

Svitlana Bulbeniuk,
PhD in Political Science,
Associated Professor,
Professor of the Department
of Political Technologies,
Kyiv National Economic University
named after Vadym Hetman
bulbeniuk.svitlana@kneu.edu.ua
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9760-7850>

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR WITHIN THE STRUGGLE OF IMPERIAL NARRATIVES AGAINST THE VALUES OF FREEDOM AND DIGNITY

Abstract.

The article presents a study of Russian imperial narratives, which are an effective tool of the modern Russia-Ukraine war. This war is seen as a conflict of worldviews and values, a struggle of identities and historical memories. The methodological basis of the article is a combination of general scientific methods of comparative and historical analysis with special methods of narrative analysis. Based on the examples of the most common imperial narratives, it is substantiated that the latter have become an effective tool of justifying armed aggression against Ukraine and waging a genocidal war. It is emphasized that imperial narratives have always been tools of Russian propaganda aimed both at the direct and/or symbolic enemy, and at other people not directly involved in the existential struggle. Particular attention is paid to highlighting the manipulative influence and effects of Russian imperial narratives, the result of which is the affirmation of a positive image of Russia and the disappearance of Ukrainians and Ukraine as self-sufficient geopolitical entities from the mental map of most European nations. The ruling class of the Russian Federation, adopting the experience of digital totalitarianism in China, modifying the propaganda of the USSR and having sufficient financial capabilities, has been gradually moving in the direction of constructing its own model of digital autocracy over the past two decades. In the era of post-truth and complete digitalization, there has been a modification of Russian imperial narratives, which contributed to the spread of their influence. The author considers alternative (pro-) Ukrainian narratives as a tool of effective counteraction to Russian imperial narratives. Ukrainian narratives are based on the national version of historical memory, which is the result of the culture of dialogue and understanding, as well as on the recognition of the core values of freedom and dignity in the worldview system of the Ukrainian state and society.

Keywords: narrative, Russia-Ukraine war, historical memory, memory wars, culture of dialogue and understanding, identity.

Problem statement in general and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. After February 24, 2022, Russia-Ukraine war became the most discussed and highlighted topic of the world news. However, it has been gradually sidelined in mass media during

2023. This happened due to several reasons but it does not mean that Russia-Ukraine war is ending. This also does not mean that Russia-Ukraine war started on February 24, 2022. It is a well-known fact that current Russia-Ukraine war as an armed conflict began in March 2014.

If we talk about Russia-Ukraine war as a worldview and value phenomenon, we must state that this war began much earlier — several centuries ago. It is a war of empire narratives produced by the Muscovite Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, and the narratives of values of Freedom and Dignity produced by the Cossack State, the Ukrainian People's Republic, and Ukraine. This war should be defined as a semantic war — a hybrid war, a type of cognitive confrontation at the level of states, nations, and individuals. The strategic goal of semantic wars is the (self) destruction of the object of aggression (*Hibrydna viina i zhurnalistyka. Problemy informatsiinoi bezpeky*, 2018, pp. 143-144).

The semantic Russia-Ukraine war unfolds not only in the temporal dimension, but also in the spatial one, because the confrontation of narratives and values extends beyond the borders of Russia and Ukraine. The potential recipients/victims of imperial Russian narratives are the inhabitants of most countries of the world. The confrontation of narratives unfolds also in the scientific dimension, affecting political science, sociology, history, theology, geography and other fields of academic knowledge.

In early 2024, the statement that the victory of Ukraine in the modern Russia-Ukraine war and the victory of civilization in a more global dimension will be final only under the conditions of the destruction of Russian imperial narratives, which still have considerable influence on the public opinion of some countries of the world, seems to be indisputable.

Goals and objectives. The purpose of the presented research is to consider the worldview and value dimension of the modern Russia-Ukraine war by means of analyzing the most common Russian imperial narratives. The research involves the following tasks:

- 1) substantiation of the imperial nature of the narratives used to justify armed aggression against Ukraine;
- 2) historical analysis of the genesis and development of Russian imperial narratives;
- 3) consideration of the wars of memory and the culture of mutual understanding — two opposite strategies of strengthening or destroying certain narratives — as the basis of identities.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Undoubtedly, representatives of social and humanitarian sciences have been

interested in the study of narratives for decades. A significant part of the research is dedicated to the systematization of basic approaches to narrative analysis within linguistics, literary studies, and art studies (Turner, 1996; Dintselbakhera, 2004). Ukrainian scientists systematized main approaches to narrative analysis and this systematization was used in the preparation of this research (Huk & Bekhta, 2020). A separate group of scientific works includes publications that highlight political effects and influences of narratives (Pocheptsov, 2022; Ozhevan, 2016; Fukuiama, 2022).

Both domestic and foreign scientists (Plokhii, 2023; Bezpiatchuk, 2023; Bokach, 2019; Kononenko, 2013; Pavlov, 2022) have studied historical origins of the imperial narratives and their consequences. Along with the general historical analysis of the origins of imperial narratives, it is worth noting the scientific studies dedicated to topical issues of historical memory (Volianiuk, 2018; Babka, 2018; Kultura prymyrennia: nova istorychna svidomist v Ukraini, 2015; Buber, 1994).

Taking into account the importance of countering Russian imperial narratives not only within Ukraine, but also in the countries of Europe and North America, the works of contemporary German researchers were used in the preparation of the research (Schwendemann, 2018; Sommerbauer, 2016; Schlögel, 2022; Sasse, 2022). All these works are united by their authors' awareness of the huge mental failure of Europeans in general and Germans in particular at recognition of Ukrainian identity, which is completely different from the one, presented in Russian narratives. However, the situation changed after February 24, 2022.

Outlining previously unresolved parts of the general problem that the article is dedicated to. In our opinion, the most significant previously unresolved parts of the narrative analysis of the Russian imperial discourse include:

- substantiation of the genocidal nature of the modern Russia-Ukraine war, which was the topic of the author's previous articles as well (Bulbenyuk & Maneliuk «Henotsyd v Ukraini u 2022 r.: oznaky, formy, zaperechennia», 2022; Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii 'ruskoho mira'», 2022);
- modification of Russian imperial narratives under the conditions of digital autocracies development (Gurieva & Treisman, 2019; Bulbeniuk «Polifoniia doslidnytskykh pozytsii shchodo vysvitlennia fenomenu novitnykh avtokratii», 2022);
- memory wars versus the development of the culture of dialogue and understanding.

