experience of preserving national identity by our people during the Second World War. Despite the occupation regime, Ukrainians managed to preserve their cultural values and traditions (Salata, 2018, p. 130; p. 143).

The Russian Federation is waging an information war against Ukraine, thereby initiating propaganda campaigns. To overcome the narratives of the enemy, Ukraine needs a powerful and high-quality product capable of broadcasting real stories about events in Ukraine.

As noted by D. Lubinets, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2023), «Documentary films are a kind of anti-propaganda of the Russian Federation, as well as a tool with which we can show the world terrible violations of human rights. And, of course, documenting today's events is evidence of the war crimes of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, which in the future can become materials in lawsuits against the aggressor and help us bring the Russian Federation to justice».

According to the Ombudsman, documentaries can primarily cover the deportation of Ukrainian children, the destruction of peaceful villages and towns, the return of prisoners of war and civilian hostages, murders and torture of the population. The documentary «Save the Grasshopper» about the deportation of Ukrainian children is well known. The film «Absolute Evil» reveals the war crimes of the army of the Russian Federation, which tells about the loss of prisoners, the shooting of civilians, the killing of children and adults, and the bombing of houses («Ombudsman: Documentary», 2023).

The Russian Federation came to the conclusion that there are not enough weapons in the conduct of war, so terrorism came to the fore. Mass attacks on civilian infrastructure facilities in the winter of 2022-2023 did not produce the expected results. The strategy of de-energizing Ukrainian cities was designed to break the will of Ukrainians to resist. The Russian leadership, not having received a positive result, began to exert informational and psychological pressure on Ukrainians.

The digitalization of modern society strengthens the informational aspect of warfare, as a variety of information is instantly disseminated through the latest means. Information influences exert a serious influence on the state of public consciousness, which affects the state of the armed forces. Another informational aspect is cyber security, which can inflict sharp blows on society. On December 11, 2023, the Russian side carried out hacking attacks on Ukraine, the Ukrainian mobile communication network «Kyivstar» was disabled, which moved the war into the information plane.

The latest information platforms affect the nature of informational and psychological special operations to reinforce the conduct of hostilities. Propaganda tools actively used by the Russian side for psychological pressure on Ukrainian society have undergone changes during the two years of the war.

Today, the aggressor's informational pressure is aimed at increasing panic, hopelessness, and depressive moods among Ukrainians. The main directions of Russian informational influence in the fall of 2023 were: the topic of «Ukraine's fatigue» in the West and the reduction of

support; threats to Ukrainians with large-scale shelling, the latest weapons, increased mobilization among citizens of the aggressor state; the negative situation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, problems in the Ukrainian army, depression and despair in this regard.

Significant efforts of russian propagandists contain the thesis of informational and psychological influence, about the concept of conflict between the military and political leadership of the state.

Currently, russian propagandists are monitoring the Ukrainian information space, collecting and analyzing all theses proclaimed by public and political figures, for further use in the implementation of informational influence. There is no censorship in Ukraine, both under martial law and before the war (Oleschuk, 2023).

The process of forming public opinion must undergo significant changes associated with the transition from an industrial society to an information society. The formation of public opinion is influenced by the development of the mass media system — Internet communications, mobile communications, social networks, which cause information shifts in political propaganda and advertising. In modern conditions, the transformation of communication technologies is determined by the state of «diffuse war» or «hybrid war» (Kropyvko, 2021, pp. 97-98).

Propaganda and political advertising are characteristic of communicative technologies of public opinion formation, while advertising is a marketing technology, and propaganda is not a marketing technology.

The influence of communication technologies on public opinion is interdependent on the following sources of information: traditional mass media — television, radio, press, are replaced by Internet communications, while the essence of the process remains unchanged, which is the importance of the factor of public opinion formation thanks to communication technologies. The determining factors of political advertising in public opinion are: the level of trust in the source of the message and its appropriateness to the agenda of society, since propaganda creates the agenda; the target audience of the advertising campaign is correctly defined. The rating of a politician, as well as of opponents — the customer of political advertising, is usually reduced by negative political advertising.

The modern characteristics of propaganda and political advertising as a technology of influence on public opinion are noted: the main trend of propaganda companies is not the restriction of information, which is inherent in authoritarian regimes, but the formation of a corresponding «picture of the world», which ensures self-censorship of users; «noise

«emotionality». The use of entertainment information as a significant component of propaganda; political advertising and propaganda create and promote life models in the information field, offering constructions rather than information. That is why propaganda is characterized as manipulation of meanings; the search for intellectually simple objects is carried out to influence public opinion, when showiness prevails over intellectual content; propaganda moves from the public space to the private space of the individual, for the sake of maintaining attention and simplifying manipulations, propagandists turn to strengthening the state of uncertainty, where neuropsychology is used; the influence of propaganda and political advertising on public opinion is characterized by systematicity, creativity, planning, discreteness, and cyclicity. The effectiveness of which directly depends on compliance with the legitimate political order. At that time, propaganda and political advertising as technologies for influencing public opinion have their own differences. Propaganda methods: creating an image of the enemy, disinformation and censorship (Kropyvko, 2021, pp. 98-99).

In the 20th century wars did not start suddenly, they were preceded by preparation, an inseparable element of which was propaganda. A few experts and analysts warned about the preparation of armed aggression by the Russian Federation, which was not heeded. There were many signs worth paying attention to regarding the inevitability of the latest Russia-Ukrainian war. During 1992–1996, the Parliament of the Russian Federation adopted a number of legislative acts that expressed territorial claims against Ukraine. In 1993–1997, the idea of a «Russian world» was popular in Russian ruling circles, which claimed the status of an all-Russian internal political unifying doctrine and a tool for the return of lost geopolitical positions.

An obstacle to the implementation of the doctrine of the «Russian world» was the position of the then president of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin, who concentrated on the settlement of the internal political crisis. As a result of long-term negotiations during an official visit to Kyiv on May 13, 1997, B. Yeltsin signed an agreement on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which was ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on January 14, 1998. The agreement entered into force on April 1, 1999, when the ratification documents were exchanged between the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Moscow (Ilnytskyi et al., 2022, p. 44; pp. 46-47).

The coming to power in 2000 of V. Putin, an apologist of the «russian world» doctrine, contributed to the repeated aggravation of Russian-Ukrainian interstate relations. V. Putin's speech at the First World Congress of Compatriots on October 11, 2001, initiated the mechanism of propagandizing the neo-imperial state-chauvinistic ideology of the «russian world», which was a certain reincarnation of the messianic doctrine «Moscow is the third Rome».

During the political crisis of 2001–2003, with the weakening of the position of the Ukrainian authorities, despite the agreement on the Russian-Ukrainian state border signed on January 28, 2003 in Kyiv between the presidents of Ukraine, L. Kuchma, and the Russian Federation, V. Putin. The treaty recognized the validity of the friendship provisions of May 31, 1997. Despite this, in September 2003, the Russian Federation attempted to capture the Ukrainian island of Tuzla.

After the end of the «Orange Revolution», Russian propagandists began to spread the thesis through television that «Bender people» are walking the streets of cities in Ukraine, who are «harming their Russian-speaking compatriots in the most terrible ways» and that «fascism is reincarnated». The ideology of «common historical memory» is a universal tool of the Kremlin's «soft power» in interstate relations.

The factor of preparation of the Russian society for a full-scale war gained large-scale application through the method of dehumanization of Ukrainians. This process intensified during the «Revolution of Dignity» (Ilnytskyi et al., 2022, p. 48; p. 53). The analysis of Russian media narratives was carried out by V. Shutov in 2014, noting that the intentions of the Russian government are purposeful, namely, propaganda tools, by means of dehumanization and demonization of Ukrainians make Russians prepared to kill Ukrainians. Dehumanization is not a modern invention, it is a certain deprivation of a person of his human essence. It is giving a person or a group of people the image of an animal and setting them apart from the category of «man». R. Shutov singled out the following directions of dehumanization: 1) Dehumanization of the protest movement and its leaders: numerous drawings, caricatures, photo frogs that represent protesters in the form of animals (monkeys, a flock of sheep), caricatures of Maidan leaders, various frames or photo collages that allegedly represented low and aggressive emotions of these people were sufficiently spread by social networks; 2) Hanging a dehumanizing label according to the logic of «Maidan = Zapadians = «Benderians» = fascism». All the rhetoric of the Russian mass media was interpreted as a fascist coup in Kyiv; 3) Dehumanization of the Ukrainian government and the entire

Ukrainian people: as a result of the victory of the revolution in Kyiv and the escalation of terrorism in the east, the new state power became the main object of dehumanization. The dehumanization of Ukrainians by the label of fascism is an official russian trend; 4) Dehumanization of the army; 5) Witch hunt (Shutov, 2014).

Propagandists of the «russian world» used manipulative strategies based on the use of the labels «nazis», «nashists» (under the name of the party «Our Ukraine»), «natsyuks», «Ukrnatsyky», «neo-nazis» to all citizens of Ukraine, which defended the sovereignty of their own state and the Ukrainian language and culture as the foundation of national identity (Ilnytskyi et al., 2022, p. 53). The position of the russian media changed radically with the coming to power of V. Putin, since most of the media became the property of the state and were controlled by the authorities through various mechanisms (Yuskiv & Khomych, 2017, p. 34).

N. Golovanova in her dissertation study «Media space in the conditions of formation and implementation of state information policy» proposed a periodization of the development of communications and opinion, media space, information policy of independent Ukraine: 1. The period of initial institutionalization of information policy (1991–1997): the media space was marked by rapid democratization in Ukraine, the formation of institutions and legislative space for the formation of state information policy was carried out; 2. The «Ukraine without Kuchma» period (1998–2004): the emergence of international media scandals due to the murder of H. Gongadze, the downplaying of the issue of ensuring the state's communication security and Ukraine's course towards European integration in 1998; 3. The period of revolutionary romanticism (2004–2009): the Orange Revolution took place and the emergence of the frame about the «three types of Ukrainians» and the work of the President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko in promoting the frame about the European destiny of Ukraine; 4. The period of information outsourcing (2010–2013): The Party of Regions controlled the media and the formation of an army of opinion leaders, while the President of Ukraine V. Yanukovich relied on Western advisers for strategy and communications under the leadership of Paul John Manafort, against the background of a lack of state communications return to negative fakes of 2003; 5. The period of the Rebellion of Dignity (2014–2015): against the background of the disappearance of the established system of stable communications, the revolution of Dignity appears, and the active work of many personal and some editorial media, businesses, and volunteers to form mechanisms for informing the world and fellow citizens unfolds; the

emergence of the «Novorossiya» frame and the application of the communicative frame in 2004 in relation to three types of Ukrainians as the essence of such aggression, as the beginning of the process of restructuring state communications to the conditions of information warfare; 6. The period of formation of the information security system of Ukraine (2016–2020): the emergence of a new architecture of the state information policy as part of the national and information security of the state; strengthening such frames as «russia is an aggressor that continues to attack», «Ukraine is a victim that continues to fight», abroad such a frame as «Ukraine is corruption»; 7. The period of turbulence, the rise of information wars and the beginning of digital transformation (2020–2021): the use of information policy tools is used to counter the information war on the part of the russian federation, and to respond to internal processes (Golovanova, 2021, pp. 11-12).

The impact of political technologies on the political consciousness of citizens during the 2019 presidential elections of Ukraine played a significant role. The relevance of political technologies is due to political competition, the struggle for power during the election period and the formation of state authorities at all hierarchical levels after the elections. The uniqueness of the 2019 elections was the appearance in the political environment of many people far from politics and the loss of support for old politicians. The appearance of such communications with voters as Facebook, Telegram, and Instagram is an effective tool in the fight for voters' votes and support. Information in the field of politics and the Internet enable each political actor to organize his own information flow in the network and effectively influence public opinion and political consciousness, to form the necessary image in society or achieve other political goals (Shurko, 2020, pp. 237-238).

During the formation of Ukraine's independence, the transformation of public policy in general and state information policy is continuously carried out (Holovanova, 2021, p. 11). In modern Ukraine, under the conditions of a full-scale invasion of the russian federation, the question of compliance of the political and institutional structure with the needs of capacity, requirements and resistance is important. The ability of public governance institutions to adequately represent their position is a significant sign of the democratization of Ukrainian society despite the severe consequences of enemy aggression. The ability to convince the public of the appropriateness of certain decisions and actions confirms the valuable identity of Ukraine as a European state (Tretyak & Toryanyk, 2023, pp. 35-36).

The information policy of the state is formed on the basis of social relations, which are combined with information and information

infrastructure. In the sphere of political life, this is information provision of public dialogue, interaction between society and the government, and the «war of compromising documents». In general, the state information policy should ensure national interests in the information sphere (Holovanova, 2021, p. 13).

The main problems that need to be solved for an effective fight against propaganda are: 1) prohibition of permission for propaganda based on liberalism and pluralism of opinions. This is related to the external propaganda of propaganda regimes. Suspending the broadcasting of propaganda media, due to the blocking of satellite broadcasting and pages in social networks. The ban on spreading fakes should not be seen as a sanction against the regime, but as a measure of information hygiene; 2) blocking footage in social networks that show victims of war because of «their excessive brutality», which could be prevented by banning the spread of propaganda; 3) paying attention in each state to cases of growth in its information space of significant weight of the mass media of another state.