Research methods. The study of the informational or, in a broader sense, the worldview and communication aspect of the modern Russia-Ukraine war involves the application of interdisciplinary methodology. Along with such general methods as system analysis and comparative-historical analysis, the research involves special scientific methods. Since one of the central categories of our research is the concept of «narrative», it seems logical to apply the methodology of narrative analysis borrowed from literary studies, art studies and linguistic studies. In contrast to these branches of scientific knowledge, which consider the category of «narrative» primarily as a means of developing artistic discourse in modern art and its verbal constructions (Huk & Bekhta, 2020, p. 430), political science analyzes worldview and values presented in the narrative and their effects on public consciousness, public opinion and political behavior (at the level of an individual, group and mass). Therefore, for a researcher who is professional in political sciences, narratives are primarily history and discourse with an emphasis on discourse (according to S. Chatman) and not just the recounting of the stories (Huk & Bekhta, 2020, p. 432). This is the research and methodological basis of the presented study.

Special attention should be paid to the historiographical tradition of research into the genesis of mentality as a complex of ideas inherent in a certain community during a certain historical period/epoch. Within the scope of our research, such methodology is interesting in view of the analysis of collective psychology as a subject of the history of mentality. According to P. Dintselbakher, ideologies as the essence of collective beliefs form a kind of «clothes» on the «mental skin» of a nation. Particular attention in the methodology of the history of mentality is paid to the «mode of perception», which includes the automatic combination of values or judgments (Dintselbakher, 2004, pp. 11, 23). Thus, the task of analyzing the semantic-narrative aspect of the modern Russia-Ukraine war determines the methodological basis of the study.

Results and discussions. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, which began in spring of 2014, has many dimensions: military, historical, informational, civilizational, and value. In our opinion, it is quite symbolic that the main marker of the start of Russia-Ukraine war was the annexation and occupation of Crimea. It is a well-known fact that Crimea has been the arena of changes in civilizations, great migrations of peoples, and the creation of myths and narratives for several millennia. The research is dedicated to the semantic-narrative aspect of Russia-Ukraine war, which manifests itself through the clash of narratives and values. More precisely, it is a struggle of values framed in imperial and counter-imperial narratives.

Narrative (from the Latin «narrare» — to tell, explain in detail) is a complex linguistic phenomenon that has a special semantic load with emphasis, depending on the goals, on political, historical, social, economic, cultural, religious, ethnic and other aspects of the formation and development of society and the state. M. Turner considers the narrative as a fundamental tool of thinking (Turner, 1996, p. 4-5).




Figure 1. The nature of narrative.

Compiled by the author.

Within the framework of Russia-Ukraine war, narratives become tools of propaganda and counter-propaganda aimed at both the enemy, and other people not directly involved in the existential struggle. As the Ukrainian expert in the field of information wars and communication technologies H. Pocheptsov notes, «Narrative war is becoming dominant in the information age, when video and media have replaced missiles and shells. Now the one who aims not at the body but at the soul gets victory» (Pocheptsov, 2022).

Some researchers consider confrontation of narratives as a type of strategic communication. Professor M. Ozhevan defines strategic narratives as means by which political actors construct the meanings and essence of «big politics». The scientist points out the ability of strategic narratives to organize the behavior of political actors based on commitment to certain value systems. M. Ozhevan calls such value systems the «body» of a particular narrative (Ozhevan, 2016, p. 30).

We can assert that the narrative war/narrative confrontation on the part of Russia has been going on for several centuries, particularly at the level of values and outlook. The peculiar feature of the most widely spread and rooted narratives about «three brotherly peoples — Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians», «Kyivan (Ancient) Rus as a common cradle», «Moscow as the Third Rome», «Great Russian Culture» and «Great Patriotic War» is their orientation towards the past. Actually, some researchers of the modern Russia-Ukraine war claim that it is the war of the past against the future, where the Russian Federation as an aggressor state is the personification of the archetypal Past, whereas Ukraine as a victim of aggression is a desire for the Future (Plokhii, 2023; Bezpiatchuk, 2023).

Table 1. Opposition of narratives as a type of strategic communication.

NARRATIVE	COUNTER NARRATIVE	ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE
The millennial Russian statehood, the origins of which can be traced back to the statehood of Ancient Russia (Kyivan Rus). The modern Russian Federation is the historical heir to the ancient Russian statehood.	The medieval state of Kyivan (Ancient) Rus is the beginning of the origins of Ukrainian statehood. Kyiv is the "capital city" («stolnyi grad» org.) of Rus, the capital of the restored Ukrainian state.	The state-building origins of modern Ukraine and the Russian Federation are different: Kyivan Rus for Ukraine and the Golden Horde (Ulug Ulus) for Russia. The multi-vector nature of state-building traditions determines opposite geopolitical priorities and orientations in the present.
<i>Toponymy and historiography:</i> • Theophan Prokopovych as the author of the title «Russian Empire», • «History of the Russian State» in 12 volumes by Nikolay Karamzin, • «The History of Russia from the Earliest Times» in 29 volumes by Sergei Solovyov.	<i>Toponymy and historiography:</i> • place names of Kyiv, Chernihiv and other cities of the times (e.g. Golden Gate, Podil, Antoniiv Caves), • «History of Ukraine-Rus» in 10 volumes by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, • «History of Ukraine-Rus» by Mykola Arkas.	Works by contemporary Ukrainian and foreign (including some Russian) historians, political scientists, art historians. <i>The narrative is in the process of being conceptualised.</i>

Compiled by the author.

In fact, even during the period of preparation for the modern Russia-Ukraine war, since 2008, Russian ideologues began to superimpose a multi-layered content context on the narrative about the heroic past/common past. They denied Ukrainian statehood and national history, emphasized the secondary role of Ukrainian culture and language, counterbalanced the common heroic past and the «wretchedness» of Ukraine's independent existence as a failed state, etc. All this was «sold» on the domestic and foreign political markets. At the same time, for the third decade in a row, Russian ideologues and leaders of the Russian Federation have been «selling» narratives about «Russia that was deceived and insulted» exclusively on the domestic market. «Russian President Vladimir Putin talks about the tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union and how Europe and the United States

took advantage of Russia's weakness in the 1990s to bring NATO to its borders», F. Fukuiama rightly notes in the work «Identity. The need for dignity and the politics of grievance» (Fukuiama, 2022, p. 21).

Narratives of «insults» were eagerly accepted by the majority of Russian citizens with an imperial-chauvinist superiority complex that was insurmountable even in the years of the Soviet Union. According to the Polish historian L. Przybyla (Academy of Military Art), Russian society was raised on the «fertile soil» of the ideas of «the Third Rome», on imperial ideology, which form the basis of «imperial madness» (Istoryk: Rosiisko-ukrainska viina — tse mishanyyna elementiv Pershoi i Druhoi svitovoi ta suchasnoi viiny, 2023). So, let us have a little excursion into history.

Metropolitan Zosyma of Moscow and All Russia initiated the idea of «Moscow as the Third Rome» in the preface to his work «Paschal Exposition» (1492). This idea became popular due to the Pskov elder Philotheus (1523–1524) (Kononenko, 2013, p. 146, cited by Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk in «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022). It is important that for centuries this idea had neither a serious spread, nor a paradigmatic substantiation and state support, first from the Muscovite kingdom, and later from the Russian Empire. P. Kononenko points out that the political program of the idea of the «Third Rome» in the Russian Empire and its introduction into public discourse by the imperial will of Alexander II is connected with the geopolitical ambitions of St. Petersburg («The Fourth Rome» or «The Second Constantinople») on Balkans and the weakening of another empire — the Ottoman Empire (Kononenko, 2013, p. 146, cited by Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk in «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022). V. Bokach, a modern Ukrainian researcher, observes, «Imperial ambitions of the modern Russian government and the church are the basis of the ‘Russian Word’» (Bokach, 2019, p. 138, cited by Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk in «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022). Therefore, as we can see, in historical retrospect and in the latest political ambitions, the marginal quasi-ideology of the «Russian Word», openly denying its own marginality, declares overambitious goals:

- to make the Bosphorus and Dardanelles intra-imperial straits;
- to establish and lead the «Slavic World» as the direct opposite of the British World (we cannot help mentioning Anglo-Saxons who were the main enemies of the ideologues of the «Russian Word» in the 19th century and again at the stage of preparation to and during Russia-Ukraine war, which continues until now);

- not only to restore the Soviet Union till its centenary anniversary, but to create a new and unified modern empire (Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022, p. 164).

Table 2. «Russian World» as a quasi-ideology.

CORE VALUE/ IDEAS	DEVELOPMENT STAGES	IDEOLOGISTS/ LEADERS
1. «Moscow as the Third Rome». 2. The «Russian World» as a special civilisation that opposes the declining Western civilisation. 3. Orthodoxy as the spiritual and religious basis of ideology, the Russian Orthodox Church as its main guide. 4. The newest traditionalism, calls to return to the past. 5. «Declaration of Russian Identity», where Russian language is the leading identifier of belonging to the «Russian World».	1. The end of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw the emergence of the concept «Moscow as the Third Rome». 2. Synopsis The Kyivan is a pro-Moscow historical and ideological work, one of the main ideas of which is the continuity of the power of the Moscow princes from the power of the Kyivan princes. 3. The beginning of the eighteenth century saw the transformation of the Muscovy into the Russian Empire. 4. The first quarter of the nineteenth century — the Russian Empire as the «gendarme of Europe». 5. On 30 December 1922, the USSR was formed as a Eurasian quasi-empire. 6. In the late 1940s and 1955, the «socialist camp» was formed and the Warsaw Pact was signed. 7. The mid-1990s saw the conceptualisation of a renewed idea of the «Russian World». 8. February 10, 2007 — Putin's Munich speech.	1. Monk Philotheus. 2. Innokenty Gizel. 3. Theophan Prokopovych/Peter I, Catherine II. 4. Alexander I, Nicholas I. 5. Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin. 6. Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev. 7. Alexander Dugin, Georgy Shchedrovitsky. 8. Vladimir Putin.

Compiled by the author.

It is worth emphasizing that in many ways this idea remained on the sidelines of public journalistic and academic discourse during the 19th and early 20th centuries. During the years of the USSR, for obvious reasons, the narrative «Moscow as the Third Rome» remained exclusively the subject of research by a very narrow group of scientists. The reincarnation of the narrative took place in late 1990s, and its final revival and consecration by both the Kremlin and the church authorities on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church took place after 2008. Today, the narrative «Moscow as the Third Rome» is an important “brick” in an outwardly intact and strong fortress of the quasi-ideology of the «Russian Word» as the value foundation of the modern Russia-Ukraine war, which has all peculiar features of a genocidal war.

Thus, questions arise:

- Why were the ideas of the «Russian Word» attractive to many outside Russia?

- Why don't they lose popularity now — after Bucha, Mariupol, Izyum?

We will try to outline several answers based on the narrative analysis of the value foundation of the modern Russia-Ukraine war.

First, the ideas of the «Russian Word» are potentially attractive to those who are in favor of anti-Americanism worldview. Let us be brave enough to assert that in this case the principle «the enemy of my enemy is my friend» is applied. Therefore, for the defined group of supporters of the «Russian Word» the value foundation of this quasi-ideology is rather on the margins of their worldview and value system.

Secondly, in any society there are individuals and groups of citizens who are inclined to marginal ideologies, projects, and political programs at the national level. Sometimes they feel a thirst for political exoticism, sometimes a desire to break out of the bounds of stereotyping and sometimes they just tell some family stories (a kind of «my grandmother learned Russian on her own in order to read all Dostoevsky's books in the original»). The ideologues of the «Russian Word» successfully use such conscious or unconscious «useful idiots», recruiting them to the ranks of supporters of the narrative «Moscow as the Third Rome».

Thirdly, having virtually unlimited financial resources, Russian ruling class, with the help of ideologues of the «Russian Word», has been successfully re-structuring national political systems of some countries of Old Europe for the past two decades. Being tired of the «old» classical politicians is a phenomenon that is one of the most common in countries with stable democracies and those in the process of democratization. Therefore, the ideologues of the «Russian Word»

took the opportunity to aggregate the interests and energy of the potential protest electorate and articulate this protest in the right way, marginalizing or trying to marginalize political systems of these countries (Bulbenyuk & Manelyuk, «Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideolohii ‘ruskoho mira’», 2022, pp. 167-168).

As mentioned above, the quasi-ideology of the “Russian Word» may seem like a strong fortress from the outside, and the narrative of «great Russian culture» is another «brick» of it. In our opinion, the narrative of «great Russian culture» is used especially cynically after 24 February 2022. Why does the author assert this? The answer is as follows. First, this narrative has deep roots, because we can see its origins as far back as the 19th century. Secondly, in the modern Russia-Ukraine war, the narrative of «great Russian culture» is an effective tool of manipulation and political speculation on the Western political market, which is successfully used by representatives of the ruling class of the Russian Federation, led by V. Putin, as well as opponents of the war from among the Russian opposition and emigrant intellectuals. The narrative of «great Russian culture» has many adherents abroad and totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and modern Russia have always been taking advantage of it. Russia-Ukraine war caused the creation of new modifications of this narrative, in particular the discourses of «cancel culture» and «good Russians».