In Ukraine, attention was drawn to the problem of combating propaganda after the Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of Crimea. First, there was a ban on using pro-Russian social networks on the territory of Ukraine, the blocking of propaganda sites, and an increase in the importance of Ukrainian content in the media. In 2015, laws on decommunization were adopted. Later, new methods of counter-propaganda were introduced in Ukraine (Drabyuk, 2022, pp. 155-156).

Since 2020, counter-propaganda has been carried out in Ukraine by the so-called «elves», which are a network of activists in the Baltic countries, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic. They conducted trainings, the lecturers of which were people with competences in countering propaganda and disinformation, as well as journalists, soldiers, and volunteers who actively fought against russian aggression for a long time.

The appearance of the first elves took place in Lithuania in 2014 and was determined as a countermeasure to russian information attacks against Lithuania, Ukraine and other democratic countries. Propaganda and information manipulation cause a direct threat to the security of Ukraine and the well-being of Ukrainians («They appeared in Ukraine», 2020).

In Ukraine, in 2021, bodies were formed to counter information threats and disinformation — the Center for Strategic Information Security Communications under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine and the Center for Countering

Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.

In Ukraine, the Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine (Regarding the Prohibition of the Production and Distribution of Information Products Aimed at Promoting the Actions of the Aggressor State) No. 5101 of 02/18/2021 was introduced, which was signed by the President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyi. According to the Draft Law, in some legislative acts there was a ban on justifying, recognizing as legitimate, denying the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014, and by presenting the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine as a «civil conflict», «internal conflict», «civil war», and denying the temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine. A ban on the glorification of persons who carried out the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014, as well as illegal formations and groups of mercenaries, which are managed and financed by the Russian Federation, which are recognized as «militias», «insurgents», «polite military people» («Draft of the Law on», 2021, p. 3).

When analyzing the development of a democratic regime by means of political propaganda, it is possible to draw conclusions: political propaganda is present in all types of political regimes; democratic political propaganda is polycentric, including many subjects of power — political parties, people, political elite, political leaders, socio-political parties and organizations, mass media, the state; with the development of scientific knowledge and technologies, political propaganda develops and forms and uses significant resources and opportunities; democratic political propaganda is divided into «white», «black», «gray»; according to the essence and type, propaganda uses the following resources: manipulation, agitation, myth-making, beliefs, stereotypes; the development of a democratic regime is interdependent on the level of development of the population's culture and political consciousness, which is ensured by educational and educational work (Kravchuk, 2005, p. 308).

Conclusions.

Political propaganda can significantly influence the formation of public opinion. In democratic countries, the influence of political advertising and propaganda on public opinion is balanced by rational political debates, while in the post-Soviet space their dominance is unlimited (Kropyvko, 2021, p. 99).

Mass media and social networks (YouTube, Telegram, TikTok) have a significant influence on the formation of public opinion, through which both propaganda and anti-propaganda are carried out. The

corresponding stream is focused on the political sphere of society. Especially under martial law, means of propaganda and anti-propaganda are important channels of both dissemination and prevention of negative informational influences of the russian occupiers and their authorities.

Citizens' critical thinking should be countered by propaganda. Media literacy, media education and public activism should encourage the population to highlight quality information. The responsibility of Ukrainian journalists for the coverage of information is the fight against fakes and narratives in the russian mass media.

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SUGGESTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION WARFARE

Abstract.

The article examines the role and place of suggestion in information warfare. At the present stage of human development — the information stage — the issue of studying the intensification of information wars with the use of technologies of influence on human consciousness — suggestion — is becoming relevant. An integral part of scientific cognition of political categories is the use of methods that ensure the reliability of empirical and theoretical provisions. In this research, the following methods were used: method of analysis, method of synthesis, induction, deduction, system-structural method. The study of suggestive technologies as a multidimensional concept is the purpose of this article. Suggestion through the word manifests a deep property of the psyche that arose much earlier than the ability to think analytically. Suggestion is a powerful tool for influencing the consciousness and subconscious of a person and society. That is why suggestive technologies play a leading role in information warfare.

The mechanisms of influence on the human psyche and consciousness are at the heart of suggestive technologies. Their task is to skillfully lead to the hidden arousal of intentions in a person that he or she did not have before. The suggester (the subject of influence, the sender) wants the subject (the object of influence, the recipient) to recognize a particular act that is being suggested as the only right one for him or her. To achieve this, the persuader does not use coercive means, but rather persuasive means based on suggestion.

Information warfare involves measures of suggestive influence on human consciousness in the ideological and emotional spheres. The main task of information warfare is to have a direct negative destructive impact on the political image of the state and create difficulties in its internal development. Information warfare is always aimed at misinforming society and sowing views favorable to the persuader. The cognitive dimension of information warfare is based on knowledge of the opponent's thinking. The means of information warfare is the word.

Keywords: *suggestion, language manipulation, information influence, information warfare.*

*With a word you can kill and revive, injure and heal,
sow anxiety and hopelessness and spiritualize,
dispel doubt and upset, cause a smile and tears,
to give rise to faith in a person and to sow despair,
to inspire work and bind the strength of the soul*

Vasyl Sukhomlynskyi is an outstanding Ukrainian teacher, writer, poet.

The word is the most important tool of influence on human consciousness. Language as a system of concepts and words in which a person perceives the world and society, is the main means of subjugation. In the era of the information society, the study of **the problem** of intensification of information wars with the use of technologies of influence on human consciousness — suggestion — is becoming more relevant. An integral part of scientific knowledge of political categories is the use of methods that ensure the reliability of empirical and theoretical provisions. Among **the main methods used** in this scientific research are the method of analysis, method of synthesis, induction, deduction, and system-structural method. The application of these methods allowed us to achieve **the goal**, namely, to study suggestive technologies as a multidimensional phenomenon. Suggestion through the word manifests a deep property of the psyche that arose much earlier than the ability to think analytically.

The word is the foundation of suggestion, on which non-verbal tools of communication and influence, such as gestures, looks and intonations, are built. Suggestive technologies accumulate manipulative, psychological and informational influences that are realized through information operations and information weapons (Garbar, 2019).

The phenomenon of suggestion permeates many spheres of human life and accompanies humanity throughout its existence. People are influenced from the moment of birth and throughout their lives. A word is a signal that enters the brain, is processed and shapes human behavior. All information affects the human psyche, consciousness and actions (Akul'shyn, 2018).

The power of words has been recognized since ancient times. In their works, Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and Sun Tzu paid attention to oratory and persuasion. Their work on the analysis of the verbal factor in the scientific interpretation of suggestion remains relevant. **An analysis of recent research and publications** has shown that the word as a component of suggestion is considered by

J. Vandriess, W. Humboldt, W. Wundt and R. Jacobson. Verbal communication as a factor of influence on human consciousness was studied by L. Resnyanska, I. Zymnia, and Y. Lotman. The works of Y. Shaygorodsky, I. Cherepanova, K. Kalandarov, G. Pocheptsov and others reveal the essence of suggestive phenomena in the structure of manipulative and pragmatic activity. Suggestive phenomena at the deep personal subconscious level were studied by L. Adler, S. Freud, and C.G. Jung. The psychoanalytic approach has made a special contribution to the theory of suggestion, considering it as one of the phenomenal and unpredictable manifestations of the psyche. R. Bendler, J. Grinder, V. Satir, M. Erikson, R. Dilts, F. Pucelik, and others have studied language manipulation and neuro-linguistic programming as manifestations of suggestion. The phenomenon of information influence and information warfare is studied in the works of P. Berger, Z. Bzezinsky, N. Wiener, U. Lipman, M. McLuhan, E. Noel-Neumann, M. Poster, T. Reed, A. Toffler, V. Petryk, G. Pocheptsov, M. Prsyazhnyuk, I. Feskov, D. Frolov, and Y. Shaygorodsky. The most authoritative sources for considering the issue of information warfare are the works of scientists of the US Armed Forces. However, the issue of suggestive technologies in information warfare requires further research — a systematic and thorough study on the way to defending our rights to life, liberty and dignity.

The researchers sought to uncover the mechanisms by which words convey the semantic component of a situation and its ability to influence the perception and reflection of the essence of an object. They identified as a function of language not only the communication of information but also the psychological impact on the affective and volitional spheres of the object of perception. The mechanisms of influence on the human psyche and consciousness are the basis of suggestive technologies. Their task is to skillfully lead to the hidden arousal of intentions in a person that he or she did not have before. The suggester (the subject of influence, the sender) wants the subject (the object of influence, the recipient) to recognize a particular act that is being suggested as the only right one for him or her. To achieve this, the suggester does not use coercive means but rather persuasive means based on suggestion.

Suggestion is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon that requires consideration from various aspects to understand its essence. This paper highlights linguistic, psychological, hypnotic, and neurolinguistic approaches to understanding the phenomenon of suggestion.

Table 1. Approaches to the definition and essence of the concept of suggestion.

Approach	Definition of the concept	The essence of the approach
<i>Linguistic</i>	Suggestion is an influence on the will and feelings of a person; suggestion which is carried out with the help of verbal and non-verbal means of communication that cause certain feelings, perceptions, emotional states in the subject and encourage him to perform the actions planned by the suggester.	The essence of the approach is the use of language to establish and maintain psychological contact, join the subject's reality, utilize consciousness and gain access to the unconscious through latent verbal influence.
<i>Psychological</i>	Suggestion is a mental influence on an individual through the suppression of his or her level of development, which affects his or her critical attitude to information sources and ability to analyze and act consciously.	The essence of the approach involves directing suggestion to develop the subjugated person's readiness for certain actions while simultaneously suppressing their logic and thinking capabilities. In other words, suggestion is explained as one of the strongest forms of influence, along with hypnosis and zombification through lateral programming of the psyche.
<i>Hypnotic</i>	Suggestion is a low-energy information signal that closely correlates with subthreshold perception, is not subjectively realized, and influences human behavior.	The essence of the approach is to use language strategies to neutralize the ability to resist suggestion. In this approach, there are almost no direct orders, only some comments, questions, and consultations with the partner in communication.
<i>Neurolinguistic</i>	Suggestion is the imposition of «necessary information» on a subgroup amid a stream of other messages.	The approach involves finding a «key» to the human subconscious — a neurosemantic hypertext containing the most important words and phrases for the target audience — that delivers information to the deeper layers of the human psyche and changes the consciousness and behavior of the target audience.

Compiled by the author based on sources 3, 6, 7, 11, 14, 26.

Thus, in summary, suggestion is a process of influencing the human psyche associated with a decrease in consciousness and criticality when perceiving the content that is inspired, which does not require either detailed personal analysis or assessment of the motivations for mental actions. The essence of suggestion is to influence a person's feelings and, through them — his or her will and mind. Suggestion is a leading means of organizing public opinion and manipulating consciousness, a direct invasion of people's mental lives. In this case, the information influence is organized in such a way that the thought, idea, or image directly enters the sphere of consciousness and is fixed in it as data, indisputable and already proven (Kurban, 2016). This is made possible by substituting the active attitude of the psyche towards the subject of communication with the passivity of perception, deliberately created by the distraction of attention by a large amount of information, an active form of its presentation, and artificial exaggeration of the prestige of sources.

The essence of suggestion is the ability to subdue and change behavior not on the basis of reasonable, logical arguments or motives but only on the basis of a demand or proposal coming from another person, and the object subjected to suggestive influence does not realize its submissiveness, continuing to consider its actions as a consequence of its own initiative or independent choice (Pocheptsov, 2012).

Neuro-linguistic programming is considered to be the most complex form of suggestion. In neuro-linguistic programming, there are three types of representative systems for perceiving reality. The integrated delivery of sensory information through visual (visual), auditory (auditory) and kinesthetic (tactile) systems allows you to penetrate the deeper layers of the human psyche. The peculiarity lies in the fact that the subconscious does not impose a certain opinion but artificially creates an information context that stimulates the «completely independent» formation of the necessary thoughts and conclusions (Bandler & Grinder, 1975). The goal of using neuro-linguistic programming in the political sphere is to use suggestive technologies to penetrate the subconscious and, by changing or transforming thoughts, views, and ideals, to cause the behavior of an individual, group, or masses that would maximize the acquisition, use, and retention of power. The stability and longevity of the effect of using neuro-linguistic programming in the political process is due to the fact that the objects of influence consider the thoughts inspired by them to be their own (Petryk et al, 2011).

Language manipulation, which is based on the peculiarities of language and the principles of its use, can be considered a special case

of using suggestive technologies. Language manipulation is the use of language features and principles of its use in order to covertly influence the addressee in the direction desired by the manipulator: covert, meaning unaware of the addressee. «Language manipulation as a type of manipulative influence is realized through the use of language resources for the purpose of covertly influencing the cognitive and behavioral activity of the addressee» (Ruda, 2012, pp. 50-51). The manipulative possibilities of language are extremely rich: linguistic metaphor, false analogy, ambiguity, indirect speech acts, presuppositions, etc.