What does «cancel culture» mean? After the attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, especially after the actual live demonstration and streaming of the consequences of the destruction of Ukrainian cities, villages and towns, we can hear more and more frequently about the collective responsibility of Russian citizens for committing war crimes. Canceling tours of Russian artists, boycotting or banning the participation of Russian artists in international festivals and important events, painful personal sanctions are examples of the «asymmetric reaction» of the «collective West» to the silent consent of the absolute majority of the artistic elite of the aggressor country for the policy of genocide of the Ukrainian people (Bulbeniuk, *Informatsiino-psykholohichni vplyvy ta dydzhytalizatsiia: politolohichniy analiz*, 2022, p. 10).

It is not surprising that in March 2022 discourses about the unethicity and inadmissibility of «cancel culture» were actively spread and popularized by bloggers and «opinion leaders» not only among the Russian population but also among potential readers and viewers abroad. Moreover, the majority of opponents of the «cancel culture» deliberately manipulated and distorted the facts, substituted

the concepts and engaged in outright deception. Social networks Facebook and Twitter (now X), YouTube platform, and messengers became a favorable environment for the deployment of these artificially created discourses. Thus, Russian «opinion leaders», speaking against «cancel culture», appealed in particular to the position of J. Rowling, who became a target of the «cancel culture» policy and signed a letter of protest against «cancel culture» practice together with other 150 public figures in 2020 (JK Rowling criticizes «cancel culture» in open letter signed by 150 public figures, 2020). Instead, in March 2022, the author of «Harry Potter» wrote in response to similar appeals that it might not be appropriate to criticize the Western «cancel culture» by those who currently kill civilians for the crime of resistance or by those who throw in prison and poison their critics. She appealed directly to the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin (JK Rowling hits back at Putin's «cancel culture» comment, 2022, cited by Bulbenyuk, Informatsiino-psykholohichni vplyvy ta dydzhytalizatsiia: politolohichniy analiz, 2022, p. 11). As we can see, the British writer clearly outlined ethical components of the problem and the manipulative effects of the informational and psychological influences of the opponents of the «cancel culture».

In spring of 2022, spread of the «cancel culture» discourse and the issue of Russians as «another victim of the genocide of this war» resulted in another agitation caused by the public opinion in many countries of Europe and North America. Its aim was to spread doubts, to show that not everything was so unequivocal and to reconsider the aggressor and the victim. The shift in emphasis and the equalization of the aggressor and the victim of aggression resulted in the development of a discourse about «good Russians» as an alternative to Putin's militarist regime and the speechless crowd of more than a hundred million people. Starting from March 2022, some representatives of Russian culture, primarily writers, begin to distance themselves publicly from the Russian regime and Russian-Ukrainian war, which is stubbornly called «Putin's». For example, L. Ulytska writes an essay in Spiegel in which she claims, «culture in Russia has suffered a serious defeat» (Schlögel, 2022, p. 43). At the same time, the majority of Russian intellectuals publicly distance themselves from aid to Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Thus, in November 2023, L. Ulytska, V. Yerofeev, and V. Sorokin publicly denied accusations concerning their financial aid to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stressing that they take on exclusively humanitarian position.

During this period, the term «Putin's war» was widely used instead of the term «Russian-Ukrainian war». According to the author, the

discourse of «good Russians», similar to the discourse of «the Russian people as victims of genocide», was initiated by the same ideologues of the «Russian World» or those close to them. It is aimed at diverting the attention of the world community from the facts of genocide of the Ukrainian people, which takes place on the occupied territories of Russia.

It is important to emphasize that the genocide of Ukrainians as a political nation by the Russian Federation has deep historical roots and psychological reasons. For example, O. Pavlov singles out one of these psychological reasons, namely an inferiority complex of Russians and the Russian Federation in relation to Ukrainians and Ukraine and, as a result, the idea of revenge as «one of the main reasons of the Russian war against Ukraine». «A clear sign of this inferiority complex is a desire for revenge, the basis of which is the hateful attitude of the Russian Federation towards the Ukrainian people, who do not want to be under the influence of a “friendly neighbor». An appropriate punishment was also chosen — a «special military operation», with its mythical goals of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine», emphasizes O. Pavlov (Pavlov, 2022, p. 133, cited in Bulbeniuk & Maneliuk, *Henotsyd v Ukraini u 2022 r.: oznaky, formy, zaperechennia*, 2022).

It is important that not only Ukrainian researchers substantiate the genocidal nature of the modern Russia-Ukraine war. For example, a German researcher H. Saase, who is the author of the book «War against Ukraine. Background, Events, Consequences», wrote in late 2022, «The scale of destruction and war crimes committed by Russian troops, as well as Russia’s offer to all Ukrainians to accept Russian citizenship, leave no doubt as to what Russia under President Vladimir Putin is striving for — the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation» (Saase, 2022, Vorwort).




Figure 2. Models of historical memory.

Compiled by the author.

The struggle of historical memories as a kind of confrontation between the narratives of imperialism on the part of Russia and freedom on the part of Ukraine has always been a non-force instrument of «punishment». Historical memory and its political components are, primarily, not about the past and not even about the present, but about the future. The foundation of the policy of historical memory is the culture of memory. «The culture of memory is a policy that involves different ways of constructing the past, including dealing with an embarrassing heritage, comprehending certain historical events and personal experience that form an alternative view of conventional history, legitimized by one or another political regime» (Vaits, 2023). The concept of «culture of memory» was defined and explained by the curators of the exhibition of modern Ukrainian art, which was held at the Albertinum Museum of Fine Arts (Dresden, Germany), and where one of the four themes was «Culture of Memory». The exhibition became the first of its kind in Germany; its main goal was to tell about the past and present of Ukraine, about the struggle of its people for freedom and independence. The exhibition took place from early May to September 10, 2023 (Vaits, 2023). In our opinion, the exhibition is one of the successful practices of resisting Russia's imperial historical narratives; it aims to promote the concept of Ukrainian national identity beyond Ukraine.

The aggression of the Russian Federation since the beginning of 2022 proved how important it is to expand the influence of the historical memory strategy. O. Volianiuk notes that «the conceptual apparatus of modern political science in general and memory studies in particular clearly needs to be expanded in light of modern challenges of simulated democracy and «shaking» foundations of national and international security. For example, for several consecutive years, social humanitarians from all over the world, following philologists, have been discussing the phenomenon of «post-truth» circumstances in politics» (Volianiuk, 2018, p. 89).

V. Babka notes, «The characteristic features of the policy of memory are its immanence in the political system, inclusion in the humanitarian strategy of the state, and focus on the current needs and values of society» (Babka, 2018, p. 203). As we can see, the policy of historical memory can and should be a part of the national humanitarian strategy, forming the worldview foundations for the development of a political nation as a basis for strengthening its sovereignty. Under the conditions of the deployment of a hybrid war and the transformation of political manipulation into an instrument of undermining state sovereignty, the importance of the policy of historical memory is

difficult to overestimate. Moreover, it is the distortion of historical facts that becomes the weapon in the hybrid war, which is designed to provide justification for, let us say, theses about the «artificial nature of Ukrainian statehood» or the «inauthenticity of the Ukrainian language».

The uniqueness of Ukraine's experience in regard to historical memory and its components such as wars of memory and the culture of understanding is that our country has not fully understood the tragic essence of the past, but once again faced serious geopolitical and civilizational challenges, as well as ethical challenges. Our enemy — the Russian Federation — uses the tools of memory wars in a real war — the biggest war in Europe since the end of World War II. In addition, the toolkit of memory wars is used by Russia with the aim of dehumanizing Ukrainians in the temporal dimension: by distorting and downplaying the participation of Ukrainians in the Second World War and in modern world political processes.

The wars of memory as a conflict of narratives and as a clash between the values of imperialism, on the one hand, and the values of freedom and dignity, on the other, pose a great threat to Ukraine. We are talking about the threat of deepening value, worldview, historical-retrospective splits within Ukrainian society, which, under the conditions of wartime trauma, perceives any differences in the interpretation of events and figures of the past and present particularly painfully. Therefore, the challenges created by the memory wars raise extremely difficult questions for Ukrainian society and, above all, for Ukrainian intellectuals. The following questions, in our opinion, are the most acute and urgent:

- Is it necessary now, during the «hot» phase of the war, to start a public dialogue regarding the need to form a culture of understanding in post-war Ukraine? If so, what principles should it be based on?
- How should we basically rethink our past of recent centuries — as post-colonial, post-totalitarian, post-modernist etc.?
- Should the state and its institutions intervene in the process of rethinking the national past? If so, what should be the limits of such intervention?

Difficult questions that require a very careful and thoughtful approach to finding answers, especially considering the war of worldviews and values as a part of Russia-Ukraine war. Therefore, we consider it necessary to take into account the experience of other nations with great traumas of the past. In our opinion, the research-intellectual and personal experience of the German and Israeli philosopher, the founder of dialogue philosophy, M. Buber, was

unique. The main postulate of the philosopher was the idea of dialogue as a special form of communication between people, which opens eyes and helps to overcome what separates people (Buber, 1962). M. Buber himself tried to act in accordance with the postulates of the philosophy of dialogue, establishing a dialogue with Germans after the World War II (Schwendemann, 2018).

Undoubtedly, the experience of M. Buber should not be idealized, and even the very attempts to establish a dialogue between Jews and Germans in the first post-war decades caused indignation rather than favorable reviews. However, we believe that this experience should be studied, taking into account positive practice of developing the philosophy of dialogue during the 1980s — early 21st century. During this period, among German intellectuals, the idea of dialogue grew into the concept of forgiveness: «vergeben» (German) as «forgiveness of sins» and «verzeihen» (German) as an «ethical category», forgiveness as an ethical time. Starting from the 1980s and 1990s, these categories became the subject of consideration by social philosophers in Germany. As V. Rauen notes, «forgiveness means rejection». As a rejection of revenge, it is the starting point of ethical time. Such forgiveness makes the restoration of the previous time possible and is interned in the context of the guilt of consecutive historical time. This creates conditions for new ethical actions, which are not determined by the previously committed crime, but which form the basis for joint existence» (Kultura prymyrennia: nova istorychna svidomist v Ukraini, 2015, pp. 47-49).

We deliberately emphasize the importance of reinterpreting the World War II by abandoning memory wars in favor of a culture of dialogue and understanding on the example of Germany, because one of the central narratives used by the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine, starting in 2014, is about the «Great Patriotic War». It is significant that not only Ukrainian researchers pay attention to the manipulative nature of this narrative. In the book «The Ukrainian War. Behind the front line of the European conflict», German researcher J. Sommerbauer observes, «Nevertheless, the propaganda campaign is primarily a war of words. In Russian mass media, they constantly talk about a «punitive operation» in Kyiv — a Soviet-era phrase that was once used to accuse anti-Soviet partisans» (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 175). As we can see, even in the period of 2014-2021, Russian propaganda widely used the labels «punishers» and «Banderite fascists», awakening Russians' historical memory of the biggest criminals — «German fascists».

It is important that the «Great Patriotic War» narrative is aimed at achieving several goals of Russian propaganda.

First, it strives to show to Russian and foreign citizens that Ukrainian military people — participants of the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation lasting for the period of 2014-2018) and the Operation of the United Forces (for the period of 2018-2021) — are the same as «fascists». They are described as «occupiers of the freedom-loving Donbas» who commit crimes similar to the crimes of the Nazis in the occupied territories of Europe during the World War II. «And in Donbas, where the Soviet Union dominates, the fight against «fascism» is a «fair cause» for the recipients of Russian news, participants/readers of Russian and pro-Russian publics in social networks», emphasizes Y. Sommerbauer (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 176). The researcher concluded that the symbolic duel between «bad» Ukrainian «fascists» and «good» pro-Russian «anti-fascists» outside the borders of the Russian Federation, primarily in Europe, acquired «a certain interpretive sovereignty» (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 176).

Secondly, the use of the «Great Patriotic War» narrative made it possible to dehumanize Ukrainian military personnel in the eyes of the majority of Russian citizens during 2014-2021. What is more, after February 24, 2022, it has been contributing to the dehumanization of all Ukrainians, including the civilian population. Actually, after the «Ukrainian punishers» and «Banderite fascists» in 2014-2021, during the last two years we have seen «legitimate military targets» in Ukrainian cities and villages: residential buildings, schools and universities, hospitals.