Under the influence of the content of the information flows that a person perceives, the emphasis on its individual fragments, he or she forms a way of thinking, a system of values and interests, a worldview, which, over time, enriches and develops in one direction or another, act as a kind of moral and semantic filter when analyzing current information. The actions and behavior of a person in a given situation significantly depend on the orientation and stability of this filter. The content and qualitative characteristics of the filter are influenced by the components of the information environment: historical, national and ethnic factors, the education system, religious and philosophical trends, ideological propaganda, and others (Frolov, 2011).

The means, methods and techniques of suggestion discussed above constitute the physical essence of information weapons. Suggestion is a powerful tool for influencing the consciousness and subconscious of individuals and society. Therefore, suggestive technologies play a leading role in information warfare. Suggestion in information warfare uses conscious (rational) and subconscious (irrational) elements and, therefore, combines the logic of social interaction with the logic of instincts, namely, a conscious reflection of reality and an unconscious form of thinking. Information is comprehensively imparted through words, images, music, and ultra-weak energy-information signals.

According to Alvin Toffler (2000), humanity is now living through the third stage of evolution — the information stage, where information is the main element of development. Thus, the transition to information warfare is not an accident but a reflection of the human development strategy. Information wars, in one form or another, have accompanied humanity throughout its history. Sun Tzu was the first to summarize the experience of information influence on an opponent. The main principles of Sun Tzu are to use methods of information influence more than methods of direct counteraction. In the treatise «The Art of War», Sun Tzu wrote: «In any war, as a rule, the best policy is to capture the state as a whole... To win hundreds of victories in battle is not the limit

of art. To conquer the enemy without a fight is the crown of art» (Sun Tzu).

The first printed publications that allowed information warfare to enter a new stage appeared in the seventeenth century. Napoleon I used the tools of information influence — the first staff structure of psychological warfare in military chronology appeared in French logistics units. He is credited with the words «four newspapers can do more harm to the enemy than an army of a hundred thousand» and «the moral factor is three to one to the material factor» (Ostroukhov et. al, 2010).

After the end of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, the term information warfare was coined by a group of American military theorists led by G. Eccles and G. Summers. In 1991, after Operation Desert Storm, this term appeared in the official press (Myrnyi & Moroz).

As Peter Pomerantsev (2014) noted: «There are a number of theories of information warfare today. The Russian theory appeals to information and psychological warfare, the essence of which is to conquer another country without even touching it. The core of information warfare is human consciousness, the psychological sphere. Information warfare is not just about propaganda, media debates, and persuasion. It is a military doctrine that includes cyber aggression, economic, media and other means».

The goal of information warfare is to weaken the opponent's moral and material forces and strengthen your own. Information warfare involves measures of suggestive influence on human consciousness in the ideological and emotional spheres. Obviously, information warfare is an integral part of the ideological struggle. Such wars do not directly lead to bloodshed or destruction, and no one is deprived of food or shelter during their conduct. And this gives rise to a dangerously complacent attitude towards them. Meanwhile, the destruction caused by information wars in the public consciousness is quite commensurate in scale and significance and, sometimes, exceeds the consequences of kinetic wars (Zelenin, 2015).

The main task of information warfare is to have a direct negative, destructive impact on the aggregate political power of the state by weakening its real and potential capabilities to ensure its own security, creating difficulties in internal development and active foreign policy, and damaging its political image.

Information warfare transforms the information space of the targeted state. A model of worldview is imposed to obtain the desired behavior. That is, the presentation of information in a way that forms

the desired point of view, public opinion, a course of complementary logical thoughts, and an exhaustive system of views on certain issues in favor of the persuader. As a result, certain facts or events are realized in the light desired by the persuader, and the desired worldview or life position is formed with respect to issues that were previously controversial or misunderstood (Fes'kov, 2016). In the absence of contradictions and an existing stable system of views, the task of information warfare is to create doubts as well as to sow contradictions and speculation in existing beliefs. Human development is organized in such a way that a person is always looking for answers to questions of interest or concern, which is an integral part of continuous cognitive processes. As awareness grows, information vulnerability decreases, in which case information warfare requires a more sophisticated approach to generate doubts, using numerous techniques of distorting information, such as presenting falsehoods with logical proofs of the truth of these facts, falsified research and evidence that the superego should believe and accept as their beliefs (Pocheptsov, 2019).

Information warfare is possible due to the natural need for new information (to close knowledge gaps, refute or confirm doubts, verify and study in detail new contradictory facts), so information vulnerability is inherent in all social strata, and the education of society only determines how comprehensive and detailed alternative information should be presented to appear truthful. To minimize critical attitudes towards new facts, a prerequisite for starting an information war is to establish trust in an alternative source of information, presenting it as authoritative, scientifically proven, etc (Kovalevska A., 2017).

Information warfare is always aimed at misinforming society and sowing views favorable to the persuader. They often have nothing to do with reality. With the help of such weapons as the media, the opponent creates the basis for a loyal attitude to aggression, disabling important management and economic facilities through cyberattacks. This is an impact not on material objects, but on emotions, intelligence, and psyche.

The constant growth of the influence of the information sphere is characteristic of the current stage of society's development. The structure of this sphere includes a set of information, information links and information systems, objects that prepare information, store, distribute and use it, as well as a system for regulating information relations. A suggester wins with the help of word-symbols that hide stories. When the human brain is occupied with pseudo-reality, the management of human attention has achieved its goal.

The suggester fills the information space with a lot of fake information to defocus attention and disable mental filters. In

conditions of information saturation, there is a feeling of losing the ability to realize it. New information is coming at a rate that is destructive to the mind. Today, the competition for people's attention, which has always been very important, is intensifying, but now attention has become one of the most important resources. The easiest way to gain attention is not through the truth but through the use of emotions — to provoke a sense of fear or anger. The integrated use of these representational systems in suggestive technologies makes the pressure on emotions unquestionably successful. Information noise disperses the attention of society, reduces the level of analytical thinking and critical perception of fakes, messages, and narratives (Poliakova, 2022).

In information warfare, fakes (half-truths, fiction, speculation, provocation) are used to win attention through emotions. The opponent launches many fakes on various topics. A fake is a distorted or fictionalized fact used to present false information. By spreading fakes, a persuader manages the mood of society by intimidating or irritating it in order to use it in a way that is beneficial to him. Fake news on the relevant topic forms a message. A message is a call to action supported by motivating facts. A collection of messages is combined into a narrative — a story, a narrative that explains the world around us. The task of narratives is to form a certain worldview. It is the narrative that is strategically most important because messages can be modified, fakes can be invented to be even more emotional, and the narrative is a permanent story. One can be able to identify fakes, but succumb to certain messages or believe in the narrative in general (Ilyuk, 2022).




Figure 1. Fake — message — narrative

Compiled by the author based on sources 5.

To summarize, we can say that today, information has gradually begun to change its status, moving from a force that helped in battle to a major force that decides the outcome of the war. It is not enough to win the war on the battlefield, you need to win in people's minds. The cognitive dimension of information warfare is based on knowledge of the opponent's thinking. «Strategic empathy is the ability to think like the enemy. It is the ability to get out of your own mind and into the minds of others. It is what allows us to understand what inspires and limits the other side» (Shore, 2012, p.67). There is already an increase in strength in the mental dimension and higher values. «By knowing the enemy's values and using his representational system, we can reckon with the tasks, speak to the enemy's mind in verbal and non-verbal languages» (Szafranski, 1997, p. 405).

Thus, modern information warfare takes on new meanings, moving to the level of meanings. The meta-war continues in the space of meanings. Political decisions about what is good and what is evil are not the result of ethical and religious discussions but solely the result of changes in the perception of target audiences who live on social networks and watch mainstream TV channels. Meanings and ideas are much more powerful weapons than kinetic weapons. The war of meanings demonstrates that it is impossible to stop mass culture. It combines the characteristics of an informational, virtual product, while the system of information warfare combines information and military or information and political products (Pocheptsov, 2013).

Information warfare is a component of political warfare. This war, unlike the use of military force, has no front, and it is impossible to determine when it began. The victims in this war are states, peoples, nations, and individuals. The means of information warfare is the word.

Suggestive technologies in information warfare are an instrument of influence of military, political, and ideological action, the use of which affects the formation of public opinion, the protection of national interests, and the behavior of foreign states, non-governmental organizations, and individual groups or individuals. The history of most conflicts shows that military power alone cannot achieve an advantage. Information is a weapon, and the word is its bullet.

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RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR WITHIN THE STRUGGLE OF IMPERIAL NARRATIVES AGAINST THE VALUES OF FREEDOM AND DIGNITY

Abstract.

The article presents a study of Russian imperial narratives, which are an effective tool of the modern Russia-Ukraine war. This war is seen as a conflict of worldviews and values, a struggle of identities and historical memories. The methodological basis of the article is a combination of general scientific methods of comparative and historical analysis with special methods of narrative analysis. Based on the examples of the most common imperial narratives, it is substantiated that the latter have become an effective tool of justifying armed aggression against Ukraine and waging a genocidal war. It is emphasized that imperial narratives have always been tools of Russian propaganda aimed both at the direct and/or symbolic enemy, and at other people not directly involved in the existential struggle. Particular attention is paid to highlighting the manipulative influence and effects of Russian imperial narratives, the result of which is the affirmation of a positive image of Russia and the disappearance of Ukrainians and Ukraine as self-sufficient geopolitical entities from the mental map of most European nations. The ruling class of the Russian Federation, adopting the experience of digital totalitarianism in China, modifying the propaganda of the USSR and having sufficient financial capabilities, has been gradually moving in the direction of constructing its own model of digital autocracy over the past two decades. In the era of post-truth and complete digitalization, there has been a modification of Russian imperial narratives, which contributed to the spread of their influence. The author considers alternative (pro-) Ukrainian narratives as a tool of effective counteraction to Russian imperial narratives. Ukrainian narratives are based on the national version of historical memory, which is the result of the culture of dialogue and understanding, as well as on the recognition of the core values of freedom and dignity in the worldview system of the Ukrainian state and society.

Keywords: *narrative, Russia-Ukraine war, historical memory, memory wars, culture of dialogue and understanding, identity.*

Problem statement in general and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. After February 24, 2022, Russia-Ukraine war became the most discussed and highlighted topic of the world news. However, it has been gradually sidelined in mass media during

2023. This happened due to several reasons but it does not mean that Russia-Ukraine war is ending. This also does not mean that Russia-Ukraine war started on February 24, 2022. It is a well-known fact that current Russia-Ukraine war as an armed conflict began in March 2014.

If we talk about Russia-Ukraine war as a worldview and value phenomenon, we must state that this war began much earlier — several centuries ago. It is a war of empire narratives produced by the Muscovite Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, and the narratives of values of Freedom and Dignity produced by the Cossack State, the Ukrainian People's Republic, and Ukraine. This war should be defined as a semantic war — a hybrid war, a type of cognitive confrontation at the level of states, nations, and individuals. The strategic goal of semantic wars is the (self) destruction of the object of aggression (Hibrydna viina i zhurnalistyka. Problemy informatsiinoi bezpeky, 2018, pp. 143-144).

The semantic Russia-Ukraine war unfolds not only in the temporal dimension, but also in the spatial one, because the confrontation of narratives and values extends beyond the borders of Russia and Ukraine. The potential recipients/victims of imperial Russian narratives are the inhabitants of most countries of the world. The confrontation of narratives unfolds also in the scientific dimension, affecting political science, sociology, history, theology, geography and other fields of academic knowledge.

In early 2024, the statement that the victory of Ukraine in the modern Russia-Ukraine war and the victory of civilization in a more global dimension will be final only under the conditions of the destruction of Russian imperial narratives, which still have considerable influence on the public opinion of some countries of the world, seems to be indisputable.

Goals and objectives. The purpose of the presented research is to consider the worldview and value dimension of the modern Russia-Ukraine war by means of analyzing the most common Russian imperial narratives. The research involves the following tasks:

- 1) substantiation of the imperial nature of the narratives used to justify armed aggression against Ukraine;
- 2) historical analysis of the genesis and development of Russian imperial narratives;
- 3) consideration of the wars of memory and the culture of mutual understanding — two opposite strategies of strengthening or destroying certain narratives — as the basis of identities.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Undoubtedly, representatives of social and humanitarian sciences have been

interested in the study of narratives for decades. A significant part of the research is dedicated to the systematization of basic approaches to narrative analysis within linguistics, literary studies, and art studies (Turner, 1996; Dintselbakhera, 2004). Ukrainian scientists systematized main approaches to narrative analysis and this systematization was used in the preparation of this research (Huk & Bekhta, 2020). A separate group of scientific works includes publications that highlight political effects and influences of narratives (Pocheptsov, 2022; Ozhevan, 2016; Fukuiama, 2022).

Both domestic and foreign scientists (Plokhii, 2023; Bezpiatchuk, 2023; Bokach, 2019; Kononenko, 2013; Pavlov, 2022) have studied historical origins of the imperial narratives and their consequences. Along with the general historical analysis of the origins of imperial narratives, it is worth noting the scientific studies dedicated to topical issues of historical memory (Volianiuk, 2018; Babka, 2018; Kultura prymyrennia: nova istorychna svidomist v Ukraini, 2015; Buber, 1994).