Thirdly, the narrative of the «Great Patriotic War», which became a tool in the hybrid war of the Russian Federation against the democracies of the world, contributed to the spread of the conviction in the political consciousness of the «collective West» and the «collective East» that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were as invincible as the former army of the USSR in 1945. We must state that this task was quite successfully completed, taking into account constant fluctuations of public opinion of the «collective West» and government officials and constant calls for the need for negotiations.

Thus, one of the essential dimensions of the modern Russia-Ukraine war is the dimension of war/confrontation of narratives. This is not accidental. According to the author, it is a consequence of the transformation of modern autocracies into digital autocracies. The ruling class of the Russian Federation, adopting the experience of introducing digital totalitarianism in China, modifying the propaganda practices of the USSR and having sufficient financial capabilities, has been gradually moving in the direction of constructing its own model of digital autocracy over the past two decades.

The authors of the theory of information (digital) autocracy S. Guriev and D. Treisman call it one of the most common and most promising models of modern authoritarian and hybrid regimes. In an informational autocracy, the bet is on the representation of one's power as the most competent, as well as on the co-optation of the most informed strata of the population. The information component becomes no less important than the personal component. Informatization penetrates all components of the state system: from law enforcement agencies (police, army, special services) to the involvement (collaboration) of the best representatives of the information elite and «opinion leaders» (Guriev & Treisman, 2019, cited by Bulbeniuk, Polifoniia doslidnytskykh pozytsii shchodo vysvitlennia fenomenu novitnikh avtokratii, 2022).

One of the main tools of the information autocracy and the war of narratives is blurring the boundaries between fact and fiction, when it is not important whether a certain event/series of events happened in reality; the main thing is to blur the very picture of reality and create a «new reality» (Sommerbauer, 2016, p. 178). Constructing a «new reality» presupposes the formation and promotion of imperial narratives, each of which appeals to historical events/figures/phenomena while at the same time denying Ukraine's right to statehood.

Promotion and spread of imperial narratives is supported by the fact that modern identity is impermanent (Fukuizama, p. 156). The blurring of identity boundaries is different in autocracies and democracies.

In autocracies, assimilation is the main method. Using the example of Russia's imperial narratives, we can see how assimilation blurs the boundaries of identity through the idea of «three brotherly nations» and the formation of a «single Russian people». The policy of Russification and the declaration of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages as «dialects» of the Russian language, the relegation of both languages to the margins of scientific linguistics over the 19th and 20th centuries, attempts to unify religious life are the tools of assimilation that were actively implemented in the Russian Empire and the USSR. Currently, they are being implemented by Russia in the occupied territories of Ukraine and Belarus.

In democracies, blurring the boundaries of identity is the policy of multiculturalism and tolerance. Ukraine, having embarked on the path of European integration, will not be able to ignore these two important components of the new identity policy. At the same time, European countries should also reject the overt and latent imperial Russian narratives in the perception of Ukrainians, Ukrainian culture and

language, and Ukrainian history. It is with regret that we have to state that in some places these narratives still determine the attitude towards Ukrainians and Ukraine, influencing the adoption of certain political and administrative decisions. It should be noted that the values of multiculturalism and tolerance are produced when the very idea of the identity of a particular nation has been formed, when a nation is present on the mental map of other nations and they recognize its specific identity. In the case when the mechanisms of imperial assimilation in relation to Ukrainians has had an impact on mental maps of Europeans for several centuries, it is actually unrealistic to talk about the perception of Ukrainians as bearers of a specific and different from Russians identity.

«In Germany, in particular, people are used to believing that Ukrainians are part of «Russia», the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union and that they speak a language that is something like a subtype of Russian», a German researcher K. Schlögel wrote in the preface to his book «Decisions in Kyiv. Ukrainian lessons» (Schlögel, 2022, p. 9). The researcher of Slavic studies, who made a long trip to Ukraine, contributed to his book, the first edition of which was published in 2015. He notes with regret that until the end of February 2022, Ukraine and Ukrainians did not exist on the mental map of the absolute majority of Germans; that Germans felt guilty for the crimes of Nazism exclusively before Russians («Ruskiye»). All this was the result of V. Putin's successful information war, «Putin's media people are familiar not only with the idiom of postmodernism, but also with the values of Holy Rus» (Schlögel, 2022, pp. 38, 40). K. Schlögel's conclusion is that the modern Russia-Ukraine war is a war with the very idea of Freedom (Schlögel, 2022).

Another German researcher, H. Saase, actually repeats the opinion of K. Schlögel, noting that until February 24, 2022, Ukraine and Ukrainians did not actually exist on the mental map of the average European (Saase, 2022, p. 11). H. Saase states that the unexpected strength of Ukraine, demonstrated in 2022, the recognition of the strength of the Ukrainian state by Europeans is a consequence of the distorted image of our state and Ukrainians, formed, among other things, by the efforts of Russian propaganda. Answering the question «Why did this war break out? Why now?» H. Saase points to neo-imperial state ideology as the basis of motivation for Russia-Ukraine war (Saase, 2022, pp. 12, 16).

Conclusions.

The role and place of imperial narratives in unfolding the modern Russia-Ukraine war is difficult to overestimate. Imperial narratives

actually appear as the supporting structures or the worldview and mental backbone of Russia-Ukraine war, which has a genocidal nature.

In the era of post-truth and complete digitalization, there has been a modification of Russian imperial narratives and the increase of their influence. The information (digital) autocracy that has taken hold in Russia and has many features similar to China's digital totalitarianism is quite successful in using imperial narratives for both Russians and foreigners. The discourse of memory wars remains dominant in the promotion of Russian imperial narratives, especially in external political, cultural, and academic communities. The leading feature of Russian imperial narratives is their exclusive focus on the past.

What can effectively counter the influence of Russian imperial narratives as a weapon in modern Russia-Ukraine war? In author's opinion, alternative (pro-) Ukrainian narratives can become such a tool. They are based on the national version of historical memory formed in the result of the culture of dialogue and understanding, as well as on the recognition of the core values of freedom and dignity in the worldview system of the Ukrainian state and society.

ВИКОРИСТАНІ ДЖЕРЕЛА

1. Бабка, В. (2018) Політика пам'яті: спроба теоретичного синтезу, моделі впровадження та роль у перехідному суспільстві. *Наукові записки. Інститут політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І. М. Кураса НАН України*, Вип. 6 (74), 201-215.

2. Безп'ятчук, Ж. (2023) Тімоті Снайдер: «Під час нинішньої війни Путін говорив відверто нацистські речі. *BBC News. Україна*, 10 вересня. <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c6bpdpr9x23vo>

3. Бокач, В. (2019) «Русский мир» як антиукраїнська релігійно-політична концепція. *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія філософсько-політологічні студії*, Вип. 24, 134–140.

4. Бульбенюк, С. С. (2022) Інформаційно-психологічний вплив та діджиталізація: політологічний аналіз. Матеріали Всеукраїнського круглого столу «Трансформація українського суспільства в цифрову еру» (м. Одеса, 25 березня 2022 р.). Одеса, 97 с., 8-13.

5. Бульбенюк, С. С., Манелюк, Ю. М. (2022) Геноцид в Україні у 2022 р. ознаки, форми, заперечення. *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія філософсько-політологічні студії*, Вип. 44, 220-227. http://fps-visnyk.lnu.lviv.ua/archive/44_2022/27.pdf

6. Бульбенюк, С. С., Манелюк, Ю. М. (2022) Системна маргіналізація як завдання і наслідок впливу квазіідеології «руського міра». *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія філософсько-політологічні студії*, Вип. 42, 163-169. http://fps-visnyk.lnu.lviv.ua/archive/42_2022/21.pdf

7. Бульбенюк, С. С. (2022) Поліфонія дослідницьких позицій щодо висвітлення феномену новітніх автократій. *Актуальні проблеми філософії та соціології*, № 34, 47-51. http://apfs.nuoua.od.ua/archive/34_2022/8.pdf
8. Вайц, В. (2023) У Дрездені відкрилася виставка сучасного мистецтва України. *DW*, 05.05. <https://www.dw.com/uk/u-drezdeni-vidkrilasa-vistavka-sucasnogo-ukrainskogo-mistectva/a-65533062>
9. Воляннюк, О. Я. (2018) Меморіальна пропаганда : спроба концептуалізації поняття. *Науковий часопис НПУ імені М. П. Драгоманова*, Вип. 24, 88-93.
10. Гук, О.-М. І., Бехта, І. А. (2020) Поняття наративного аналізу і основні підходи. *Молодий вчений*, листопад, № 11 (87), 430-435.
11. Дінцельбахер, П. (Ред). (2004) *Історія європейської ментальності*. Пер. з нім. Львів : Літопис, 720 с.
12. Жадько, В. О. (Red.). (2018) *Гібридна війна і журналістика. Проблеми інформаційної безпеки* : навчальний посібник. Київ : Видавництво НПУ імені М. П. Драгоманова, 356 с.
13. Історик (2023): Російсько-українська війна — це мішанина елементів Першої і Другої світової війни та сучасної війни. *Polskie Radio*, 28.02. <http://surl.li/rahxс>
14. Кононенко, В. П. (2013) Третій Рим. *Енциклопедія історії України*. 10 Т-Я. Київ : Наукова думка, 784 с., 146.
15. *Культура примирення : нова історична свідомість в Україні*. (2015) Одеса : Фенікс, 274 с.
16. Ожеван, М. (2016) Глобальна війна стратегічних наративів : виклики та ризики для України. *Стратегічні комунікації*, № 4 (41), 30-40.
17. Павлов, О. І. (2022) Помста як комплекс меншовартості та чинник російської війни проти України (2014-2022 року). *Актуальні проблеми філософії та соціології*, № 36, 130-135.
18. Плохій, С. (2023) *Російсько-українська війна. Повернення історії*. Київ : KSD, 400 с.
19. Почепцов, Г. (2022) Не читайте чужих наративів. *Укрінформ*, 18.10. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3596443-ne-citajte-cuzih-narativiv.html>
20. Фукуяма, Ф. (2022) *Ідентичність. Потреба в гідності і політика скривдженості*. Пер. з англ. Київ : Наш формат, 192 с.
21. Buber, M. [1962] (1994) *Das dialogische Prinzip*.
22. Guriev, S. & Treisman, D. (2019) *A Theory of Informational Autocracy* (April, 3). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335016686_A_Theory_of_Informational_Autocracy

23. JK Rowling criticizes «cancel culture» in open letter signed by 150 public figuresю. (2020) *CNBC*, Jily 8. <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/08/jk-rowling-cancel-culture.html>
24. JK Rowling hits back at Putin's «cancel culture» comment. (2022) *BBC*, 25 March. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60878133>
25. Sasse, G. (2022) *Der krieg gegen die Ukraine*. Hintergründe, Ereignisse, Folgen, C.H. Beck, 303 s.
26. Schlögel, K. (2022) *Entscheidung in Kiew. Ukrainische Lektionen*. Carl Hanser Verlag, 384 s.
27. Schwendemann, W. (2018) «Ich habe keine Lehre, aber ich führe ein Gespräch». Einführung in Ich und Du von Martin Buber. *Folgezeitschrift des «Freiburger Rundbriefs (Neue Folge)», № ½, 10-20.*
28. Sommerbauer, J. (2016) *Die Ukraine im Krieg. Hinter den Frontlinien eines europäischen konflikts*. K&S, 208 s.
29. Turner, M. (1996) *The Literary Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 187 p.

REFERENCES

1. Babka, V. (2018) Polityka pamiaty : sprobа teoretychnoho syntezy, modeli vprovadzhennia ta rol u perekhidnomu suspilstvi. [Policy of memory : an attempt of theoretical synthesis, models of implementation and the role in transition society]. *Naukovi zapysky. Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy*, Vyp. 6 (74), 201-215. [in Ukrainian]
2. Bezpiatchuk, Zh. (2023) Timoti Snaider: «Pid chas nynishnoi viiny Putin hovoryv vidverto natsystski rechi». [During the current war, Putin has said openly Nazi things]. *BBC News. Ukraina*, 10 veresnia. <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c6pdrp9x23vo> [in Ukrainian]
3. Bokach, V. (2019) «Russkyi myr» yak antyukrainska relihiino-politychna kontseptsia. [“Russian Peace” as an anti-Ukrainian religious and political concept]. *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriiа filosofsko-politologichni studii*, Vyp. 24, 134–140. [in Ukrainian]
4. Buber, M. [1962] (1994) Das dialogische Prinzip. [The Dialogue Principle]. [in German]
5. Bulbeniuk, S. S. (2022) Informatsiino-psykhologichni vplyvy ta dydzhitalizatsiia : politologichniy analiz. [Information and psychological influences and digitalization: a political science analysis]. *Materialy Vseukrainskoho kruhloho stolu «Transformatsiia ukrainskoho suspilstva v tsyfrovu eru»* (m. Odesa, 25 bereznia 2022 r.). Odesa, 97 s., 8-13. [in Ukrainian]
6. Bulbeniuk, S. S. & Maneliuk, Yu. M. (2022) Henotsyd v Ukraini u 2022 r. : oznaky, formy, zaperechennia. [Genocide in Ukraine in 2022: signs, forms, and denials]. *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriiа filosofsko-politologichni*

studii, № 44, 220-227. http://fps-visnyk.lnu.lviv.ua/archive/44_2022/27.pdf [in Ukrainian]