Taking into account the importance of countering Russian imperial narratives not only within Ukraine, but also in the countries of Europe and North America, the works of contemporary German researchers were used in the preparation of the research (Schwendemann, 2018; Sommerbauer, 2016; Schlögel, 2022; Sasse, 2022). All these works are united by their authors' awareness of the huge mental failure of Europeans in general and Germans in particular at recognition of Ukrainian identity, which is completely different from the one, presented in Russian narratives. However, the situation changed after February 24, 2022.

Outlining previously unresolved parts of the general problem that the article is dedicated to. In our opinion, the most significant previously unresolved parts of the narrative analysis of the Russian imperial discourse include:

- substantiation of the genocidal nature of the modern Russia-Ukraine war, which was the topic of the author's previous articles as well (Bulbenyuk & Maneliuk «Henotsyd v Ukraini u 2022 r.: oznaky, formy, zaperechennia», 2022; Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii 'ruskoho mira'», 2022);

- modification of Russian imperial narratives under the conditions of digital autocracies development (Guriev & Treisman, 2019; Bulbeniuk «Polifoniia doslidnytskykh pozytsii shchodo vysvitlennia fenomenu novitnykh avtokratii», 2022);

- memory wars versus the development of the culture of dialogue and understanding.

Research methods. The study of the informational or, in a broader sense, the worldview and communication aspect of the modern Russia-Ukraine war involves the application of interdisciplinary methodology. Along with such general methods as system analysis and comparative-historical analysis, the research involves special scientific methods. Since one of the central categories of our research is the concept of «narrative», it seems logical to apply the methodology of narrative analysis borrowed from literary studies, art studies and linguistic studies. In contrast to these branches of scientific knowledge, which consider the category of «narrative» primarily as a means of developing artistic discourse in modern art and its verbal constructions (Huk & Bekhta, 2020, p. 430), political science analyzes worldview and values presented in the narrative and their effects on public consciousness, public opinion and political behavior (at the level of an individual, group and mass). Therefore, for a researcher who is professional in political sciences, narratives are primarily history and discourse with an emphasis on discourse (according to S. Chatman) and not just the recounting of the stories (Huk & Bekhta, 2020, p. 432). This is the research and methodological basis of the presented study.

Special attention should be paid to the historiographical tradition of research into the genesis of mentality as a complex of ideas inherent in a certain community during a certain historical period/epoch. Within the scope of our research, such methodology is interesting in view of the analysis of collective psychology as a subject of the history of mentality. According to P. Dintselbakher, ideologies as the essence of collective beliefs form a kind of «clothes» on the «mental skin» of a nation. Particular attention in the methodology of the history of mentality is paid to the «mode of perception», which includes the automatic combination of values or judgments (Dintselbakher, 2004, pp. 11, 23). Thus, the task of analyzing the semantic-narrative aspect of the modern Russia-Ukraine war determines the methodological basis of the study.

Results and discussions. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, which began in spring of 2014, has many dimensions: military, historical, informational, civilizational, and value. In our opinion, it is quite symbolic that the main marker of the start of Russia-Ukraine war was the annexation and occupation of Crimea. It is a well-known fact that Crimea has been the arena of changes in civilizations, great migrations of peoples, and the creation of myths and narratives for several millennia. The research is dedicated to the semantic-narrative aspect of Russia-Ukraine war, which manifests itself through the clash of narratives and values. More precisely, it is a struggle of values framed in imperial and counter-imperial narratives.

Narrative (from the Latin «narrare» — to tell, explain in detail) is a complex linguistic phenomenon that has a special semantic load with emphasis, depending on the goals, on political, historical, social, economic, cultural, religious, ethnic and other aspects of the formation and development of society and the state. M. Turner considers the narrative as a fundamental tool of thinking (Turner, 1996, p. 4-5).




Figure 1. The nature of narrative.

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Within the framework of Russia-Ukraine war, narratives become tools of propaganda and counter-propaganda aimed at both the enemy, and other people not directly involved in the existential struggle. As the Ukrainian expert in the field of information wars and communication technologies H. Pocheptsov notes, «Narrative war is becoming dominant in the information age, when video and media have replaced missiles and shells. Now the one who aims not at the body but at the soul gets victory» (Pocheptsov, 2022).

Some researchers consider confrontation of narratives as a type of strategic communication. Professor M. Ozhevan defines strategic narratives as means by which political actors construct the meanings and essence of «big politics». The scientist points out the ability of strategic narratives to organize the behavior of political actors based on commitment to certain value systems. M. Ozhevan calls such value systems the «body» of a particular narrative (Ozhevan, 2016, p. 30).

We can assert that the narrative war/narrative confrontation on the part of Russia has been going on for several centuries, particularly at the level of values and outlook. The peculiar feature of the most widely spread and rooted narratives about «three brotherly peoples — Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians», «Kyivan (Ancient) Rus as a common cradle», «Moscow as the Third Rome», «Great Russian Culture» and «Great Patriotic War» is their orientation towards the past. Actually, some researchers of the modern Russia-Ukraine war claim that it is the war of the past against the future, where the Russian Federation as an aggressor state is the personification of the archetypal Past, whereas Ukraine as a victim of aggression is a desire for the Future (Plokhii, 2023; Bezpiatchuk, 2023).

Table 1. Opposition of narratives as a type of strategic communication.

NARRATIVE	COUNTER NARRATIVE	ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE
<p>The millennial Russian statehood, the origins of which can be traced back to the statehood of Ancient Russia (Kyivan Rus). The modern Russian Federation is the historical heir to the ancient Russian statehood.</p>	<p>The medieval state of Kyivan (Ancient) Rus is the beginning of the origins of Ukrainian statehood. Kyiv is the "capital city" («stolnyi grad» org.) of Rus, the capital of the restored Ukrainian state.</p>	<p>The state-building origins of modern Ukraine and the Russian Federation are different: Kyivan Rus for Ukraine and the Golden Horde (Ulug Ulus) for Russia. The multi-vector nature of state-building traditions determines opposite geopolitical priorities and orientations in the present.</p>
<p><i>Toponymy and historiography:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theophan Prokopovych as the author of the title «Russian Empire», • «History of the Russian State» in 12 volumes by Nikolay Karamzin, • «The History of Russia from the Earliest Times» in 29 volumes by Sergei Solovyov. 	<p><i>Toponymy and historiography:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • place names of Kyiv, Chernihiv and other cities of the times (e.g. Golden Gate, Podil, Antoniiv Caves), • «History of Ukraine-Rus» in 10 volumes by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, • «History of Ukraine-Rus» by Mykola Arkas. 	<p>Works by contemporary Ukrainian and foreign (including some Russian) historians, political scientists, art historians.</p> <p><i>The narrative is in the process of being conceptualised.</i></p>

Compiled by the author.

In fact, even during the period of preparation for the modern Russia-Ukraine war, since 2008, Russian ideologues began to superimpose a multi-layered content context on the narrative about the heroic past/common past. They denied Ukrainian statehood and national history, emphasized the secondary role of Ukrainian culture and language, counterbalanced the common heroic past and the «wretchedness» of Ukraine's independent existence as a failed state, etc. All this was «sold» on the domestic and foreign political markets. At the same time, for the third decade in a row, Russian ideologues and leaders of the Russian Federation have been «selling» narratives about «Russia that was deceived and insulted» exclusively on the domestic market. «Russian President Vladimir Putin talks about the tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union and how Europe and the United States

took advantage of Russia's weakness in the 1990s to bring NATO to its borders», F. Fukuiama rightly notes in the work «Identity. The need for dignity and the politics of grievance» (Fukuiama, 2022, p. 21).

Narratives of «insults» were eagerly accepted by the majority of Russian citizens with an imperial-chauvinist superiority complex that was insurmountable even in the years of the Soviet Union. According to the Polish historian L. Przybyla (Academy of Military Art), Russian society was raised on the «fertile soil» of the ideas of «the Third Rome», on imperial ideology, which form the basis of «imperial madness» (Istoryk: Rosiisko-ukrainska viina — tse mishanyna elementiv Pershoi i Druhoi svitovoi ta suchasnoi viiny, 2023). So, let us have a little excursion into history.

Metropolitan Zosyma of Moscow and All Russia initiated the idea of «Moscow as the Third Rome» in the preface to his work «Paschal Exposition» (1492). This idea became popular due to the Pskov elder Philotheus (1523–1524) (Kononenko, 2013, p. 146, cited by Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk in «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022). It is important that for centuries this idea had neither a serious spread, nor a paradigmatic substantiation and state support, first from the Muscovite kingdom, and later from the Russian Empire. P. Kononenko points out that the political program of the idea of the «Third Rome» in the Russian Empire and its introduction into public discourse by the imperial will of Alexander II is connected with the geopolitical ambitions of St. Petersburg («The Fourth Rome» or «The Second Constantinople») on Balkans and the weakening of another empire — the Ottoman Empire (Kononenko, 2013, p. 146, cited by Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk in «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022). V. Bokach, a modern Ukrainian researcher, observes, «Imperial ambitions of the modern Russian government and the church are the basis of the ‘Russian Word’» (Bokach, 2019, p. 138, cited by Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk in «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022). Therefore, as we can see, in historical retrospect and in the latest political ambitions, the marginal quasi-ideology of the «Russian Word», openly denying its own marginality, declares overambitious goals:

- to make the Bosphorus and Dardanelles intra-imperial straits;
- to establish and lead the «Slavic World» as the direct opposite of the British World (we cannot help mentioning Anglo-Saxons who were the main enemies of the ideologues of the «Russian Word» in the 19th century and again at the stage of preparation to and during Russia-Ukraine war, which continues until now);

- not only to restore the Soviet Union till its centenary anniversary, but to create a new and unified modern empire (Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022, p. 164).

Table 2. «Russian World» as a quasi-ideology.

CORE VALUE/ IDEAS	DEVELOPMENT STAGES	IDEOLOGISTS/ LEADERS
<p>1. «Moscow as the Third Rome».</p> <p>2. The «Russian World» as a special civilisation that opposes the declining Western civilisation.</p> <p>3. Orthodoxy as the spiritual and religious basis of ideology, the Russian Orthodox Church as its main guide.</p> <p>4. The newest traditionalism, calls to return to the past.</p> <p>5. «Declaration of Russian Identity», where Russian language is the leading identifier of belonging to the «Russian World».</p>	<p>1. The end of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw the emergence of the concept «Moscow as the Third Rome».</p> <p>2. Synopsis The Kyivan is a pro-Moscow historical and ideological work, one of the main ideas of which is the continuity of the power of the Moscow princes from the power of the Kyivan princes.</p> <p>3. The beginning of the eighteenth century saw the transformation of the Muscovy into the Russian Empire.</p> <p>4. The first quarter of the nineteenth century — the Russian Empire as the «gendarme of Europe».</p> <p>5. On 30 December 1922, the USSR was formed as a Eurasian quasi-empire.</p> <p>6. In the late 1940s and 1955, the «socialist camp» was formed and the Warsaw Pact was signed.</p> <p>7. The mid-1990s saw the conceptualisation of a renewed idea of the «Russian World».</p> <p>8. February 10, 2007 — Putin's Munich speech.</p>	<p>1. Monk Philotheus.</p> <p>2. Innokenty Gizel.</p> <p>3. Theophan Prokopovych/Peter I, Catherine II.</p> <p>4. Alexander I, Nicholas I.</p> <p>5. Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin.</p> <p>6. Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev.</p> <p>7. Alexander Dugin, Georgy Shchedrovitsky.</p> <p>8. Vladimir Putin.</p>

Compiled by the author.

It is worth emphasizing that in many ways this idea remained on the sidelines of public journalistic and academic discourse during the 19th and early 20th centuries. During the years of the USSR, for obvious reasons, the narrative «Moscow as the Third Rome» remained exclusively the subject of research by a very narrow group of scientists. The reincarnation of the narrative took place in late 1990s, and its final revival and consecration by both the Kremlin and the church authorities on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church took place after 2008. Today, the narrative «Moscow as the Third Rome» is an important “brick” in an outwardly intact and strong fortress of the quasi-ideology of the «Russian Word» as the value foundation of the modern Russia-Ukraine war, which has all peculiar features of a genocidal war.

Thus, questions arise:

- Why were the ideas of the «Russian Word» attractive to many outside Russia?

- Why don't they lose popularity now — after Bucha, Mariupol, Izyum?

We will try to outline several answers based on the narrative analysis of the value foundation of the modern Russia-Ukraine war.

First, the ideas of the «Russian Word» are potentially attractive to those who are in favor of anti-Americanism worldview. Let us be brave enough to assert that in this case the principle «the enemy of my enemy is my friend» is applied. Therefore, for the defined group of supporters of the «Russian Word» the value foundation of this quasi-ideology is rather on the margins of their worldview and value system.

Secondly, in any society there are individuals and groups of citizens who are inclined to marginal ideologies, projects, and political programs at the national level. Sometimes they feel a thirst for political exoticism, sometimes a desire to break out of the bounds of stereotyping and sometimes they just tell some family stories (a kind of «my grandmother learned Russian on her own in order to read all Dostoevsky's books in the original»). The ideologues of the «Russian Word» successfully use such conscious or unconscious «useful idiots», recruiting them to the ranks of supporters of the narrative «Moscow as the Third Rome».

Thirdly, having virtually unlimited financial resources, Russian ruling class, with the help of ideologues of the «Russian Word», has been successfully re-structuring national political systems of some countries of Old Europe for the past two decades. Being tired of the «old» classical politicians is a phenomenon that is one of the most common in countries with stable democracies and those in the process of democratization. Therefore, the ideologues of the «Russian Word»

took the opportunity to aggregate the interests and energy of the potential protest electorate and articulate this protest in the right way, marginalizing or trying to marginalize political systems of these countries (Bulbenyuk & Manelyuk, «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022, pp. 167-168).

As mentioned above, the quasi-ideology of the “Russian Word» may seem like a strong fortress from the outside, and the narrative of «great Russian culture» is another «brick» of it. In our opinion, the narrative of «great Russian culture» is used especially cynically after 24 February 2022. Why does the author assert this? The answer is as follows. First, this narrative has deep roots, because we can see its origins as far back as the 19th century. Secondly, in the modern Russia-Ukraine war, the narrative of «great Russian culture» is an effective tool of manipulation and political speculation on the Western political market, which is successfully used by representatives of the ruling class of the Russian Federation, led by V. Putin, as well as opponents of the war from among the Russian opposition and emigrant intellectuals. The narrative of «great Russian culture» has many adherents abroad and totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and modern Russia have always been taking advantage of it. Russia-Ukraine war caused the creation of new modifications of this narrative, in particular the discourses of «cancel culture» and «good Russians».

What does «cancel culture» mean? After the attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, especially after the actual live demonstration and streaming of the consequences of the destruction of Ukrainian cities, villages and towns, we can hear more and more frequently about the collective responsibility of Russian citizens for committing war crimes. Canceling tours of Russian artists, boycotting or banning the participation of Russian artists in international festivals and important events, painful personal sanctions are examples of the «asymmetric reaction» of the «collective West» to the silent consent of the absolute majority of the artistic elite of the aggressor country for the policy of genocide of the Ukrainian people (Bulbeniuk, *Informatsiino-psykholohichni vplyvy ta dydzhytalizatsiia: politolohichni analiz*, 2022, p. 10).

It is not surprising that in March 2022 discourses about the unethicity and inadmissibility of «cancel culture» were actively spread and popularized by bloggers and «opinion leaders» not only among the Russian population but also among potential readers and viewers abroad. Moreover, the majority of opponents of the «cancel culture» deliberately manipulated and distorted the facts, substituted

the concepts and engaged in outright deception. Social networks Facebook and Twitter (now X), YouTube platform, and messengers became a favorable environment for the deployment of these artificially created discourses. Thus, Russian «opinion leaders», speaking against «cancel culture», appealed in particular to the position of J. Rowling, who became a target of the «cancel culture» policy and signed a letter of protest against «cancel culture» practice together with other 150 public figures in 2020 (JK Rowling criticizes «cancel culture» in open letter signed by 150 public figures, 2020). Instead, in March 2022, the author of «Harry Potter» wrote in response to similar appeals that it might not be appropriate to criticize the Western «cancel culture» by those who currently kill civilians for the crime of resistance or by those who throw in prison and poison their critics. She appealed directly to the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin (JK Rowling hits back at Putin's «cancel culture» comment, 2022, cited by Bulbenyuk, Informatsiino-psykholohichni vplyvy ta dydzhytalizatsiia: politolohichniy analiz, 2022, p. 11). As we can see, the British writer clearly outlined ethical components of the problem and the manipulative effects of the informational and psychological influences of the opponents of the «cancel culture».

In spring of 2022, spread of the «cancel culture» discourse and the issue of Russians as «another victim of the genocide of this war» resulted in another agitation caused by the public opinion in many countries of Europe and North America. Its aim was to spread doubts, to show that not everything was so unequivocal and to reconsider the aggressor and the victim. The shift in emphasis and the equalization of the aggressor and the victim of aggression resulted in the development of a discourse about «good Russians» as an alternative to Putin's militarist regime and the speechless crowd of more than a hundred million people. Starting from March 2022, some representatives of Russian culture, primarily writers, begin to distance themselves publicly from the Russian regime and Russian-Ukrainian war, which is stubbornly called «Putin's». For example, L. Ulytska writes an essay in Spiegel in which she claims, «culture in Russia has suffered a serious defeat» (Schlögel, 2022, p. 43). At the same time, the majority of Russian intellectuals publicly distance themselves from aid to Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Thus, in November 2023, L. Ulytska, V. Yerofeev, and V. Sorokin publicly denied accusations concerning their financial aid to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stressing that they take on exclusively humanitarian position.

During this period, the term «Putin's war» was widely used instead of the term «Russian-Ukrainian war». According to the author, the

discourse of «good Russians», similar to the discourse of «the Russian people as victims of genocide», was initiated by the same ideologues of the «Russian World» or those close to them. It is aimed at diverting the attention of the world community from the facts of genocide of the Ukrainian people, which takes place on the occupied territories of Russia.

It is important to emphasize that the genocide of Ukrainians as a political nation by the Russian Federation has deep historical roots and psychological reasons. For example, O. Pavlov singles out one of these psychological reasons, namely an inferiority complex of Russians and the Russian Federation in relation to Ukrainians and Ukraine and, as a result, the idea of revenge as «one of the main reasons of the Russian war against Ukraine». «A clear sign of this inferiority complex is a desire for revenge, the basis of which is the hateful attitude of the Russian Federation towards the Ukrainian people, who do not want to be under the influence of a “friendly neighbor». An appropriate punishment was also chosen — a «special military operation», with its mythical goals of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine», emphasizes O. Pavlov (Pavlov, 2022, p. 133, cited in Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk, *Henotsyd v Ukraini u 2022 r.: oznaky, formy, zaperechennia*, 2022).

It is important that not only Ukrainian researchers substantiate the genocidal nature of the modern Russia-Ukraine war. For example, a German researcher H. Saase, who is the author of the book «War against Ukraine. Background, Events, Consequences», wrote in late 2022, «The scale of destruction and war crimes committed by Russian troops, as well as Russia’s offer to all Ukrainians to accept Russian citizenship, leave no doubt as to what Russia under President Vladimir Putin is striving for — the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation» (Saase, 2022, Vorwort).

Historical memory models




Figure 2. Models of historical memory.

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The struggle of historical memories as a kind of confrontation between the narratives of imperialism on the part of Russia and freedom on the part of Ukraine has always been a non-force instrument of «punishment». Historical memory and its political components are, primarily, not about the past and not even about the present, but about the future. The foundation of the policy of historical memory is the culture of memory. «The culture of memory is a policy that involves different ways of constructing the past, including dealing with an embarrassing heritage, comprehending certain historical events and personal experience that form an alternative view of conventional history, legitimized by one or another political regime» (Vaits, 2023). The concept of «culture of memory» was defined and explained by the curators of the exhibition of modern Ukrainian art, which was held at the Albertinum Museum of Fine Arts (Dresden, Germany), and where one of the four themes was «Culture of Memory». The exhibition became the first of its kind in Germany; its main goal was to tell about the past and present of Ukraine, about the struggle of its people for freedom and independence. The exhibition took place from early May to September 10, 2023 (Vaits, 2023). In our opinion, the exhibition is one of the successful practices of resisting Russia's imperial historical narratives; it aims to promote the concept of Ukrainian national identity beyond Ukraine.

The aggression of the Russian Federation since the beginning of 2022 proved how important it is to expand the influence of the historical memory strategy. O. Volianiuk notes that «the conceptual apparatus of modern political science in general and memory studies in particular clearly needs to be expanded in light of modern challenges of simulated democracy and «shaking» foundations of national and international security. For example, for several consecutive years, social humanitarians from all over the world, following philologists, have been discussing the phenomenon of «post-truth» circumstances in politics» (Volianiuk, 2018, p. 89).

V. Babka notes, «The characteristic features of the policy of memory are its immanence in the political system, inclusion in the humanitarian strategy of the state, and focus on the current needs and values of society» (Babka, 2018, p. 203). As we can see, the policy of historical memory can and should be a part of the national humanitarian strategy, forming the worldview foundations for the development of a political nation as a basis for strengthening its sovereignty. Under the conditions of the deployment of a hybrid war and the transformation of political manipulation into an instrument of undermining state sovereignty, the importance of the policy of historical memory is

difficult to overestimate. Moreover, it is the distortion of historical facts that becomes the weapon in the hybrid war, which is designed to provide justification for, let us say, theses about the «artificial nature of Ukrainian statehood» or the «inauthenticity of the Ukrainian language».

The uniqueness of Ukraine's experience in regard to historical memory and its components such as wars of memory and the culture of understanding is that our country has not fully understood the tragic essence of the past, but once again faced serious geopolitical and civilizational challenges, as well as ethical challenges. Our enemy — the Russian Federation — uses the tools of memory wars in a real war — the biggest war in Europe since the end of World War II. In addition, the toolkit of memory wars is used by Russia with the aim of dehumanizing Ukrainians in the temporal dimension: by distorting and downplaying the participation of Ukrainians in the Second World War and in modern world political processes.

The wars of memory as a conflict of narratives and as a clash between the values of imperialism, on the one hand, and the values of freedom and dignity, on the other, pose a great threat to Ukraine. We are talking about the threat of deepening value, worldview, historical-retrospective splits within Ukrainian society, which, under the conditions of wartime trauma, perceives any differences in the interpretation of events and figures of the past and present particularly painfully. Therefore, the challenges created by the memory wars raise extremely difficult questions for Ukrainian society and, above all, for Ukrainian intellectuals. The following questions, in our opinion, are the most acute and urgent:

- Is it necessary now, during the «hot» phase of the war, to start a public dialogue regarding the need to form a culture of understanding in post-war Ukraine? If so, what principles should it be based on?
- How should we basically rethink our past of recent centuries — as post-colonial, post-totalitarian, post-modernist etc.?
- Should the state and its institutions intervene in the process of rethinking the national past? If so, what should be the limits of such intervention?

Difficult questions that require a very careful and thoughtful approach to finding answers, especially considering the war of worldviews and values as a part of Russia-Ukraine war. Therefore, we consider it necessary to take into account the experience of other nations with great traumas of the past. In our opinion, the research-intellectual and personal experience of the German and Israeli philosopher, the founder of dialogue philosophy, M. Buber, was

unique. The main postulate of the philosopher was the idea of dialogue as a special form of communication between people, which opens eyes and helps to overcome what separates people (Buber, 1962). M. Buber himself tried to act in accordance with the postulates of the philosophy of dialogue, establishing a dialogue with Germans after the World War II (Schwendemann, 2018).

Undoubtedly, the experience of M. Buber should not be idealized, and even the very attempts to establish a dialogue between Jews and Germans in the first post-war decades caused indignation rather than favorable reviews. However, we believe that this experience should be studied, taking into account positive practice of developing the philosophy of dialogue during the 1980s — early 21st century. During this period, among German intellectuals, the idea of dialogue grew into the concept of forgiveness: «vergeben» (German) as «forgiveness of sins» and «verzeihen» (German) as an «ethical category», forgiveness as an ethical time. Starting from the 1980s and 1990s, these categories became the subject of consideration by social philosophers in Germany. As V. Rauen notes, «forgiveness means rejection». As a rejection of revenge, it is the starting point of ethical time. Such forgiveness makes the restoration of the previous time possible and is interned in the context of the guilt of consecutive historical time. This creates conditions for new ethical actions, which are not determined by the previously committed crime, but which form the basis for joint existence» (Kultura pry myrennia: nova istorychna svidomist v Ukraini, 2015, pp. 47-49).

We deliberately emphasize the importance of reinterpreting the World War II by abandoning memory wars in favor of a culture of dialogue and understanding on the example of Germany, because one of the central narratives used by the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine, starting in 2014, is about the «Great Patriotic War». It is significant that not only Ukrainian researchers pay attention to the manipulative nature of this narrative. In the book «The Ukrainian War. Behind the front line of the European conflict», German researcher J. Sommerbauer observes, «Nevertheless, the propaganda campaign is primarily a war of words. In Russian mass media, they constantly talk about a «punitive operation» in Kyiv — a Soviet-era phrase that was once used to accuse anti-Soviet partisans» (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 175). As we can see, even in the period of 2014-2021, Russian propaganda widely used the labels «punishers» and «Banderite fascists», awakening Russians' historical memory of the biggest criminals — «German fascists».

It is important that the «Great Patriotic War» narrative is aimed at achieving several goals of Russian propaganda.

First, it strives to show to Russian and foreign citizens that Ukrainian military people — participants of the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation lasting for the period of 2014-2018) and the Operation of the United Forces (for the period of 2018-2021) — are the same as «fascists». They are described as «occupiers of the freedom-loving Donbas» who commit crimes similar to the crimes of the Nazis in the occupied territories of Europe during the World War II. «And in Donbas, where the Soviet Union dominates, the fight against «fascism» is a «fair cause» for the recipients of Russian news, participants/readers of Russian and pro-Russian publics in social networks», emphasizes Y. Sommerbauer (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 176). The researcher concluded that the symbolic duel between «bad» Ukrainian «fascists» and «good» pro-Russian «anti-fascists» outside the borders of the Russian Federation, primarily in Europe, acquired «a certain interpretive sovereignty» (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 176).