7. Bulbeniuk, S. S. & Maneliuk, Yu. M. (2022) Systemna marhinalizatsiia yak zavdannia i naslidok vplyvu kvaziideologii «ruskoho mira». [Systemic marginalization as a task and consequence of the influence of the quasi-ideology of the “Russian Word”]. *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriiia filosofsko-politologichni studii*, № 42, 163-169. http://fps-visnyk.lnu.lviv.ua/archive/42_2022/21.pdf [in Ukrainian]

8. Bulbeniuk, S. S. (2022) Polifoniia doslidnytskykh pozytsii shchodo vysvitlennia fenomenu novitnikh avtokratii. [Polyphony of research positions on the phenomenon of modern autocracies]. *Aktualni problemy filosofii ta sotsiologii*, № 34, 47-51. http://apfs.nuoua.od.ua/archive/34_2022/8.pdf [in Ukrainian]

9. Dintselbakher, P. (Red). (2004) *Istoriia yevropeiskoi mentalnosti*. [History of European mentality]. Per. z nim. Lviv: Litopys, 2004, 720 s. [in Ukrainian]

10. Fukuiaima, F. (2022) *Identychnist. Potreba v hidnosti i polityka skryvdzhenosti*. [Identity. The need for dignity and the policy of offence]. Per. z anhl. Kyiv: Nash format, 192 s. [in Ukrainian]

11. Guriev, S. & Treisman, D. (2019) *A Theory of Informational Autocracy* (April, 3). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335016686_A_Theory_of_Informational_Autocracy [in English]

12. Huk, O.-M.I. & Bekhta, I.A. (2020) Poniattia naratyvnoho analizu i osnovni pidkhody. [The concept of narrative analysis and the main approaches]. *«Molodyi vchenyi»*, lystopad, № 11 (87), 430-435. [in Ukrainian]

13. Istoryk: Rosiisko-ukrainska viina — tse mishanyyna elementiv Pershoi i Druhoi svitovoi ta suchasnoi viiny (2023). [Historian: Russian-Ukrainian war is a mixture of elements of the First and Second World Wars and modern warfare]. *Polskie Radio*, 28.02. <http://surl.li/paxxc> [in Ukrainian]

14. JK Rowling criticizes «cancel culture» in open letter signed by 150 public figures. (2020) *CNBC*, Jily 8. <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/08/jk-rowling-cancel-culture.html> [in English]

15. JK Rowling hits back at Putin's «cancel culture» comment. (2022) *BBC*, 25 March. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60878133> [in English]

16. Kononenko, V. P. (2013) Tretii Rym. [The Third Rome]. *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*. T. 10 T-Ya. Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 784 s., 146. [in Ukrainian]

17. *Kultura prymyrennia: nova istorychna svidomist v Ukraini*. (2015) [Culture of reconciliation: a new historical consciousness in Ukraine]. Odesa: Feniks, 274 s. [in Ukrainian & German]

18. Ozhevan, M. (2016) Hlobalna viina stratehichnykh naratyviv: vyklyky ta ryzyky dlia Ukrainy. [The global war of strategic narratives: challenges and risks for Ukraine]. *Stratehichni komunikatsii*, № 4 (41), 30-40. [in Ukrainian]
19. Pavlov, O. I. (2022) Pomsta yak kompleks menshovartosti ta chynnyk rosiiskoi viiny proty Ukrainy (2014-2022 roky). [Revenge as an inferiority complex and a factor in the Russian war against Ukraine (2014-2022)]. *Aktualni problemy filosofii ta sotsiologii*, № 36, 130-135. [in Ukrainian]
20. Plokhii, S. (2023) *Rosiisko-ukrainska viina. Povernennia istorii*. [The Russian-Ukrainian War. The return of history]. Kyiv: KSD, 400 s. [in Ukrainian]
21. Pocheptsov, H. (2022) Ne chytaite chuzhykh naratyviv. [Do not read other people's narratives]. *Ukrinform*, 18.10. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3596443-ne-citajte-cuzih-narativiv.html> [in Ukrainian]
22. Sasse, G. (2022) *Der krieg gegen die Ukraine*. [The war against Ukraine]. Hintergründe, Ereignisse, Folgen, C.H. Beck, 303 s. [in German]
23. Schlögel, K. (2022) *Entscheidung in Kiew. Ukrainische Lektionen*. [Decision in Kiev. Ukrainian lessons]. Carl Hanser Verlag, 384 s. [in German]
24. Schwendemann, W. (2018) «Ich habe keine Lehre, aber ich führe ein Gespräch». Einführung in Ich und Du von Martin Buber. [“I have no teaching, but I have a conversation”. Introduction to “You and I” by Martin Buber]. *Folgezeitschrift des «Freiburger Rundbriefs (Neue Folge)»*, № ½, 10-20. [in German]
25. Sommerbauer, J. (2016) *Die Ukraine im Krieg. Hinter den Frontlinien eines europäischen konflikts*. [Ukraine at war. Behind the front lines of European conflicts]. K&S, 208 s. [in German]
26. Turner, M. (1996) *The Literary Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 187 p. [in English]
27. Vaits, V. (2023) U Drezdeni vidkrylasia vystavka suchasnoho mystetstva Ukrainy. [An exhibition of contemporary Ukrainian art was opened in Dresden]. *DW*, 05.05. <https://www.dw.com/uk/u-drezdeni-vidkrilasa-vistavka-sucasnoho-ukrainskogo-mistectva/a-65533062> [in Ukrainian]
28. Volianiuk, O. Ya. (2018) Memorialna propahanda : sprobha kontseptualizatsii poniattia. [Memorial propaganda: an attempt to conceptualise the concept]. *Naukovyi chasopys NPU imeni M. P. Drahomanova*, Vyp. 24, 88-93. [in Ukrainian]
29. Zhadko, V. O. (Red.). (2018) *Hibrydna viina i zhurnalistyka. Problemy informatsiinoi bezpeky : navchalnyi posibnyk*. [Hybrid warfare and journalism. Problems of information security]. Kyiv: Vyd-vo NPU imeni M. P. Drahomanova, 356 s. [in Ukrainian]