Secondly, the use of the «Great Patriotic War» narrative made it possible to dehumanize Ukrainian military personnel in the eyes of the majority of Russian citizens during 2014-2021. What is more, after February 24, 2022, it has been contributing to the dehumanization of all Ukrainians, including the civilian population. Actually, after the «Ukrainian punishers» and «Banderite fascists» in 2014-2021, during the last two years we have seen «legitimate military targets» in Ukrainian cities and villages: residential buildings, schools and universities, hospitals.

Thirdly, the narrative of the «Great Patriotic War», which became a tool in the hybrid war of the Russian Federation against the democracies of the world, contributed to the spread of the conviction in the political consciousness of the «collective West» and the «collective East» that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were as invincible as the former army of the USSR in 1945. We must state that this task was quite successfully completed, taking into account constant fluctuations of public opinion of the «collective West» and government officials and constant calls for the need for negotiations.

Thus, one of the essential dimensions of the modern Russia-Ukraine war is the dimension of war/confrontation of narratives. This is not accidental. According to the author, it is a consequence of the transformation of modern autocracies into digital autocracies. The ruling class of the Russian Federation, adopting the experience of introducing digital totalitarianism in China, modifying the propaganda practices of the USSR and having sufficient financial capabilities, has been gradually moving in the direction of constructing its own model of digital autocracy over the past two decades.

The authors of the theory of information (digital) autocracy S. Guriev and D. Treisman call it one of the most common and most promising models of modern authoritarian and hybrid regimes. In an informational autocracy, the bet is on the representation of one's power as the most competent, as well as on the co-optation of the most informed strata of the population. The information component becomes no less important than the personal component. Informatization penetrates all components of the state system: from law enforcement agencies (police, army, special services) to the involvement (collaboration) of the best representatives of the information elite and «opinion leaders» (Guriev & Treisman, 2019, cited by Bulbeniuk, Polifoniia doslidnytskykh pozytsii shchodo vysvitlennia fenomenu novitnikh avtokratii, 2022).

One of the main tools of the information autocracy and the war of narratives is blurring the boundaries between fact and fiction, when it is not important whether a certain event/series of events happened in reality; the main thing is to blur the very picture of reality and create a «new reality» (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 178). Constructing a «new reality» presupposes the formation and promotion of imperial narratives, each of which appeals to historical events/figures/phenomena while at the same time denying Ukraine's right to statehood.

Promotion and spread of imperial narratives is supported by the fact that modern identity is impermanent (Fukuiama, p. 156). The blurring of identity boundaries is different in autocracies and democracies.

In autocracies, assimilation is the main method. Using the example of Russia's imperial narratives, we can see how assimilation blurs the boundaries of identity through the idea of «three brotherly nations» and the formation of a «single Russian people». The policy of Russification and the declaration of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages as «dialects» of the Russian language, the relegation of both languages to the margins of scientific linguistics over the 19th and 20th centuries, attempts to unify religious life are the tools of assimilation that were actively implemented in the Russian Empire and the USSR. Currently, they are being implemented by Russia in the occupied territories of Ukraine and Belarus.

In democracies, blurring the boundaries of identity is the policy of multiculturalism and tolerance. Ukraine, having embarked on the path of European integration, will not be able to ignore these two important components of the new identity policy. At the same time, European countries should also reject the overt and latent imperial Russian narratives in the perception of Ukrainians, Ukrainian culture and

language, and Ukrainian history. It is with regret that we have to state that in some places these narratives still determine the attitude towards Ukrainians and Ukraine, influencing the adoption of certain political and administrative decisions. It should be noted that the values of multiculturalism and tolerance are produced when the very idea of the identity of a particular nation has been formed, when a nation is present on the mental map of other nations and they recognize its specific identity. In the case when the mechanisms of imperial assimilation in relation to Ukrainians has had an impact on mental maps of Europeans for several centuries, it is actually unrealistic to talk about the perception of Ukrainians as bearers of a specific and different from Russians identity.

«In Germany, in particular, people are used to believing that Ukrainians are part of «Russia», the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union and that they speak a language that is something like a subtype of Russian», a German researcher K. Schlögel wrote in the preface to his book «Decisions in Kyiv. Ukrainian lessons» (Schlögel, 2022, p. 9). The researcher of Slavic studies, who made a long trip to Ukraine, contributed to his book, the first edition of which was published in 2015. He notes with regret that until the end of February 2022, Ukraine and Ukrainians did not exist on the mental map of the absolute majority of Germans; that Germans felt guilty for the crimes of Nazism exclusively before Russians («Ruskiye»). All this was the result of V. Putin's successful information war, «Putin's media people are familiar not only with the idiom of postmodernism, but also with the values of Holy Rus» (Schlögel, 2022, pp. 38, 40). K. Schlögel's conclusion is that the modern Russia-Ukraine war is a war with the very idea of Freedom (Schlögel, 2022).

Another German researcher, H. Saase, actually repeats the opinion of K. Schlögel, noting that until February 24, 2022, Ukraine and Ukrainians did not actually exist on the mental map of the average European (Saase, 2022, p. 11). H. Saase states that the unexpected strength of Ukraine, demonstrated in 2022, the recognition of the strength of the Ukrainian state by Europeans is a consequence of the distorted image of our state and Ukrainians, formed, among other things, by the efforts of Russian propaganda. Answering the question «Why did this war break out? Why now?» H. Saase points to neo-imperial state ideology as the basis of motivation for Russia-Ukraine war (Saase, 2022, pp. 12, 16).

Conclusions.

The role and place of imperial narratives in unfolding the modern Russia-Ukraine war is difficult to overestimate. Imperial narratives

actually appear as the supporting structures or the worldview and mental backbone of Russia-Ukraine war, which has a genocidal nature.

In the era of post-truth and complete digitalization, there has been a modification of Russian imperial narratives and the increase of their influence. The information (digital) autocracy that has taken hold in Russia and has many features similar to China's digital totalitarianism is quite successful in using imperial narratives for both Russians and foreigners. The discourse of memory wars remains dominant in the promotion of Russian imperial narratives, especially in external political, cultural, and academic communities. The leading feature of Russian imperial narratives is their exclusive focus on the past.

What can effectively counter the influence of Russian imperial narratives as a weapon in modern Russia-Ukraine war? In author's opinion, alternative (pro-) Ukrainian narratives can become such a tool. They are based on the national version of historical memory formed in the result of the culture of dialogue and understanding, as well as on the recognition of the core values of freedom and dignity in the worldview system of the Ukrainian state and society.

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INSTITUTIONAL COUNTERACTION TO INFORMATIONAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE

Abstract.

The article analyzes the peculiarities of Ukrainian institutional system connected with informational policy, its opportunities and weakness in counteraction to informational war.

The importance of the topic is based on the great hidden influence of propaganda on military actions in Ukraine by changing people's values and minds.

The main discussed topics are evolution of the informational policy institutions, their development, effectiveness and weaknesses in counteraction to informational warfare. In general, the threats to informational safety are lack of preventive measures, insufficient attention to civic education, development of patriotism, active citizenship, democratic values and principles.

As a conclusion, the author proposes a wide understanding of the institutional system of counteraction to informational war. In particular, it should include state and civil institutions of decommunization, cultural memories, Ukrainian language and traditions popularization.

Keywords: *political institute, public opinion, state informational war, propaganda, information security, information policy.*

Statement of the problem in a general form and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. Informational pressure, propaganda, and disinformation is one of the greatest part of current Russian military aggression. It has taken place for centuries, preparing the background of colonial policy under many nations, Ukrainians in particular. It has created so strong stereotypes around the World that they couldn't be broken even because of modern transparency of information, digital technologies or good sense. The danger of informational war is its latent hidden form. A great amount of people believe in nonsense myths which is profitable for the ruling group. Untruth became a part of public consciousness and mind.

As a state policy informational war has its own institutional design. In modern society the institutional war is not only a dependent media but also all institutions which support authoritarian regime (education, science, culture etc.).

Today's informational unsafety in Ukraine is a result of imperial policy and rhetoric both historical and modern. Political institute is a system of rules and sustainable relations. That's why our government should create as strong system of institution as it necessary to resist enemy's influences.

The goals and objectives of the article. In this article we are going to find out main clusters of institutional counteraction to the informational war. For achieving this goal the evolution of informational policy institutes should be analyzed first.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The theory of informational warfare have a long history of research. We can mention works of M. Taddeo (Taddeo,2020), D. Bolton (Bolton, 2021), M. Libicki (Libicki, 2020). They gave modern definition of main article's terms.

The counteraction to Russian propaganda became rather popular topic in whole world. Foreign researches like N. Jankowicz (Jankowicz, 2020), Information Wars in the Baltic States (Information, 2022) are very interesting because they helpful for compare with domestic studies.

The results of Ukrainian researches made by N. Galipchak (Galipchak, 2022), T. Koroluk (Koroluk, 2023) are rather close to article's subjects. They can fulfill our discussion. There are also modern Ukrainian monographs which pay attention to the role of communicative aspects during the military aggression: B. Parahonskiy and G. Yavorska (Parahonskiy, 2019), I. Semenets-Orlova (Fundamentalni..., 2023), Ja. Vermenych (Vermenych, 2023).

Highlighting previously unresolved parts of the general problem, to which the article is devoted. Despite a great number of previous researches there are some unresolved questions, in particular: how to make counteraction to informational war permanent and effective, how to transform it to institutional form.

Results and discussions.

The evolution of institutes' informational policy in Ukraine.

In 1991 after the declaration of independence Ukrainian government received the opportunity to create and develop its informational space by passing judicial documents and establishing new institutions.

These processes were primarily aimed at:

- eradicating the worldview post-colonial dependence of the Ukrainian people;
- building a foundation for democratic values and European identity;
- providing protected information environment;

- preventing further imposition of the inferiority complex of Ukrainians.

A set of regulatory and legal documents was successfully developed to achieve these aims, and the organizational structuring of institutions regulating information policy took place. *The first stage* of the institutionalization of the information environment includes the development of the foundations for the information sector.

The regulatory basis for the institutions of information environment comprises:

- The Constitution of Ukraine, which guarantees the right to freedom of speech, free expression of one's thoughts, views and beliefs, arbitrary use and dissemination of oral and written information (Konstytutsia).

- The Law of Ukraine «On Information» which regulates information circulation, defines the main information concepts, establishes the principles of relationships in information sector, such as the right to openness, accessibility, reliability, completeness of information, respect for the preservation and protection of personal information, information security (Zakon).

- Laws of Ukraine «On Printed Mass Media (Press) in Ukraine», «On Television and Radio Broadcasting», «On State Support of Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists», «On the National Informatization Program», «On Information Agencies», «On Electronic Documents and Electronic Document Circulation», «On Scientific and Technical Information», «On Communication» which regulate separate areas of mass media functioning.

In general, the legislative system of Ukraine affirms the equality of relationships in information sector, the principles of media democratization, the openness of various branches of social life, the principles of the information policy of the state aimed at equal interaction between society and the government. It recognizes the role of new information technologies in ensuring economic, social and political development.

At this stage, a system of non-state institutions of the information environment is developed. Of course, mass media occupy a special place among them. As an institution of democracy, it promotes the implementation of the principle of openness and transparency of the political system, provides opportunities for monitoring the activities of the authorities. The organizational system of mass media includes various means and channels of information transmission as well as the leading state body, the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

At the same time, some contradictions of the institutionalization of the information environment were not resolved at the first stage, in particular:

- No precautions were taken against the transformation of mass media into a tool of state propaganda and manipulation of public opinion. The possibilities of imposing far-fetched, artificially fabricated problems through mass media, speculating on national feelings, etc., which leads to confrontation, polarization of society, and the growth of conflict potential are particularly threatening (Couldry, 2003). That is, the principle of freedom of the press must be combined with legally approved restrictions on the disclosure of state secrets, dissemination of anti-state and separatist ideas, violations of moral norms and the ethical code of journalists, insults to the honor and dignity of any person or group. Unfortunately, these risks were not taken into account at the initial stage of the state building.

- The trend of mass media commercialization, insufficient attention to ensuring economic independence of mass media, the absence of independent alternative sources of funding, which would make it possible to value the rating and authority of one's media channel more than the remuneration from interested parties. Ukrainian mass media often belong to certain business or political groups. They compete with each other in the information environment, ensuring the diversity of information sources, but not contributing to the legitimacy of the mass media institution in society. The content of informational messages is dictated by the motive of making a profit and increasing the rating of the channel. Mass media do not cover socially significant issues, do not perform an educational function and do not promote effective communication between state authorities and the public.

- Destructive influence of the media on the consciousness of citizens due to the enhanced role of governmental informational resources under the conditions of a low level of political culture. Journalists and intellectuals usually have a high level of support in society. Unfortunately, they may represent the interests of a narrow group of people. According to N. Couldry, media power can be defined as the concentration of the symbolic ability to «construct reality» (both actual representations and credible fictions) in media institutions (Coldry, 2003). Today, it is a common practice to write commissioned articles, TV broadcasts, disseminate false information or fake news, distort and suppress true information at the initiative of sponsors of specific information channels.

- Unregulated functioning of international information systems and institutions in Ukraine within the framework of mass media

globalization. The absence of borders in the dissemination of information, unified standards of behavior can give positive results when it comes to the exchange of experience regarding democratization in various spheres of public life, openness and transparency of information, accessibility to broad segments of the population. However, there is a negative risk of hostile informational influences, the control over the media environment by several powerful transnational corporations, which makes it possible to give a one-sided or biased coverage of information.

- Non-regulated activities of online mass media.

Therefore, the development of institutions in information environment urgently needed the formalization of the communication rules, compliance with the requirements of journalistic ethics, the definition of the confidentiality of information, and various types of secrecy.

We associate *the second stage* with the growth of information threats and the need to adapt the information environment to hybrid warfare. The most important achievements of this stage are:

- The development of public radio and television projects, public broadcasting. For example, in 2013, an independent channel «Public Television» of the National Public Television and Radio Company of Ukraine was established. It is financed by the State Budget of Ukraine and by means of commercial revenues, but state bodies do not have the right to interfere with the policy of the company. According to the law, its tasks include comprehensive and impartial dissemination of information about socially significant events in Ukraine and beyond; consolidation and integration of Ukrainian society; promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture, as well as national minorities; satisfaction of informational, cultural and educational needs of the population; encouraging the strengthening of Ukraine's international authority (Zakon).

- Functioning of public institutions in the information sector (Union of Journalists of Ukraine, «Committee for the Protection of Press Freedom», Union of Ukrainian Journalists «Independence»). We believe that their main task is to ensure the value norms for the functioning of mass media. It can be achieved by monitoring the effectiveness of guarantees of press freedom, compliance with journalistic ethics, and publicizing the facts of pressure on mass media by the authorities or certain political forces.

- «Ukrainization» of domestic media. In 2019, the Law of Ukraine «On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as an Official Language» was finally adopted. It regulates the use of the Ukrainian

language in various public spheres (Articles 20–42). The activities of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council were focused on providing 77% of Ukrainian television content on national TV channels (the content of the EU, the USA and Canada makes 19%), reducing the share of Russian content to a historic minimum of 4%. In general, in 2019, the share of the Ukrainian language on the air of national TV channels comprised 94% (Rezultaty).

- Developing of a state-building national idea, strengthening of national identity. Military events united the people of Ukraine and disproved many myths about the differentiation of society.

At the same time, the institutional system responded slowly and inconsistently to challenges concerning:

- Ensuring information security, in particular countering disinformation about military operations in Donbas. State institutions acted «on the run», overcoming the consequences of the lack of preventive measures to ensure information security. In 2014, the issues of developing cyber security standards, state policy regarding countermeasures against information aggression of foreign states, determination of the mechanism of counteracting negative informational and psychological influence, protection of journalists working in places of armed conflicts and terrorist acts became especially acute.

During 2014–2019, the broadcasting of 86 foreign TV channels on the territory of Ukraine, of which 74 are of direct Russian origin, was restricted (Rezultaty...). The Information Security Strategy was adopted only in 2021 (Strategija...). However, even today, preventing the spread of unverified, incomplete, biased, unreliable information, populism, etc. with the aim of manipulating public opinion, political rhetoric, increasing the ratings of certain political forces are still the unsolved tasks in ensuring information security. Instead, new tasks arise, for example, the spread of European values for successful integration into the EU, development of the ideology of peace and statehood of Ukraine in the post-war period.

- Ensuring the competitiveness of Ukrainian mass media, their ability to provide quality content for consumers, which will increase the level of trust in this institution.

- Using mass media potential for informational and explanatory work, raising the political and legal culture of the population. Thus, in the conditions of a military conflict, a system of information assistance to affected people regarding the possibility of protecting their rights should work more effectively. Ukrainian translation of the conclusions of the UN on the events in the East of Ukraine and other international

documents on the protection of rights should be provided. Besides, information should be disseminated not only through electronic media, because people, who were forced to leave their place of residence, do not always have access to the Internet.

In general, we agree with the opinion that in Ukraine, the methods of direct pressure on mass media by the government (when instructions were given from state authority to press and media) yield to a negative informational and psychological influence on the Ukrainian audience by means of using reality construction technology that controls how events are covered (Kostetska, 2017).

We are observing *the third stage* of institutionalization of Ukrainian information environment after the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. During this period, crisis communication with the public through mass media became a priority task. Objectively, this entailed the narrowing of freedom of the press.

The new communication rules were characterized by:

- regularity of notifications from the authorities. According to the classic principles of crisis communication, information messages from the top state officials are made public every day, and in critical situations — immediately, with constant clarification of data. In addition, mass media must contribute to the reduction of tension and conflict in society by discussing passive forms of protest and monitoring public sentiments (slacktivism, blockchain).

- revitalization of international communication, that is implementation of public diplomacy at all levels.

- increasing the audience of electronic mass media which have become widespread because they are perceived as environment for the expression of various opinions and views, including oppositional ones, free from censorship. Users view online media as a «mouthpiece» of public opinion due to easy mechanisms for providing feedback from the public through user comments, various polls and surveys.

We agree with the statement that online communication between the community and the government provides the only opportunity today to quickly and affordably clarify the expediency of major political decisions, to provide effective feedback from society to the government when discussing proposals and analyzing the results of governmental decisions. Online mass media, L. Kochubey rightly observes, create opportunities for more informative participation of citizens in the political life of Ukraine, reinforce the phenomenon of transparency, openness of activity and responsibility of power structures, strengthen channels of interactive communication between citizens (Kochubej, 2017).

However, the weakness of social networks is the lack of liability for spreading false, unverified information or even outright fakes, which can be too dangerous in wartime.

In general, the functioning of political institutions in the information sector requires further regulation of information security guarantees, compliance with journalistic ethics, the availability and equality of various information channels and sources of financing their activities, taking into account the trends of mass media globalization and using positive potential of online media.

The system of institutional countermeasures against information warfare.

Of course, supreme authorities are involved in ensuring information security. The President of Ukraine is the spokesperson and symbol of our state in international relations and at the national level. Unfortunately, in the history of Ukraine, there were cases when the head of the state not only underestimated the communication aspect of politics, but also openly damaged the image of Ukraine, finding himself at the center of scandals.

The Verkhovna Rada is the highest public institution that enacts laws, particularly in the field of information security. However, the work of the parliament in this area is not very fruitful. The issue of regulating the information sector was raised in January 1997, when possible threats in the information sector were identified and the need to minimize unauthorized interference with the Ukrainian information environment was declared («National Security Strategy of Ukraine»). Besides, information policy was discussed at parliamentary hearings in 1999 and 2001 on «Information policy of Ukraine: the state and prospects» and «Problems of information activity, freedom of speech, compliance with the law and the state of information security of Ukraine», but their conclusions were not implemented in practice.

The activities of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine contribute to countering information warfare.

The activity of public relations services within central and local authorities also plays an important role in countering disinformation. With the development of decentralization processes, connections with local self-government bodies are gaining special importance.

The National Security and Defense Council belongs to the system of state institutions designed to ensure information security. However, the Information and Analytical Center was created at the National Security and Defense Council only in 2014. The Center for Countering Disinformation also functions in its structure, an entity established in accordance with the decision of the National Security and Defense

Council of Ukraine dated March 11, 2021 «On the establishment of the Center for Countering Disinformation» and put into effect by the Decree of the President of Ukraine # 106 of March 19, 2021.

Recent events in Ukraine make us take a broader look at the institutional opposition to information warfare. Many factors in the development of information environment were considered secondary. They include a language issue, the formation of historical memory, and decommunization. To overcome this contradiction, a system of relevant institutions is being formed. These institutions are not only to regulate the activities of mass media. In a broad context, they are related to scientific, educational, linguistic and cultural spheres, as well as the policy of decommunization, etc.

Institutions that contribute to the development of the Ukrainian language. According to the law on promoting the functioning of the Ukrainian language, the position of the Commissioner for the Protection of the Official Language was created. Their duties include protecting the right of Ukrainian citizens to receive information and services in different spheres of public life in the official language, removing obstacles and restrictions in using the official language. To fulfil their obligations, the Commissioner submits proposals to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to ensure the effective implementation of the relevant state policy, comprehensive development of the official language in different spheres of public life, and assistance in meeting the language needs of Ukrainians living outside Ukraine. They also monitor the implementation of legislation on the official language and state target programs; consider citizens' complaints regarding compliance with the requirements of the legislation on the official language; conduct official investigations and bring to disciplinary liability officials who violate the legislation on the official language; annually publicly report on their activities.

Despite the recognition of the Ukrainian language as the only official language, no punishment was foreseen for the use of the Russian language at the level of officials and high-ranking officials, in the field of business and service. In addition, no measures were taken to increase the prestige of the Ukrainian language, to eradicate the imposed imperial and Soviet stereotype about its «unfashionability». No state programs were administered for the public to learn the Ukrainian language. Citizens had the opportunity to learn the official language only on personal initiative, at their own expense. However, since the knowledge of the Ukrainian language is not mandatory for everyday life and employment (in contrast to English), there are few people willing to learn it.

As of 2023, there are 473 free Ukrainian language courses in Ukraine, including 13 regional programs (Kremin, 2023).

Institutions for the policy of decommunization.

An important stage in the process of institutionalizing the information sector of Ukraine was the adoption of the Law of Ukraine «On Purification of Power» (2014), which has regulated the process of lustration aimed at establishing democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Ukraine. Another law was adopted in 2015 «On Condemnation of Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Prohibition of Propaganda of their Symbols».

The activities of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance were significantly intensified in order to implement the tasks defined in the laws regarding the implementation of decommunization. Its aim is to provide a comprehensive professional evaluation of the theory and practice of communism in the history of Ukraine during the 20th century, organize events and analyze citizens' appeals concerning decolonization, refutation of historical fakes, etc.

One of the elements of decommunization is the renaming of cities, towns, streets, establishments and educational institutions after world-famous Ukrainians, including ATO heroes, writers, politicians, scientists, and musicians.

Conclusions.

From the beginning of 90s Ukrainian society created all official (governmental and civil) institutes for counteraction to informational war. All the media have equal rights to provide their activities. This is the reason for decrease in quantity and influence of Russian media and separatist's or aggressive rhetoric.

At the same time public and regional media need financial and other support. Many measurements were too weak to form social values and too late to escape from propaganda destructive influence. Unfortunately for a long time there were no studies on democratic and patriotic values, civil participation. There was no monitoring of fake sources. Finally, according to polls, many Ukrainians believed in Russian myths and some leaders share them in different kind of communications. In edition state institutes paid very little attention to Ukraine's image, sharing information about real Ukrainian history, culture, traditions, modern achievements in economic, science and other areas.

Each year Russian fakes and narratives increase in Ukraine and World. For minimize such problem in future the counteraction should be permanent and systematic. The effective system of informational monitoring should be created by Parliament Comity to avoid manipulations, hate and aggressive speech, ethnic and ideological

intolerance. The professional ethic of journalist, media workers should be developed to sharing only truth and checked information. Educational institutions should support civil and political studies to create open public space and strong civil society. Public organizations can influence on creation systematic program of life-long civil education.

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
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APPLICATION

Application 1.

How has the popularity and level of trust in Ukrainian channels changed over the past 10 year
Performed by: Artur Kovalenko,
2nd year student of the educational programme
«Political Technologies and Leadership».



Over the past few years, not only news consumption habits have changed, but also the information space itself. Today, Ukraine is in an active phase of information warfare, which is manifested in the spread of information and psychological special operations, disinformation campaigns, and the use of automated accounts to influence public opinion.



The Ukrainian media landscape itself has undergone significant changes over the past 10 years.

These changes concern both the popularity and the level of trust in Ukrainian channels.

Change in popularity

Until 2014: Ukrainian television was weakly dominant as a source of information. The most popular channels were «1+1», «Inter», «Ukraine» and STB.

2014-2022: after the Revolution of Dignity and the start of the war in Donbas, the popularity of Ukrainian channels began to grow. This is due to the fact that people were looking for information about events in the country.

2022: with the beginning of the full-scale war of russia against Ukraine, the popularity of Ukrainian channels increased even more. People are looking for reliable information about the war and events in the country.

Change in the level of trust

Until 2014: the level of trust in Ukrainian channels was low. This is due to the fact that many channels were considered pro-government or oligarchic.

2014-2022: after the Revolution of Dignity and the start of the war in Donbas, the level of trust in Ukrainian channels began to grow. This is due to the fact that people have become more appreciative of the Ukrainian language and culture.

2022: with the beginning of russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the level of trust in Ukrainian channels increased even more. People appreciate the fact that Ukrainian channels provide reliable information about the war and events in the country.



In 2021, the most common source of information for Ukrainians about events in Ukraine and the world will remain traditional mass media, namely national TV channels. The share of viewers of Ukrainian television is 67%. Other traditional media — newspapers and radio — are significantly inferior to the reach of the audience by new media: social networks account for 44% of consumers, Ukrainian online media — 29%, messengers — 16%, while Ukrainian newspapers only have 6%, and on the radio — 7%.




1. З яких джерел Ви найчастіше отримуєте інформацію про стан справ в Україні та світі? (не більше трьох відповідей)

	2021 (Центр Разумкова)	2020 (Центр Разумкова)	2019 (КМІС)	2018 (КМІС)
Українське телебачення (загальнонаціональні канали)	66,6	75,0	74,0	85,7
Російське телебачення	4,6	5,6	4,3	4,7
Українські інтернет-ЗМІ	28,5	26,9	27,5	27,1
Соціальні мережі	44,4	44,1	23,5	23,5
Українські газети (загальнонаціональні видання)	5,8	7,7	6,7	8,1
Українське радіо (загальнонаціональні станції)	7,0	8,8	1,6	2,0
Місцеве телебачення	8,5	8,8	4,3	6,4
Місцеве радіо	2,3	2,1	1,6	2,0
Місцеві інтернет-ЗМІ	7,4	5,9	4,1	2,5
Місцеві друковані видання	3,4	4,3	1,7	4,8

Results of a study conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation «Democratic Initiatives», 2020.

In 2022, the Ukrainian mass media managed to break the negative balance of trust among Ukrainians. 57% of citizens began to trust Ukrainian media, which is 43% more than the number of those who do not trust it. Trust in the Russian mass media among Ukrainians is practically non-existent: it decreased from 3% to 1% in a year, and the balance fell from 76% to 92%. It is interesting that the only region where trust in «rosZMI» (Russian Media) was at the level of 0% is the east of Ukraine (in the west and center — 1%, in the south — 2%).

*Results of the survey conducted by the
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,
2022.*



In 2023, television and social networks are almost equal in terms of trust. Television retains the lead by a small margin (61.1%), and social networks are trusted by only 1.1% of respondents. Confidence in the Internet without social networks has slightly decreased and is 45.1%. Slightly fewer Ukrainians expressed trust in radio (41%) and print media (30.3%). Almost 8% of respondents do not trust any of the sources.


Results of the study of media consumption of Ukrainians, commissioned by the Civic Network OPORA, 2023.



Factors that influenced the changes

Revolution of Dignity,
war with the russian federation (2014-...






The American sociologist and economist James Coleman in the article «Social and Human Capital» notes: «...*A group within which there is complete reliability and absolute trust is able to do much more compared to a group that does not possess such qualities*». Therefore, the Ukrainian mass media, like other state and social institutions, will have to continue to regain the lost trust of citizens. After all, it is the basis of multifaceted public dialogue and the development of the national information space.

Russian-language information resources in Ukraine on the example of television


Performed by: Eduard Filippov, Anastasiia Kovalenko, Uliana Chyndarova,
2nd year students of the educational programme «*Political Technologies and Leadership*».

The most common sources of information for Ukrainians still remain the traditional media, among which the main part is TV channels (67%) of the surveyed respondents chose this option for receiving information.



Серед інших методів отримання інформації на соціальні мережі перепадає 44% кількості громадян, які отримують інформацію; українські інтернет ЗМІ — 29%; месенджери — 16%; газети — 7%; радіо — 4%.

(Among other methods of obtaining information, social networks account for 44% of the number of citizens who receive information; Ukrainian internet mass media — 29%; messengers — 16%; newspapers — 7%; radio — 4%).



Among which the most popular are TV channels with entertainment and news content: «1+1» (43%) respondents chose this channel; «Ukraine» (34%) respondents chose this channel; STB (32%) respondents chose this channel; ICTV (31%) respondents chose this channel.

За віковою характеристикою наведені такі дані як:

Молодше покоління тяжіє до медіа інформаційної ери, а старші вікові групи - до традиційних ЗМІ

З яких джерел Ви найчастіше отримуєте інформацію про стан справ в Україні та світі? (по більше трьох відповідей)


	15-29 роки	30-39 роки	40-49 роки	50-59 роки	60 років
Українське телебачення (оператори-національні канали)	39,5%	34,6%	30,6%	24,8%	16,2%
Соціальні мережі	37,4%	30,5%	20,1%	9%	1,4%
Українське Інтернет-ЗМІ	34,2%	31,9%	33%	31%	13,7%
Родичі, друзі, сусіди, колеги по роботі, знайомі	29,2%	23,8%	26%	26%	28,8%
Месенджери (Viber, Telegram, WhatsApp, TikTok, Instagram тощо)	26,3%	23,1%	18,8%	13,1%	6,2%
Міжнародне телебачення	4,2%	6,3%	6,6%	6,2%	13,9%
Українське радіо (оператори-національні станції)	2,7%	4,2%	4,8%	8,2%	9,8%
Українське газети (оператори-національні видання)	3,2%	3,7%	3,8%	6,4%	9,9%
Російське телебачення	1,8%	3,1%	6,5%	5,5%	5,7%
Міжнародні друковані видання	1,2%	6,6%	3,1%	4,2%	4,7%

Загальнонаціональне дослідження проведено на замовлення ГО «Діалогос Медіа» фондом економічних ініціатив ім. Лева Кучерка спільно з соціологічною службою Центру Разумкова, у період з 17 по 22 грудня 2022 року. Вибіркова сукупність складала 2918 респондентів (за віковою характеристикою населення України, за винятком повномасштабного воєнного стану територій АР Крим, частини Донецької та Луганської областей). Максимальна статистична похибка опитування (без урахування ймовірності) не перевищує 2,2%.

Джерело: Фонд «Діалогос Медіа» ім. Лева Кучерка - Створено за допомогою SurveyKit

According to the age characteristics, the following data are given.

Джерело: <https://dif.org.ua/article/mediaspozhyvannya-v-ukraini-zmina-mediapotreb-ta-progrash-rosiyskoi-propagandi>



It is quite interesting that respondents who trust these channels are 2 times less than those who watch these TV channels. Although the lists of trust leaders coincide to a large extent with the lists of the most popular.

What for Russian-language TV channels, most of them are Russian TV channels (5%) of the total volume of Ukrainian media space. Statistics for 2023. But it was not always like that.

Джерело: <https://www.volynnews.com/news/society/mova/>

Мова провідних телеканалів у прайм-тайм частка часу телепрограм, %




Джерело: Інститут свободи виразу

Моніторинг рід мов виразу свободи, www.dobrovol.org

Визначення: TEXTORSCADA

1. На Вашу думку, мали чи не мали вплив українські медіа (телебачення, преса, інтернет) на формування проросійських настроїв на Сході України та в Криму?



Результати опитування: 2014-2015 роки, виконані за підтримки українського розвідки



In total, about 42 Russian channels are banned in Ukraine. Among them are such federal media giants as: "Russia 24"; First Channel and NTV. According to the National Council, this is due to the fact that this is not an authorized display of advertising — the violation of the law is that in Ukraine it is forbidden to rebroadcast commercial advertising from those countries that have not signed the European Convention on Transfrontier Television, and this concerns Russia.

But it is impossible to say that in the last 10 years there was any reasonable strategy to counter Russian media narratives — rather, it was a reaction to everything that has been happening since the spring of 2014. For example, there is a completely separate situation in the occupied territories of Ukraine, where the influence of Russian media resources has only increased over the past 10 years, with no decent alternative from the Ukrainian media)

Джерело: <https://ms.detector.media/mediaslidzhennya/post/12201/2014-12-24-82-ukraintsiv-vvazhayut-shcho-ukrainski-media-mayut-buty-objektyvnymy-a-ne-zaymaty-propagandystsku-pozytsiyu/>

This is generally confirmed by research by the GfK Ukraine company and the Institute of Mass Information, which was conducted back in 2016: all Russian and separatist TV channels made it to the top 10 TV channels in the occupied territories, and the 1+1 channel took the last place. If we take the statistical data (IMI) of the Institute of Mass Information, then the overwhelming majority (90%) of Ukrainians refused to watch Russian mass media.

In 2014, at the request of the National Television and Broadcasting Council, Russian TV channels were turned off, but satellite TV viewers still have access to their international versions. And already in the spring of 2022, this way of watching Russian mass media was stopped, through the 6th package of sanctions of the European Union against Russia, after that (90%) of private "dishes" in Ukraine lost access to Russian resources.




Джерело: <https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2021/02/04/infografika/svit/informacijna-vijna-yaki-telekanaly-zaboronyaly-krajiny-svitu>

In the picture you can see: when, where and what was forbidden in the world.

Джерело: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/182898/2020-11-27-yakby-vyrubyty-svitlo-trom-kanalam-propagandy-pomenshalo-by-v-razy-otar-dovzhenko/>

РОЗПОДІЛ ЗАФІКСОВАНИХ ЗА ВЕСЬ ПЕРІОД
МОНІТОРИНГУ ПРИКЛАДІВ ПОШИРЕННЯ
ПРОРОСІЙСЬКИХ ДЕЗІНФОРМАЦІЙНИХ НАРАТИВІВ
У ЗАГАЛЬНОНАЦІОНАЛЬНОМУ МЕДІАПРОСТОРІ

ЗА ДЖЕРЕЛАМИ



Статистичні дані на 2015 рік «Мова українського» ТБ


The picture has language been using of Ukrainian TV.

Джерело:

https://texty.org.ua/fragments/63164/Z_ukrajinskyh_telekanaliv_znykaje_ukrajinska_mova_INFOGRAFIKA-63164/

Мова «українського» ТБ

● 6 червня 2015 р. ● 7 листопада 2015 р.



● Українська ● Російська ● Російська з субтитрами ● Дві мови

За результатами моніторингів ефіру телеканалів «Україна», «Інтер», НТН, ICTV, 1+1, 2+2, СТБ, «Новий», ТЕТ і К1, проведених Громадянським рухом «Відсіч» 7 листопада та 6 червня 2015 року.

What so the conclusion can be drawn?

Russian media resources had very long hands before a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by 02/24/22; most of the information space in Ukraine belonged to them or their puppets, such as "112 Ukraine". The active activity of these media parasites contributed to the active depoliticization of Ukrainians, the formation of Russian narratives, but not directly, but very carefully and for many years. Later, these pens were cut a little, but not completely cut off, because in the modern realities of the development of information technologies, this is impossible, especially on the Internet, where there are completely free platforms, for example, Twitter (currently X), for pushing Russian propaganda and increasing spheres of influence. Therefore, I personally believe that the only way to reduce the spheres of influence of Russian media resources is to create Ukrainian competitive platforms on the international television and radio scene.

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Study of the rise in popularity of public Telegram channels during a full-scale war

Performed by: Valeriia Bezsmertna, Victoriia Dubas, Mariia Liytenko,
2nd year student of the educational programme «*Political Technologies and Leadership*».

With the beginning of a full-scale war, the media space of Ukraine underwent significant transformations. In this context, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the Telegram messenger as a key factor that defined the new landscape of the information space. In recent years, this communication tool has not only become a convenient channel for exchanging messages, but also defined itself as a significant platform for obtaining relevant information.

In the context of rapid growth in popularity, Telegram channels have gone beyond a simple communication service, surpassing traditional mass media in popularity. Modern Telegram has become not only a means of exchanging news, but also a key information hub, where well-known publications such as «Ukrainian Pravda», «European Pravda», «Mirror of the Week» interact intensively with their readers.[1] Traditional mass media face the task of adapting to new conditions of competition and providing access to information in an era when the media space is rethinking its role and influence on society.

TOP 10 PUBLIC TELEGRAM CHANNELS

NEWS AND POLITICAL TOPICS

number of subscribers

language of most posts:



Ukrainian



Russian



2.7 million
"Trukha Ukraine"



1.7 million
"Ukraine Now: news,
war, Russia"



1.3 million
"Insider UA"



1.3 million
"Real War | Ukraine
News"



0.9 million
"TSN news /
TCH.ua"



0.9 million
"Legitimate"



0.9 million
"Real Kyiv | News
Ukraine"



0.8 million
"Resident"



0,7 million
"Ukraine NOW"



0,6 million
"Fu**ing Odessa"

For the study of political advertising, channels that are not covered by ZMI are selected according to the following criteria:

- oriented to the Ukrainian audience;
 - belong to the category of news and political public channels;
 - have more than 100 thousand subscribers;
 - not in personal blogs
- not with the official channels of politicians or government agencies.

zmi.np.org
analchesko@zmi.np.org
+38 067 658 7798



Popularity of channels by coverage for 24 hours



- Trukha. Ukraine
- Ukraine Now: news, war, Russia
- Ukraine Online
- Real War | Ukraine
- Insider UA
- All-seeing EYE Ukraine
- Lachen writes
- Telegram news service - Ukraine
- Battalion "Monaco"
- Top News | (War, Ukraine, News)

Popularity of channels according to the indicator of attracting subscribers



- Trukha. Ukraine
- Ukraine Now: news, war, Russia
- Ukraine Online
- Real War | Ukraine
- Insider UA
- All-seeing EYE Ukraine
- Lachen writes
- Telegram news service - Ukraine
- Battalion "Monaco"
- Top News | (War, Ukraine, News)

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Наукове видання

**Політичні технології
інформаційної війни:
внутрішній та світовий аспекти**

Монографія

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